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GOD INFINITE AND REASON

CONCERNING THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD

BY

WILLIAM J. BROSNAN, S.J., Ph.D.

Professor of Natural Theology

Woodstock College

Woodstock, Maryland



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INTRODUCTION

God Infinite and Reason is a continuation of the scientific study of God, under the guidance of reason, which was begun in *God and Reason,* published some years since. The demonstrated conclusions we there reached, after having examined and explicitly disproved many of the older and more modern erroneous views concerning God, were that there exists a God, and only one God, who is the one, and only possible one, unproduced, and, hence, self-existing and necessarily existing, Being; the intelligent and personal first cause and ruler of all other existing beings, including man; a Being whose nature demands of His intelligent subjects that they should know Him, reverence Him, adore Him, serve Him.

What advance beyond this conclusion the present work makes, in further developing our concept of this Supreme Being is told in its opening chapter. As it is, however, a reasoned advance, and hence presupposes a knowledge of the matter it supplements, it is but natural to conclude that a readier and surer grasp and fuller understanding of the questions it treats will be had by one who has given time and thought to the study of *God and Reason.*

In this connection it may be well to state that not only *God and Reason* but the present work also has been written for thoughtful private or classroom study and not for casual or cursory reading. With this end in view the matter in both works has been developed in thesis-form, terms requiring definition have been precisely defined, and the syllogism has been used in proofs and in the presentation and solution of difficulties. For although a less formal style of treatment would have made for easier and pleasanter reading it would not have lent itself as readily, as the style adopted, to the clear-cut, accurate and orderly definition of terms, development of proofs and handling of difficulties, so necessary in a philosophical work designed for serious study.

The above remarks will make it immediately evident, to one who has any knowledge at all of the trend of present-day philosophy, that neither *God and Reason* nor the present work is likely to make

any appeal to the modern philosopher. That they should do so is well-nigh impossible. The preventing obstacle, however, is not merely the form in which their matter is cast, which, though an obstacle, is not a serious one, but the false theory of knowledge on which modern philosophy is all but universally built. For independently altogether of the form of treatment, it is almost impossible to conceive how any philosophical treatise, which is based, as ours is, on the immediately evident conviction that intellectual truth is measured by an objective norm, that objects existing outside and independently of the thinker can be truly cognized, and that the logical conclusions of reason are of real worth, can meet the run of modern philosophers on any common ground at all.

The minimum possible ground would seem to be some common system of knowledge. The modern philosopher, however, quite generally, explicitly rejects each one of the principles of knowledge above enunciated. He will not admit an objective norm of intellectual truth; he will not admit in any true sense either sense-knowledge or intellectual knowledge of a world external to, and existing independently of, the thinker; he will not admit, even when he professes some kind of realism, the legitimate conclusions of reason to be of any real worth, at least in those matters which are of the highest importance to man, those, namely, which have to do with religion and morality. And in this last regard he is particularly explicit and emphatic, citing not infrequently only Kant's *ipse dixit* as his reason, in rejecting all the traditional proofs for the existence of God.

If we consider, now, the substitutes for reason, in furnishing the foundation of faith and religion, which modern philosophy offers, and the resulting chaos into which it has been thrown by their use, we shall see still more clearly how it is utterly opposed to any reasoned study of God. These substitutes are many and "variously named." They lie, we are told, "beyond reason or deeper than reason."

Hocking, in *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*,[1] says:

"Our current science of religion may now assume without too much discussion that the grounds of religion are supra-rational or sub-rational,

[1] Pp. v, vi.

. . . deeper than reason or any work of reason. But a vague territory is this Beyond-reason or Deeper-than-reason. Once singly named Faith, now it has many names—instinct, the sub-conscious, the co-conscious, feeling, will, value-judgment, social sense, intuition, mystic reason, perhaps *l'élan vital*—as its border is touched in various scientific excursions."

And Durant Drake, in his article, "Seekers after God," [2] writing in full accord with the attack of present-day philosophy on the God of "the cut-and-dried conception of mediæval and modern orthodoxy" says:

"If there is less avowed atheism today (and certainly atheism is less blatant, if perhaps more widespread), it is because it seems now rather needless to be an atheist. There are so many conceptions of God afloat that any one at all widely read can scarcely fail to find one suited to his mental outlook and convictions."

In other words, modern philosophy tells us that the god it wants is not a "cut-and-dried" one, but one who will fit in with each individual's tastes and desires, and, hence, as "the God of the future is in the making," if you cannot find a ready-made god to suit you, then make your own god.

Now, this is just what the modern philosopher judges he has a right to do, and is doing. Evidence of the fact meets one on all sides. The article of Professor Drake just cited witnesses to it. He even goes so far as to say that it is doubtful "if many today really believe in the grim potter-God of St. Paul", and that the modern gods are, in all probability, truer than the God of the "Fourth Gospel."

Another recent writer, Professor Otto, of the Department of Philosophy, Wisconsin University, devotes one chapter of his book, *Things and Ideals*, to "The World and the God-makers." He calls attention to the movement among present-day philosophers, which "is a self-conscious determination to dethrone the God of our fathers, and to replace him by a God elected on a platform of approved social and political ideals." And he adds, justifying the movement: "The disfavor into which the God of our fathers has fallen was perhaps inevitable anyway (for humanity was on the

[2] The *Harvard Theological Review*, Jan., 1919.

point of outgrowing the ethics of its deity), but it was precipitated and intensified by the war." [3]

Professor Beckwith, Professor of Christian Theology, Chicago Theological Seminary, also, throughout his work, *The Idea of God,* reveals the activities of the modern god-makers. What is more, he fully believes that a man has a right to fashion his god to suit his changing mode of life and subjective needs. He tells us, in one of his many similar statements, that [4]

> "What is required is some conception of God which shall make him real, attractive and helpful. . . . The historic creeds do not answer here. . . . An idea of God which suffices for one people cannot answer for another people at the same time or at another age of the world, nor indeed for the same people at a further age in its own history."

As a consequence, Professor Beckwith, led by the conviction that the God of "the historic creeds" "does not interpret the world to the modern man," adds to the long list of man-made gods one of his own making, who seems, to Professor Beckwith at least, to serve that purpose.

It must not, however, be supposed for a moment that these god-makers, who think that a changing world demands a changing god, are so foolish as to believe that they are making for themselves a real god. That is not their purpose. They are quite satisfied with a god who is nothing but a personified variable ideal, that fits in somehow with the kind of interpretation they choose to give to whatever objective world they admit, and also, and principally, with their own subjective inconstant moods and desires. Dr. Harry Emerson Fosdick in a review, in the *Saturday Review of Literature,*[5] of Julian Huxley's *Religion Without Relevation,* calls attention to this modern movement to make religion the cult of a personal ideal, dignified with the name of god; a movement which is an affirmative answer of the modern philosopher to the question put by Professor Drake, in the article mentioned above, "Are we to turn with renewed zeal to religion but free it more and more from theolatry?" These modern god-makers have freed it from God-worship. Their god is not God.

[3] P. 248. [4] Pp. 32, 17. [5] Jan. 14, 1928.

Dr. Fosdick writes:

"*Religion Without Revelation* is also the work of an agnostic [Julian Huxley is the grandson of the well-known agnostic, Thomas Huxley], of one, indeed, who definitely discards belief in a personal God of any sort whatever and pleads for 'the liberation of the idea of God from the shackles of personality which have been riveted on it.' . . .

"Indeed, whether one agree with the author's position or not, one who wishes a deep insight into a most considerable movement in religious thinking today would do well to read Professor Huxley's book. In America we call the movement humanism. If the word God in an objective sense is allowed at all, as Professor Huxley occasionally uses it, it means Cosmic Power, lacking any personal significance and caring nothing for man and his spiritual values. The primary and cogent meaning of God to our author is always subjective. God is a 'creature of the human soul.' As American representatives of this movement have put it, God is like Santa Claus or Uncle Sam—the imaginative embodiment and the picturesquely personalized symbol of inner experiences and qualities; he did not make us but we made him. It is not true, they would say, that an honest man is the noblest work of God, but that an honest God is the noblest work of man. Professor Huxley is very insistent throughout his book that the curse of religion is the idea of a supernatural Deity and that religion is a 'way of life founded upon the apprehension of sacredness in existence.'"

The lamentable confusion in religion and morals—the most fundamental concerns of man's life—to which this contemporary philosophy of unreason must necessarily lead is evident enough from the frank admission, either explicit or clearly implied, of the writers just cited, that, whatever be the name given to the blind guide they follow when philosophizing, their philosophy logically concedes to every individual man the right to make and remake his god whenever and in what way soever it pleases him. Though a still clearer knowledge of this confusion would be had if we were to add a description of the many so-called divine beings begotten by this false philosophy, we omit doing so here, as such a description, sufficiently complete, is given *passim* in *God and Reason,* and in scholions of the theses of the present work.

It will be profitable, however, to consider here, and at some length, a rather recent attempt at god-making—*Space, Time and Deity,* by S. Alexander, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Manchester, England—to which we refer but briefly elsewhere. It strikingly exemplifies the point we have been stressing, namely,

the radical opposition to our reasoned philosophy of the contemporary philosophy of unreason; first, by the impossible solution of the problem of reality it offers, and secondly, and still more, by the destructive concept of God it develops; a concept which robs God of every perfection distinctively His, undermines morality, and makes of religion a mockery.

A sympathetic critic of Professor Alexander's philosophy has written that the author of *Space, Time and Deity* "might almost be called the Aquinas of the religion of evolution." This is, in a measure, true. For although we cannot agree with the statement in its implication that Professor Alexander has shown extraordinary mental acumen in developing his philosophy of reality, it will be found to be practically true that his religion is "the religion of evolution," and the god he substitutes for the true God, is, in reality, *Evolution.*

It is not the first time, though, that Evolution has been deified. Witness the more than irreverent words of Bernard Shaw quoted, with evident approval, by Durant Drake, in the article previously cited:

> "Mr. Bernard Shaw, who, in that delightful play, 'Androcles and the Lion,' showed his ability to appreciate the Christian spirit, tells us in his preface that 'Jesus declared that the reality behind the popular belief in God was a creative spirit in ourselves, called by him the Heavenly Father, and by us *Evolution,* Élan Vital, Life Force, and other names.' . . . Perhaps our modern God-ideas have really (as Mr. Shaw evidently feels) more of the spirit of the Master's teaching than the Hellenic subtleties of the Nicene Creed—or even of the Fourth Gospel."

Let us see now how Professor Alexander solves the problem of reality, and how the God of reality fares in that solution.

According to his theory the original reality is not God, but "a single vast entity," [6] Motion or Space-Time, that is, pure motion or motion without anything moved; pure space and pure time or space and time void of existing things. Motion or Space-Time is infinite or without limit; eternal or without beginning. It "does not exist, but it is existence itself, taken in the whole"; [7] uncaused

[6] *Space, Time and Deity,* Vol. I, p. 66.
[7] *Ibid.,* Vol. I, p. 338.

existence, for "there is no cause which is not itself a part of it." [8] "It is not a substance," [9] but "the stuff of substances," [10] "the stuff out of which all existents are made." [11] It is not only "the stuff out of which all existents are made," but it is "their creator," "their parent," [12] creating them through the active principle Time. What is more, all things that are created by Motion or Space-Time are contained within it, for they are but the products of Motion in evolution. They are all different complexities of motion, and increase in perfection as the complexities increase. This evolution of Motion is due to a "nisus" or impulse intrinsic to it and which is ever urging it on in an upward development. It is an absolutely blind, aimlessly driving nisus, though, for "Space-Time itself, by virtue of its own nisus, elaborates without forethought a 'hierarchy of ministration' which, if it were produced by mind, would imply a vast and all-wise forethought of providence." [13] "There is no overruling and pre-existing purpose in the world." [14]

All things that are, therefore, matter, life, mind, and even Professor Alexander's god, are but complexities of Motion. All things that are, the wonderfully ordered world, with all its marvelously fashioned creatures—minerals, plants, animals, man, the soul and mind of man, and Professor Alexander's god are chance products of aimlessly evolving Motion, for, as we saw in *God and Reason,* if intelligence is excluded as the source of the world-order, the only other alternative is to say that it came by chance.

The absolute impossibility of this evolutionary theory of reality, the logical outcome of its evident rejection of the principles of reason, will further appear when we consider the specific form of evolution favored by Professor Alexander, namely, Emergent Evolution.

The different and ever ascending levels of reality, he tells us, which are evolved through the haphazard activity of Space-Time's or Motion's blind nisus, and which are "roughly speaking, . . .

[8] *Ibid.,* Vol. I, p. 338.
[9] *Ibid.,* Vol. I, p. 339.
[10] *Ibid.,* Vol. I, p. 341.
[11] *Ibid.,* Vol. I, p. 342.
[12] *Ibid.,* Vol. I, p. 342.
[13] *Ibid.,* Vol. II, p. 413.
[14] *Ibid.,* Vol. II, p. 422.

motions, matter as physical (or mechanical), matter with secondary qualities, life, mind," [15] are constituted such by new qualities which "emerge" at those levels.

An "emergent quality," it is said, is one which is superior to, and different in kind from, any in the level of reality from which it "emerges." It is a new quality which is in no sense a mere resultant of previous complexities. Indeed, it so differs from the perfections from which it "emerges" that it is absolutely impossible for one knowing perfectly the nature of those perfections to predict what its nature will be. In this connection, in a foot-note to the statement that "Mind is . . . an 'emergent' from life, and life an 'emergent' from a lower physico-chemical level," Professor Alexander says: "I use the word emergent after the example of Mr. Lloyd Morgan. It seems to mark the novelty which mind possesses. . . . Consequently it contrasts with the notion that mind is a mere 'resultant' of something lower." [16] And farther on we read, "Unpredictability arises whenever the change from one level of existence with its distinctive quality to another occurs." [17]

The same two characteristics of an "emergent" are noted by Professor Driesch in his paper, "Emergent Evolution," read at the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, Harvard University, 1926.[18] He says:

> "Emergent Evolution has been made a technical term by C. Lloyd Morgan, the word 'emergent' having been used already by G. H. Lewes as contrasted with 'resultant.' . . . Emergent Evolution, thus, is the contrary of a mere 'regrouping of existing elements.' . . . That all subsequent phases in an emergent evolution are 'unpredictable' from the antecedents, is the main characteristic according to our author [Mr. Morgan]."

Now, it is quite evident that if a quality could emerge in the sense just noted, we should have a clear violation of the principle of causality, namely, a thing produced without a cause proportionate to its production. This is explicitly admitted by Professor Lovejoy in another paper, "The Meaning of Emergence and Its Modes,"

[15] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 52.
[16] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 14.
[17] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 327.
[18] *Proceedings of the Congress*, pp. 1-2.

read at the same Congress. And he, just as explicitly, holds, that, the principle of causality to the contrary notwithstanding, qualities do so emerge, and, hence, that the principle of causality has seen its day. It is nothing but "an arbitrary pseudo-maxim." [19] Here are his words:

"Emergence, then, may be taken loosely to signify any augmentative or transmutative event, any process in which there appear effects that, in some one or more several ways . . . fail to conform to the maxim that 'there cannot be in the consequent anything more than, or different in nature from, that which was in the antecedent.'"

And further on, while admitting that the question concerning the worth of the principle of causality is "not only the most fundamental one in our topic but one of the crucial issues in all philosophy," he concludes with the following flat rejection of the principle: [20]

"The 'lower,' we are told, can come from the 'higher,' but not the 'higher' from the 'lower'; the stream of being cannot rise higher than its source. But—though this will seem to some a hard saying,—neither of these forms [Professor Lovejoy had previously given another form also of the principle of causality] appears to be justified by anything better than a prejudice,—an idol of the tribe, at best. The supposed axiom lacks self-evidence, and though there are some, there are no cogent reasons for postulating it."

Professor Lovejoy, then, in his explanation of "emergence" explicitly rejects the principle of causality. Professor Alexander does so implicitly, but none the less certainly. How, then, is "emergence" to be explained? Professor Alexander confesses that it is inexplicable. It is a fact to be accepted with "natural piety." Now as this very point involves an issue which is, according to Professor Lovejoy, "the most fundamental one" in the whole theory of emergent evolution, to confess that it is inexplicable is to confess that the whole theory is inexplicable. And it is. Here is Professor Alexander's virtual confession of its bankruptcy.[21]

"The higher quality emerges from the lower level of existence and has its root therein, but it emerges therefrom and it does not belong to that lower level, but constitutes its possessor a new order of existent with its

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 32.
[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.
[21] *Space, Time and Deity*, Vol. II, pp. 46-47.

special laws of behavior. The existence of emergent qualities thus described is something to be noted, as some would say, under the compulsion of brute empirical fact, or, as I should prefer to say in less hard terms, to be accepted with the 'natural piety' of the investigator. It admits no explanation."

This, in brief, is the theory of reality offered by Professor Alexander, and leading up to the concept of the god he substitutes for the true God. It is enough to say, without entering into details, that every one of its conclusions, as stated above, are in direct opposition to the conclusions of reason.

Since reason's God, then, as we must have gathered by this time, has no place in Professor Alexander's philosophy, we are not surprised when, as spokesman for his brother modern philosophers, he tells us that "No one now is convinced by the traditional arguments for God's existence;" [22] "No theoretic consideration sustains the belief in a God who precedes his universe." [23]

What place, then, in the universe does Professor Alexander's substitute god hold, and what is his nature? Let us see. Professor Alexander says: [24]

"When we think of God as that to which all things owe their existence, we are reversing the order of fact and are regarding the universe of Space-Time, which does create all things, in the light of its highest empirical quality, which is not first but last in the order of generation. The notion of a creator God is a hybrid blending of the creative Space-Time with the created deity."

Professor's Alexander's god, therefore, "like all things in the universe . . . is in the strictest sense not a creator but a creature. . . . He is an infinite creature of the universe of Space-Time." [25] He is a complexity of motion, and motion is his creator, for his "deity owes its being to the pre-existing finites with their empirical qualities, and is their outcome," [26] and pre-existing finites are only complexities of motion. What is more, in addition to being, like all things else, the product of evolving motion, he himself evolves, for as his deity is different for the different levels of reality, so he

[22] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 343.
[23] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 421.
[24] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 399.
[25] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 398.
[26] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 398.

differs in the same way. In fact, for the lowest level of reality *Matter* was god. We read: [27]

"While for us men deity is the next higher empirical quality to mind, the description of deity is perfectly general. For any level deity is the next higher empirical quality. It is therefore a variable quality, and as the world grows in time, deity changes with it. On each level a new quality looms ahead, awfully, which plays to it the part of deity. For us who live upon the level of mind deity is, we can but say, deity [for, as we shall presently see, we do not know its nature]. . . . For creatures who possessed only the primary qualities, . . . deity was what afterwards appeared as materiality, and their God was matter."

As "deity owes its being to the pre-existing finites," man, as one of them, must play his part in the making of his god.

"It is not God then who allows the struggle [in the World War, 'for mastery between two ideals of civilization'] which is to determine, it may not be at once but in the end, what deity is to be, which ideal, if either, is on the side of the divine. God then is not responsible for the miseries endured in working out his providence, but rather we are responsible for our acts, seeing that on the issue of them depends in their measure the character of God.[28] We help to the creation of deity in so far as through our goodness we are qualified to share in the universal bent towards a higher quality." [29]

If we ask now what, concretely speaking, is that varying quality of "deity" towards which the universe of Space-Time, under the urge of its blind "nisus", is ever aimlessly tending; and which man, on his level of reality, helps to make, we are told that it is unknown and unknowable. No one knows, or can know, what it is, not even Professor Alexander's god.

Assuredly no creature on the levels of reality lower than that of "mind" can know, for "there is no thinking in the proper sense till we reach mind." And men cannot know for [30]

"Deity [for man] is the next higher empirical quality to mind, which the universe is engaged in bringing to birth. . . . What the quality is we cannot know; for we can neither enjoy nor still less contemplate it. . . . Its nature we cannot penetrate. . . . We can represent it to ourselves only by analogy. It is fully described in this analogical manner as the colour of the universe. . . . Our human altars are still raised to the unknown [and Professor Alexander should have added, unknowable] God."

[27] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 348.
[28] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 400.
[29] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 418.
[30] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 347.

Neither does Professor Alexander's god know what "deity" is, for his knowledge is only that of the finite minds included in his body, to whom, as we have just seen, deity is unknowable.[31] "Deity does not know, but only the minds know which are included in the body of God . . . Deity contemplates [if at all, through finite minds, for "deity does not know"] only those qualities which have hitherto been developed within Space-Time.

Now, if Professor Alexander's god is ignorant of the nature of "deity," the quality which makes him to be god, it is rather to be expected [32] "that he cannot foretell the quality which shall in good time supersede his deity, any more than we humans can foretell what qualities shall supersede mind. There is always hanging over him the menace which Prometheus levels against Zeus, of supersession by a higher God."

A creature-made creature, then, is this god; made by Motion, made of Motion, made aimlessly, unstable, living in dread. A pitiable being to propose as a god! An astounding, inexplicable god, who does not know what his own divinity is, and who is unknowable to his votaries, who are also his creators! Pitiable though he be, we shall find, strange to say, that Professor Alexander, notwithstanding the many things he has told us about him, does not admit his existence as a real god at all.

He presents us with what he calls his "real" god, who, however, neither possesses nor can possess the quality which is supposed to constitute god, namely, "deity." He is, therefore, not a real god. He presents us, also, with what he calls his "ideal" god, who, though he in no way possesses "deity", still, "in concession to the mythologising habit," is conceived as an individual actually possessing it. This god, therefore, is, what Professor Alexander, in the following passage, admits him to be, a myth.[33]

"We are now led to a qualification of the greatest importance. The picture which has been drawn of the infinite God is a concession to our *figurative or mythological* tendency and to the habit of the religious consciousness to embody its conception of God in an individual shape. . . . The infinite God is purely ideal or conceptual. The individual so sketched

[31] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 384.
[32] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 384.
[33] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 361-362.

is not asserted to exist; the sketch merely gives body and shape, by a sort of anticipation, to the actual infinite God whom, on the basis of experience, speculation declares to exist. As actual, God does not possess the quality of deity, but is the universe as tending to that quality. . . . Only in this sense of straining towards deity can there be an infinite actual God. . . . Just as when mind emerges it is the distinctive quality of many finite individuals with minds, so when deity actually emerges it would be the distinctive quality of many finite individuals. If the possessor of deity were an existent individual he must be finite and not infinite. Thus there is no actual infinite being with the quality of deity, but there is an actual infinite, the whole universe, with a nisus to deity; and this is the God of the religious consciousness, though that consciousness habitually forecasts the divinity of its object as actually realized in an individual form."

We have only one remark to make about this whole paragraph, which most assuredly contains, as Professor Alexander says it does, "a qualification [of his theory] of the greatest importance." The remark is this. If Professor Alexander is justified in calling the universe "an infinite actual God" because it is "straining towards deity" then any one would be justified in calling John James, for example, the actual President of these United States because he is straining towards the Presidency. This is nonsense.

We repeat, then, the statement we made above, that even if the pitiable being Professor Alexander calls god, deserved in any way the name, Professor Alexander grants him no real existence but relegates him to the region of myth.

Supposing, however, that his god is in some way deserving of the name, what of the following statement: [34] "If the question is asked, whether the speculative conception of God or deity which has been advanced here . . . belongs to theism or pantheism, that answer must be . . . that in different respects it belongs to both; and that if a choice must be made it is theistic." This answer is to be flatly rejected. The being he calls god, if he deserves the name at all, is solely a pantheistic god. Professor Alexander says,[35] "In respect of his deity the conception of God is theistic, and since his deity is what is distinctive of him, this notion of God remains predominantly theistic." This means that "in respect of his deity" he transcends the world. But he never possesses, nor can he ever pos-

[34] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 394.

[35] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 394.

sess, his deity. Therefore he does not transcend the world, he is a purely pantheistic god, if he is a god at all.

What is more, even if he could possess his deity, he would still be a pantheistic god, for his deity is made by finites, "is fed by lower finites," when it emerges it is possessed by finites, and "remains within the world and . . . is in no sense outside of it." It does not transcend it.

No less opposed to reason, and, hence, no less false, than his theory of reality with its rejection of the true God, are Professor Alexander's views on those questions of supreme importance to man, Religion, Morality, Freedom of Will, and Immortality. Few words will suffice to show this.

Reason tells us that, even though there were no positive law of God commanding it, we are bound by the law of our very nature to give adoration to God, that is, by our praise, reverence and service to acknowledge His infinite perfection and supreme dominion over us, and, consequently, our absolute dependence on Him, the Beginning and the End of all things. Professor Alexander, on the contrary, having done away with God as man's Creator and Supreme Lord and Master, tells us: [36]

"There is in fact no duty to be religious any more than there is a duty to be hungry. The religious sentiment arises from a brute or crude instinct, . . . the highest we possess. . . . The only reasonable sense in which there is a duty to be religious is that the instinct should be satisfied, like any other."

A man is religious, then, not because of any duty which binds him absolutely as a creature to acknowledge God His Master. He gives his service freely to one whom he can trust for help, and whom he considers not as a Lord and Master but rather as a partner in the religious transaction.[37]

"In the more developed religious mind our trust in God is given *freely*, and the obedience to him is a 'dignified obedience,' rendered by a person, in his limited and imperfect fashion, independent, with *his* standards of what is great and highest, to a higher being who sustains him but whom he regards as worthy of such trust. There is not merely reliance on God but co-operation between the two parties to the religious transaction. We

[36] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 406-407. [37] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 387.

do not merely resign ourselves to something greater, but that something is a partner with us."

Again: "Worship is co-operation." [38] In the same sense is the following: [39]

"When we think of God *as that to which* [sic] all things owe their existence we are reversing the order of fact . . . Accordingly, in its relation to conduct, religion does not so much command us to perform our duties with the consciousness that they are the commands of God, as rather it is religion to do our duty with the consciousness of helping to create his deity."

How, then, if "it is religion to do our duty," can a man who is remiss in the performance of every duty be religious? That he could be appears to be impossible. Nevertheless Professor Alexander, in another passage, states that a man may be a very religious man and, at the same time, an out and out scoundrel, for [40]

"the sentiment of religion and the sense of moral value are distinct. . . . If further proof of their distinctness were needed . . . it may be found in the paradox that the religious sense may exist in an intense form in a mind which has no special feeling for goodness and even in bad characters or people who have no conscience at all. We call such persons hypocrites because their life seems incompatible with their religion. . . . Yet there is no good reason to doubt the sincerity and strength of the feeling towards God which they have. . . . Experience shows that there may be religion without virtue."

With regard to morality, with reason as our guide, we learn that our actions are morally good or bad as they conform or do not conform to the eternal law of the infinitely wise, infinitely holy Supreme Lawgiver, our Lord and Master, God, commanding the observance of right order and prohibiting its violation. We learn also, under the same guidance, that some actions are by their very nature, that is, intrinsically, good or bad. They are good or bad in such wise that even God, the Supreme Lawgiver, cannot change their morality. They are good or bad for ever and for every one.

Professor Alexander, however, having done away with God, the Lord and Master of all things, including man, has also done away

[38] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 398.
[39] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 399.
[40] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 404-405.

with the Supreme Lawgiver and His eternal law. Morality, in his theory, is a mere matter of social convention. What "the collective wills" please to consider good is good, what they please to consider bad is bad. There is no such things as an action which is intrinsically good or bad, that is, good or bad by its very nature. There is no such thing as an action which is changelessly good or bad.

"Morality means then a type of existence in which passions of all sorts are regulated socially.[41] By the phrase 'coherence among wills,' we are but expressing in a more scholastic and technical manner the social character of morality.[42] In so far as the individual is good he represents the collective wills of the society." [43]

"The realities which the collective wills of persons make into morality . . . are human nature under the external conditions of its existence. . . . Human nature need not be supposed to change, but the enlargement of social relations and the complexity of living mean a constant revision of moral standards and a change in the system of conduct." [44]

"Elementary rules of conduct, like most of those in the decalogue are universal in this sense, that, being the kind of action called for by simple and elementary situations, on the response to which the very existence of society depends, *they are approved* everywhere and in all persons. But all of them admit exceptions in special cases, provided the exception is not made by the individual in his own favor but impersonally." [45]

Now just as it is absolutely impossible that an act should be morally good or bad, if the infinite God, the Source of morality, is done away with, so it is equally impossible that man should be responsible for any act, good or bad, unless in the performance of that act he is, in a true sense, free. Man, therefore, is a subject of the moral law only inasmuch as he is a free agent. Professor Alexander has done away with the source of morality. It will be seen now that, even if he had admitted the existence of the moral law, he has done away with it, as far as man is concerned, by denying that man is, in any true sense, free.

A free act of the will is one which, under the very same conditions under which it is elicited by the will, could have been not elicited. Reason tells us that, under certain conditions, the human will has the power to elicit such acts. Those who accept the con-

[41] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 278.
[42] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 276.
[43] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 280.
[44] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 282.
[45] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 276.

clusion of reason in this matter are called Indeterminists. Those who insist that the will is not free in any of its actions are called Determinists. They claim that when all the requisites are present for any act of the will, the will has no choice in the matter; it can act in only one way and it must act in that way. Its act is determined for it. This, in brief, is what reason tells us.

Professor Alexander, however, claims that the will is free, and at the same time he insists that it is absolutely determined in all its actions. In other words, he denies that the will is, in any true sense, free. Freedom, rightly understood, denies Determinism. What Professor Alexander understands by his false freedom will be evident from his own words.

"Freedom is determination as enjoyed." [46]

"There is nothing in free mental action which is incompatible with thorough determinism." [47]

"The necessity which the will obeys is the 'necessity' of causation, the determinate sequence of an event upon its conditions. . . . If indeterminism means contingency, that, in spite of its antecedents, the free act might have been different, the criterion is false. . . . The determinism of the free act means no more than this, that it has followed in fact from its antecedents, as they exist in the character of the agent and the circumstances which appeal to him for action." [48]

"Freedom is not an exceptional privilege of human life, but, as enjoyed determination, is . . . spread through the world." [49]

On the question of immortality Professor Alexander has little to say. That little, however, carries with it a denial of reason's conclusion, that the soul of man is immortal. It carries with it also the statement, quite false and, in face of the evidence of fact, quite astounding, that "the personal continuance of our lives beyond the lives of our bodies is fully accredited by none." [50]

The immortality of the soul is denied in the following passages:

"The data do not allow us to suppose, so far as we have seen, that our minds, even if we believe that they only use the body as an instrument, do exist without the instrument." [51]

"If we are to follow the clue of experience, we must therefore believe that theoretically the claim for the future life is founded on error. We

[46] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 315.
[47] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 323.
[48] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 329-330.
[49] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 333.
[50] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 424.
[51] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 423.

must content ourselves with the continuance of the species rather than of persons, and I must add that this limitation of desire seems not only imposed on us by such knowledge as we have, but is practically a higher object of desire." [52]

Professor Alexander's theory of reality need delay us no longer. As a typical example of the aimless groping of the philosophy of the day it has given point to our contention that that philosophy in all its departments, and especially when treating of God, is utterly opposed to the philosophy of reason. It has room for all kinds of Gods of its own making, but for the infinite God, the world's supreme Lord and Lawgiver, no room.

A practical and pertinent question now suggests itself. Moral and religious training is without doubt the all important factor in true education. Its necessary foundation is an acknowledgment both theoretical and practical of the essential supremacy of God as the world's absolute Lord and Lawgiver. Modern philosophy, as we have abundantly shown, denies God these essential perfections. It is this philosophy which is commonly taught in non-Catholic colleges. What, then, are we to think of these colleges as educational centers?

It is true that here and there in their faculties may be found professors who still consider that reason's conclusions concerning God and His infinite perfections are of solid worth. It is true that in their more formal pronouncements, and at solemn academic functions, they invoke, with reverence at least external, the name of God. It is true that quite generally they strongly counsel, and in some cases even demand, attendance of the students at some form of chapel service. It is true, furthermore, that not uncommonly, through Catholic endeavor, various aids to safeguard faith and morals are offered from without to those of their students who happen to be Catholics. Notwithstanding all this, however, it may be said, and conservatively said, that any student, whatever be his religious convictions, who seeks his education in one of these colleges, bringing with him a belief in the true God and a practical reverence for His moral law, does so at the risk, and, it may be,

[52] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 424-425.

the grave risk, of losing both, or at least of so weakening both that they will cease to function in his after-life as habitual principles of action.

The reason is not far to seek. The professors in these colleges, for the most part, are men whose education has been dominated and colored by the principles and conclusions of modern philosophy. They are free to teach, and when occasion offers, as is proved by facts, do teach, either directly and explicitly, or indirectly, by way of commentary on the matter at the time engaging their attention, or by innuendo, whatever they please about God, religion, morality, free will and the most sacred duties of man's life. The general and fundamental tendency of this teaching is not only to deny that reason can demonstrate the existence of a being who, as the world's creator, has supreme and absolute dominion over man and all other creatures, but to deny that any being at all of that nature exists. Any other god but this God they will tolerate.

Now, this teaching, coming as it does from those who are supposed to be safe guides in the training of youth, must have more than a passing effect on the student body. What that effect is cannot be doubted. It is a gradual loss of reverence for the true God and His moral law, and, as a consequence, the formation of a college atmosphere either wholly irreligious or at least charged with religious and moral indifferentism. This atmosphere the students must breathe. It surrounds them on all sides. It is a menace to all. Some, no doubt, militantly strong in the faith of their earlier days, and taking full advantage of the helps offered them from without, are able to withstand its blighting influence. The weaker ones, however, and there are weaker ones, either lose their faith altogether, or drift into lives in which religion plays little or no part, and the moral law, under stress of circumstances, is only too easily set aside.

That the philosophy taught in these colleges leads to a loss of reverence for God and His moral law will be evident to one who reads the many excerpts from the writings of professors of the modern schools of philosophy cited in *God and Reason* and the present work. Though to emphasize the point more might be cited here, we add only the following one.

Professor James, in *A Pluralistic Universe,* one of the Hibbert Lectures, delivered at Manchester College, England, writes: [53]

"I have been told by Hindoos that the great obstacle to the spread of Christianity in their country is the puerility of our dogma of creation. It has not sweep and infinity enough to meet the requirements of even the illiterate natives of India.

"Assuredly most of the members of this audience are ready to side with Hinduism in this matter. Those of us who are sexagenarians have witnessed in our own persons one of those gradual mutations of intellectual climate, due to innumerable influences, that makes the thought of a past generation seem as foreign to its successor as if it were the expression of a different race of men. The theological machinery that spoke so livingly to our ancestors, with its finite age of the world, its creation out of nothing, its juridical morality and eschatology, its relish for rewards and punishments, its treatment of God as an external contriver, an 'intelligent and moral governor,' sounds as odd to most of us as if it were some outlandish savage religion. The vaster vistas which scientific evolutionism has opened and the rising tide of social democratic ideals, have changed the type of our imagination, and the older monarchical theism is obsolete or obsolescent. The place of the divine in the world must be more organic and intimate. An external creator and his institutions may still be verbally confessed at church in formulas that linger by their mere inertia, but the life is out of them, we avoid dwelling on them, the sincere heart of us is elsewhere."

The conclusion to which we came above, that the irreverence for God which is shown in such a marked way in the passage just cited and, in general, in the schools of modern philosophy, must necessarily result in indifferentism in religion among the students, and consequent loss of practical reverence for the moral law, is in line with a like conclusion of Pope Leo XIII, in his Encyclical, *Æterni Patris,* namely, that the source of the evils besetting the world at the present day is to be found in the false philosophy of the modern schools. He writes on this point:

"Whoever turns his attention to the bitterness of our times and seeks a reason for the troubles that vex public and private life, must come to the conclusion that the fruitful cause of the evils which now afflict, as well as those which threaten us, lies in this: that false conclusions concerning divine and human things, which originated in the schools of philosophy, have crept into all orders of the State, and have been accepted by the common consent of the masses. For since it is in the very nature of man

[53] P. 29.

to follow the guide of reason in his actions, if his intellect sins at all his will soon follows; and thus it happens that wicked opinions in the understanding flow into human actions and make them bad. Whereas, on the other hand, if men be of sound mind and take their stand on true and solid principles, there will result a vast amount of benefits for the public and private good.

"We do not, indeed, attribute such force and authority to philosophy as to esteem it equal to the task of combatting and rooting out all errors. . . . But the natural helps with which the grace of Divine Wisdom, strongly and sweetly disposing all things, has supplied the human race are neither to be despised nor neglected, chief among which is evidently the right use of philosophy. . . .

"Therefore Divine Providence itself requires that in calling back the peoples to the paths of faith and salvation advantage should be taken of human science also—an approved and wise practice which history testifies was observed by the most illustrious Fathers of the Church. They, indeed, were wont neither to belittle nor undervalue the part that reason had to play, as is summed up by the great Augustine when he attributes to this science 'that by which the most wholesome faith is begotten, . . . is nourished, defended, and made strong.' "

The words of the learned Pontiff, who assigns as one of the remedies for these evils the study of Scholastic Philosophy, fittingly bring this introduction to a close.

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GOD INFINITE AND REASON

SOME FURTHER THESES FROM NATURAL THEOLOGY

GENERAL PRENOTES

In *God and Reason,* the first part of our Natural Theology, we proved conclusively the existence of God, as the unproduced, intelligent, personal, first cause of all things produced; a being, therefore, who exists of himself and with absolute necessity, and excludes, as absolutely impossible, the existence of any other being of like nature.

In establishing these truths about God, reason has done much. It can do more. Arguing deductively from the nature of this self-existent being, it can acquire an explicit and sure knowledge of his infinite perfection. This perfection, which it proves to be absolutely simple, it divides conceptually, for the sake of clearness and after demonstration, into many perfections, and thus develops and fills out our scientific concept of God. What is more, it can tell us which of all these infinite perfections, in themselves identical but by us for clearness' sake so conceptually divided, is, from our viewpoint, to be considered God's basic or essential perfection, that is, that perfection which makes God to be what He is, which establishes Him in His own order of being apart from every other being, and from which as from a root-perfection springs our knowledge of His other transcendent perfections, which, from our viewpoint, are to be considered as attributes flowing from that essence. How reason can do this will appear in the development of this second part of our Natural Theology—God Infinite and Reason.

Our present work, then, will treat of the essence of God, and His attributes; both those which modify His essence, looked at in itself, namely, His absolute infinity, absolute simplicity, absolute

immutability, eternity, and immensity; and those which modify it, looked at as the source of divine activity, namely, His infinite intellect, infinite will, and infinite power.

Though the establishment of these truths makes explicitly clear the falsity of Pantheism in all its forms, still this error is of such importance, because so deep-seated, so long-enduring, and so widespread among different philosophic schools, that it demands special treatment. Our treatment of it, which will close our present work, will include: 1. A brief statement of the various false opinions advanced by philosophers concerning the ultimate principle of all reality, which Monotheism asserts to be God—one and only one, personal, infinite, the Creater of the world, from which He is utterly distinct, but with which He is intimately concerned in His exercise over it of His infinite, loving providence. 2. The broad divisions of Pantheism. 3. A brief history of its rise and growth down to, and including, modern Pantheism; with the names of the founders of special pantheistic schools, and some idea of the doctrine advanced by them, special attention being given to the Pantheism of Spinoza, who has been called by some of his admirers "the first great metaphysician of modern times." 4. Various reasons which may be given to explain the rise and growth of this persistent error. 5. A thorough rejection of it in all its forms drawn from fundamental principles which are common to all of them.

In the third part of our Natural Theology, to follow later, after some of the more difficult questions concerning God's knowledge, omitted in the present work, have been discussed, the principal subject-matter of this part, namely, God's action in the world, will be taken up. We shall see there the infinite power of God, under the guidance of His infinite wisdom, freely creating the world, sustaining all existing things in their very existence, cooperating with them as the primary cause of all things, in all their actions, and directing them, according to their different natures, to the end for which everything made by Him is necessarily made—Himself, the Alpha and Omega, the Beginning and End of all things.

THESIS I

Self-existence is the metaphysical essence of God.

PRENOTES TO THE THESIS.

THE existence of God having been proved, it is quite logical that, in this the first thesis of those in which we are to investigate and demonstrate His wonderful perfections, we should determine that perfection which, from our viewpoint, constitutes the metaphysical essence of God, i.e., that perfection, from among the many perfections we find in God, which we consider to be His fundamental perfection, i.e., that perfection which makes Him to be what He is—God, and which, consequently, distinguishes Him from all other beings, and is the root-perfection or seed-perfection from which the other divine perfections that reason can discover are derived.

For a better understanding of our thesis, however, it will be well to recall a few notions from Ontology, on essence and its several divisions, as applied to substantial beings other than God.

Essence. The essence of a being is that which makes the being what it is fundamentally; which places it in its proper class among the countless classes of beings in the world, and, consequently, distinguishes it from all beings of other classes. It answers the question: "What is that?"

Essence, nature, person, suppositum. The essence of a being is also the source of all its activity, i.e., the ultimate principle through which it operates. Looked at under this aspect, it is called the nature of the being. Nature and essence, therefore, are really identified; they are distinguished mentally by us.

The being itself or, if it be intellectual, the person, is the ultimate principle *which* acts. If it be non-intellectual, it is called at times the suppositum (*sub-positum, sub-jectum, subject*), i.e., the subject to which all the actions of the being are referred. The es-

sence is the ultimate principle *which constitutes* the being. The nature is the *ultimate* principle *through or by which the being acts.* The powers, or faculties, are the *proximate* principles *through or by which it acts.* (See *God and Reason,* pp. 126 ff.)

The following example will help to a clearer understanding of these terms. I see a man of a certain size, weight, form, color, walking down the street. He gazes round about him in contentment, buttons up his coat against the sharp breeze, nods to a passing friend, and laughs and jokes as he moves along chatting with his companion. The question is put me: "Who is that?" I answer: "That is John Jay, one of the most influential persons in the village." Again I am questioned: "Are those actions of his unusual?" "No," I answer, "they are quite natural. What else would you expect from a being with human nature, and the normal faculties of a human being, who has made his life a success?" "And what is a human being?" To this question which seeks not what makes John Jay *this* human being, or *a happy* human being, or a human being *of such a color,* etc., in a word, which seeks what makes him what he is *fundamentally,* i.e., his essence, I answer correctly—neglecting all qualities, and properties, etc., which I see in him and which have led me to a knowledge of that essence—"He is a rational animal."

Had my answer been: "He is a living being," or "He is an animal," it would have been true but incomplete, for it would have denoted only partially that which makes a man fundamentally what he is; and which, consequently, would neither place him in his own proper class of beings, nor distinguish him from all beings of other classes.

Essential definition.

As the essence of a being tells us what fundamentally constitutes that being, places it in its own proper class among the many classes of being in the world, and so distinguishes it from all other beings of all other classes, the definition of a being which gives that being's essential parts, is evidently more perfect than a mere descriptive definition, i.e., one giving, not the fundamental constit-

uents of the being, but only some distinguishing marks or characteristics.

Now, there are two kinds of essential definition, corresponding to the two principal divisions of essence, viz., metaphysical and physical. These divisions are applied to God and to creatures, but not in exactly the same way.

After having defined essence as applied to God, it will be sufficient for our purpose to consider the two divisions just mentioned as applied to Him only, giving at first abstract definitions of them, and then determining in the concrete their respective constituents.

Some points to be noted before treating of God's essence.

To explain satisfactorily the essence of God and its divisions, we must here take for granted two truths, shortly to be proved, i.e., first, that God is infinitely perfect, i.e., that He possesses all possible perfections, and all of them in the most perfect possible manner; and, secondly, that God is absolutely simple, i.e., that His infinite perfections are all identified in one absolutely simple perfection, in other words, in one perfection which excludes as impossible all real and conceptual composition, and hence is absolutely indivisible. Though this absolute simplicity of God, then, necessarily excludes the possibility of conceiving Him by means of different concepts which objectively perfectly prescind from, i.e., exclude, one another, nevertheless, the very infinite worth of that simple divine perfection, which embraces in its simplicity all perfection, and the exceedingly finite power of our intellect, oblige us to express our halting knowledge of God by means of many concepts, each one showing forth, explicitly and as such, some one divine perfection, and, implicitly and as divine, all His other perfections. These concepts, then, can only imperfectly prescind from, i.e., exclude, one another.

Moreover, between some of these mentally imperfectly distinct perfections, we are forced—again by the finiteness of our knowledge and also by the nature of the subject-matter under investigation—to establish a priority and posteriority, also mental. For example,

we are forced to conceive the act of God's knowledge as prior, in the nature of things, to the act of His will.

The points noted in this section will be considered again more fully; what we have said of them here will suffice for our purpose, namely, the better understanding of the following definitions:

The essence of God is that divine perfection which makes God what He is fundamentally, i.e., God; which places Him in His own proper order of being, and which, since no other being can be like Him in essence or nature, distinguishes Him not only from all beings of other orders of being, but absolutely from all other beings, whether actual or possible.

The physical essence of God is His essence looked at as it is in itself, i.e., His essence expressed in terms of those perfections which in the physical order make God to be what He is.

What, in the concrete, constitutes the physical essence of God is not a subject of discussion among Scholastic philosophers. All readily agree that as all the perfections, into which we distinguish God's infinite simplicity, are in themselves really identified in that one absolutely simple perfection, and, hence, as all are equally radical, i.e., all equally make God what He is, namely, God, the physical essence of God, if we would attempt to express it explicitly in our finite way, is the sum of all the mentally distinct perfections into which we distinguish God's infinite simplicity.

The metaphysical essence of God is the essence of God considered not as it is in itself, i.e., not according to the perfections which in the physical order constitute it, but according to that perfection, mentally distinguished by us from His other perfections, which we conceive to be the fundamental perfection in God. It may, therefore, be defined as that perfection, of the many into which God's infinite simplicity is distinguished by us, which we conceive as God's fundamental perfection, i.e., that perfection which makes Him to be what He is, God, which places Him in His own proper order of being and distinguishes Him from all other beings both actual

and possible, and which is the source from which we derive our knowledge of the other perfections of God which unaided reason can discover. These other perfections, however, which are derived from the metaphysical essence of God demonstratively, and, hence, which are contained in it implicitly and virtually, are not all contained in it in the same way. Some are conceived as involved in it as essential notes, which, when evolved, fill it out, i.e., more explicitly express the metaphysical essence from which they were derived; others are conceived as involved in it as attributes, which, when evolved, are considered as flowing from it, i.e., from the metaphysical essence from which they were derived.

Concretely considered, God's metaphysical essence, in our thesis, is His self-existence. From among all the perfections, then, into which we distinguish God's infinite simplicity, we discover self-existence to be not merely *a* perfection which must be considered as fundamental, i.e., as essential, in God and which places Him in His own proper order of being, distinguishing Him from all other beings whatsoever, but also *the only* perfection which we must consider as constituting that essence, i.e., the only fundamental divine perfection, since it is derived by us from no other perfection of God, and all others are derived by us through it, either proximately or remotely.

Self-existence as the metaphysical essence of God; its meaning; our opinion not defended as certain.

When we say, then, that God's metaphysical essence is self-existence, we state something more than the mere fact that God exists of Himself and with absolute necessity, and, hence, is a being who can be conceived neither as non-existing, nor by means of any concept that perfectly prescinds from existence. We state, namely, that, if we desire to select, from among the many perfections into which we distinguish God's infinite simplicity, that one which must be considered as fundamental, as in a special way distinctive of God, and as the

source, from our viewpoint, of His other perfections, seeing that through it we derive our knowledge of them, we are compelled by objective reasons to choose self-existence as that perfection.

There are other philosophers and theologians, however, who think otherwise. They claim that objective reasons lead them to choose some other perfection of God as His metaphysical essence. We shall reject their opinions shortly, advancing our own at least as more probable; and not only justifiable by reason, but also apparently in accord with the following testimony of God Himself, given in the Book of Exodus, C. 3, vv. 13, 14:

"Moses said to God: Lo, I shall go to the children of Israel and say unto them: The God of your fathers hath sent me to you. If they should say to me: What is His name? What shall I say to them? God said to Moses: I am Who am. He said: Thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel: He who is, hath sent me to you." Cf. **St. Thomas,** *Summa Theologica,* 1, q.13, a.11, the body of the article.

A metaphysical definition of God is, strictly speaking, impossible.

The essential definition of a finite being, which is known as its metaphysical definition, is expressed in terms of the proximate generic note which that being possesses in common with other beings of the same genus, and the ultimate differentiating note which separates it from them, and places it in its own proper species distinct from theirs and all others. For instance, man is essentially and metaphysically defined as an animal who is rational.

As God is a being whose infinite perfections cannot be shared by any other being, and as no perfect, objective distinction can be made among any of the divine perfections, it is quite evident that God cannot be placed in any genus, properly so called, and, consequently, that no differentiating note, strictly so called, can distinguish Him from all other beings. Hence, no metaphysical definition, strictly so called, can be given of Him.

A quasi-metaphysical definition, however, can be given which represents that perfection which He has analogically, i.e., not in exactly the same way, in common with all other beings, namely, being; and that perfection by which He differs from all other beings, namely, self-existence. God, thus defined, is the Being who exists of Himself; He who is.

The opinion advanced in the thesis is held by **St. Thomas, Suarez,** and many other philosophers and theologians. Cf. *Corollary.*

ADVERSARIES.

1. **The Nominalists,** and **Descartes** and **Leibnitz,** who say that the metaphysical essence of God is the sum of all His perfections, i.e., the extensive infinity of God.

   We reject this opinion because it seems to make no distinction between the metaphysical and physical essence of God. It does not determine which one, of the many perfections into which God's infinite simplicity is mentally imperfectly divided by us, must be considered from our viewpoint as fundamental and the source from which His other perfections flow.

2. Not a few **Scotists** insist that the metaphysical essence of God is not His extensive infinity, but rather His intensive infinity, that is, not the possession of all possible perfections, but rather the possession of all of them in an infinite degree.

   We reject this opinion because intensive infinity, since it denotes the way or mode in which a perfection is possessed, is necessarily conceived by us as consequent, at least in thought, to that perfection of which it is a mode, and hence from our viewpoint it cannot be considered as a fundamental perfection in God. As a consequence, then, it cannot be considered the metaphysical essence of God.

3. Some other **Scotists,** and **Palmieri** and others, also claim that infinity is to be considered the metaphysical essence of God; not, however, extensive infinity, nor yet intensive infin-

ity, but radical infinity, i.e., the exigency for both extensive and intensive infinity.

We reject this opinion, for the reason that an exigency presupposes, at least in concept, the nature in which it inheres, and so it cannot be conceived as fundamental in a being, hence it cannot be considered the metaphysical essence of a being.

However, if the term exigency is taken concretely, i.e., if it stands for that which has the exigency for absolute infinity, and is understood to designate self-existence, from which we derive the absolute infinity of God, the opinion coincides with that expressed in our *Thesis*.

4. **Many Thomists,** who, however, in this point do not follow **St. Thomas,** claim that the knowledge of God is His metaphysical essence. By knowledge, however, some of them mean the exigency for knowledge, others mean the intellectual faculty and still others mean His actual knowledge.

   We reject all of these opinions, because not only actual knowledge and the faculty of knowing, but also the exigency for knowledge, presuppose, at least in concept, the nature from which they flow. Hence none of these perfections can be considered as fundamental in God; none of them can be considered His metaphysical essence. Cf. *Difficulty* 7.

Proof of the Thesis.

That perfection, from among the many into which we mentally distinguish God's infinite simplicity, is to be chosen as His metaphysical essence, which, from our viewpoint, must be considered:

1. As a fundamental or essential perfection of God,
2. As placing God in His proper order of being, and distinguishing Him from all other beings,
3. As that perfection which alone is fundamental or essential in God.

But self-existence is that perfection.

Therefore self-existence is the metaphysical essence of God.

Maj.[1] The Major is evident from the definition of the metaphysical essence of God.

Min. 1. Self-existence must be considered to be at least a constituent of God's metaphysical essence, for if it be not so considered, it must be conceived by us not only as posterior to that essence, but also as flowing from it, as from a source, seeing that the reason for the existence of a self-existent being cannot be anything extrinsic to that being. It is impossible, however, to conceive existence as flowing from that essence, for that essence being conceived as prior to existence, i.e., as not yet having existence, cannot be conceived as in any way the source of existence.

2. As there is, and can be, only one self-existent being, self-existence necessarily places God in His proper order of being, and distinguishes Him from all other beings.

3. That self-existence must be considered a fundamental or essential perfection of God, we have shown in the proof of the first part of the Minor; that no other perfection of God, as we conceive them, is to be considered as fundamental, is evident from the fact that, whereas we derive all other divine perfections from self-existence, we derive self-existence from none of them. Hence self-existence is, as we conceive God's perfections, the only one which is fundamental.

Corollary. The name, He who is, is the most proper name of God.

St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica,* 1, q. 13, a. 11:

"It is written that when Moses asked, If they [the children of Israel] should say to me, What is His Name?, what shall I say to them? the Lord answered him, thus shalt thou say to them, He who is hath sent me to you (Exod. 3, 13, 14). Therefore this name, He who is, most properly belongs to God.

"This Name, He who is, is most properly applied to God, for three reasons:

"First, because of its signification. It does not signify form, but simply existence itself. Hence since the existence of God is His Essence itself, which

[1] For these and similar abbreviations see Appendix.

can be said of no others (Q. 3), it is clear that among other names this one specially denominates God, for everything is denominated by its form.

"Secondly, on account of its universality. . . . Hence Damascene says that, He who is, is the principal of all names applied to God; for comprehending all in itself, it contains existence itself as an infinite and indeterminable sea of substance.

"Now by any other name some mode of substance is determined, whereas this Name, He who is, determines no mode of being, but is indeterminate to all; and therefore it names the infinite ocean of substance.

"Thirdly, from its consignification, for it signifies present existence; and this above all properly applies to God, whose existence knows not past or future, as Augustine says." (Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.)

DIFFICULTIES

1. If existence-derived-from-another is not the essential definition of any finite being, and hence cannot be its metaphysical essence, self-existence cannot be the essential definition of God, and hence cannot be His metaphysical essence. But existence-derived-from another is not the essential definition of any finite being, etc. Therefore.

   N. Maj. The Major is denied because of a want of parity. Self-existence can be predicated of only one being, hence it defines Him; existence-from-another may be predicated of countless beings, differing in essence one from another, hence it defines none of them.

2. If the **Pantheists** admit that God is a self-existent being, and, nevertheless, claim that He is identical with the world, self-existence does not distinguish God from other beings, and, hence, it cannot be His metaphysical essence.

   But the **Pantheists** admit that God, etc. Therefore.

   D. Maj. If the claim of the **Pantheists,** that God is identical with the world, is not a gross error, self-existence does not distinguish God from other beings, *C.*, if it is a gross error, *N. Cd. Min.*

3. If the notion, being, can be predicated of everything that is, self-existence cannot be the metaphysical essence of God. (Self-existence and being are synonymous.)

But the notion, being, can be predicated of everything. Therefore.

D. Maj. If the notion, being, meaning being in its widest abstract sense, i.e., being prescinding from all determining notes and meaning merely something, can be predicated of everything that is, self-existence is not the metaphysical essence of God, *N.*, if the notion being, meaning actual being, undetermined, i.e., limitless, in other words, actual being possessing reality limitlessly, can be predicated of everything, self-existence is not the metaphysical essence of God, *C. Cd. Min.*

The reason given in support of the Major is also to be distinguished. Self-existence and being are synonymous, if being denotes actual being, undetermined, i.e., limitless, *C.*, if it denotes being in its widest abstract sense, i.e., merely something, *N.*

4. If self-existence includes all the other perfections of God, it is the sum of all the perfections of God, and hence is not distinguished from God's physical essence. But self-existence includes all the other perfections of God. Therefore it is the sum, etc.

D. Maj. If self-existence contains all the other perfections of God virtually, i.e., if all the other perfections of God can be by argumentation deduced from it; and if, moreover, it formally and implicitly contains all the other perfections of God not as such and such divine perfections but merely inasmuch as they are divine, i.e., as something divine, it is the sum, etc., *N.*, if it contains all the other perfections of God formally and explicitly as such and such divine perfections, it is the sum, etc., *C. Cd. Min.*

A word of explanation will make the solution clear. As we shall see later, no objective mental precision or distinction which is perfect can be made with regard to God's perfections. Hence when we conceive any one perfection of God, we formally conceive the whole divinity under that

one aspect. For example, when I conceive divine wisdom, I do not formally conceive God partially, but I conceive the whole divinity under the formality of divine wisdom. In fact it is more correct to say: "God is wisdom," than, "God is wise." When I conceive one perfection of God, therefore, I do not conceive the others formally as such and such perfections, but formally inasmuch as they are divine, i.e., as something divine. Not only self-existence, then, but every other perfection predicated of God, formally and implicitly includes every other divine perfection as something divine. There is one way, however, in which self-existence, and only self-existence, contains the other perfections of God, namely, virtually, seeing that from self-existence, and only from self-existence, the other perfections of God may be demonstrated.

The physical essence of God is the sum of His perfections formally and explicitly conceived as such and such perfections.

5. If all the other perfections of God are identified with His self-existence, there appears to be no special reason why self-existence should be said to be His metaphysical essence.

But all the other perfections of God are identified with His self-existence. Therefore.

D. Maj. If all the other perfections of God are really or physically identified with His self-existence, there is no special reason, etc., *N.*, if, however, all the other perfections of God are mentally or metaphysically as such and such perfections distinguished from His self-existence, and if, moreover, self-existence is the only perfection which includes all the other divine perfections virtually, there is no special reason, etc., *N. Cd. Min.*

6. What is necessarily conceived as presupposing the metaphysical essence of a being, cannot be conceived as constituting that essence. But the existence of a being is necessarily conceived

as presupposing the metaphysical essence of that being. Therefore.

D. Min. The existence of a contingent being is necessarily conceived as presupposing that being's metaphysical essence, *C.*, the existence of a necessary being is necessarily conceived as presupposing, etc., *N. D. Con.*

7. That perfection which is supreme amongst the perfections of God should be considered to be His metaphysical essence, as is true, for instance, in man, whose metaphysical essence is rational animality.

Now not self-existing being, i.e., self-existence, but self-existing intelligent being, i.e., subsisting or self-existing intelligence, is supreme amongst the perfections of God. Therefore.

D. Maj. The perfection which, amongst the perfections of God, is supreme, in this sense, that it must be considered fundamental in God, that it alone is the root-perfection which we derive from a consideration of creatures and which so includes the other perfections of God that they may be deduced from it, and so may be considered to flow from it, should be considered the metaphysical essence of God, *C.*, which is supreme in the sense that it expresses explicitly the highest determination or mode of self-existence, as those who press this difficulty claim subsisting intelligence does, *N. Cd. Min.*

Humphrey, *His Divine Majesty,* p. 62:

> "Intellectuality, which is self-existent, is itself already comprehended in self-existent life; and both intellectuality and self-existent life are comprehended ultimately in self-existent being."

St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica,* 1, 2, q. 2, a. 5, *Reply to Obj.* 2:

> "Being taken simply [self-existent being], in as much as it includes all perfection of being, surpasses life and all that follows it; for thus being itself includes all these. And in this sense Dionysius speaks. But if we consider being itself as participated in this or that thing, which does not possess the whole perfection of being, but has imperfect being, such as the being of any creature; then it is evident that being itself together with an additional

perfection is more excellent. Hence in the same passage Dionysius says that things that live are better than things that exist, and intelligent better than living beings." (Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.)

Being in creatures, therefore, since it is finite, and hence does not of itself include this or that determining perfection, increases in perfection with an increase in the perfections determining it; for example, there is an increase in perfection in creatures as we pass from being to living being; to living, sentient being; to living, sentient, intelligent being. Being in God, however, that is, self-existent being, as it is limitless, and hence includes in itself all perfections, is more perfect than any of its determining modes, since they are already so contained in it that they may be derived from it and considered to flow from it.

"Aseity," says Sala, Teodicea, p. 404, "can be considered as the source of the other perfections of God; because it is by being an unproduced and altogether independent Being, subsisting by Himself, that He possesses all other perfections; every other perfection being considered as a special mode of being." (Cited by Hickey, *Theodicaea,* p. 82, note.) Cf. also *Corollary* to the present thesis.

THESIS II

God is, in the fullest sense of the word, infinite.

PRENOTES TO THE THESIS.

HAVING established self-existence as the metaphysical essence of God, i.e., as that perfection which, from among the many perfections into which we distinguish God's infinite simplicity, we conceive as the perfection which makes God to be what He is fundamentally, which places Him in His own proper class of being, and distinguishes Him from all other beings, and which, finally, is the source from which we derive, and from which we conceive to flow, the other perfections of God, which, consequently we call attributes, it is but natural that we should now see what those attributes are, and show that a being who exists of Himself must necessarily possess them.

Divine attributes are perfections which belong to God alone, and which, according to our way of conceiving God, necessarily flow from His metaphysical essence.

They may be divided in many ways. The following division will be sufficient for us:

Essential attributes are those which modify or determine the essence of God, looked at in itself. They are unicity, infinity, simplicity, immutability, immensity, and eternity.

Operative attributes are those which modify or determine the essence of God, looked at as the source of divine activity. They are the intellect, the will, and the omnipotence of God.

Our concern now is with the essential attributes, and as we have already demonstrated the unicity of God, we will treat in this thesis of His infinity; that perfection, namely, which determines the essence of God to be such that none greater is conceiv-

able. By reason of His infinity, then, God is a being who is, not merely relatively perfect, but, in every way, and in the strictest and fullest sense of the word, absolutely perfect.

A perfect being is one who possesses those perfections, and only those perfections, which are suitable to its nature.

Essentially perfect is predicated of a being because of its possession of that which makes it to be what it is. It is quite evident that everything that is, must be essentially perfect.

Accidentally perfect is said of a being that possesses all those non-essentials, and only those, which are suitable to, and, hence, adorn, its nature. There are no accidental perfections in God.

A perfection, then, is something, some reality, which either essentially or accidentally is suitable to a being; goes to make it complete.

In a corollary we will give the two general classes into which perfections that are found in finite beings are divided, and after defining the different ways in which one may possess a perfection, we will tell in what way God possesses perfections of these two classes.

Infinite, in the broadest, i.e., most generic, sense of the word, is defined to be that which, in some way or other, is limitless.

Actually infinite is that which is actually limitless.

Potentially infinite is that which is never actually infinite or limitless; but, though ever actually finite, has the capacity to be, and in fact in some cases will be, actuated still further limitlessly. The eternal life which will be ours after death is infinite in this sense.

Absolutely infinite, i.e., infinite in the fullest sense of the word, is the being who actually possesses every possible perfection, and all of them in the most perfect possible way. He is a being than whom no greater can be conceived. This is the infinity which is predicated of God in our thesis.

In some way infinite is predicated of that which is infinite in some particular line, for example, infinite in duration, in extension; an infinite multitude.

Whether or not that which is infinite in some particular line only, may be actually infinite, is a question debated by philosophers. The truer solution of this question appears to be that only the absolutely infinite can be actually infinite.

ADVERSARIES.

1. **The Traditionalists,** who admit the infinity of God, but deny that reason can demonstrate it.
2. **Hobbes** and his followers, who admit that infinity may be predicated of God but only in the sense that we do not know of any limit to His perfections.
3. **The Positivists** and other **Agnostics,** who deny that the human intellect can know God; and the skeptical **Atheist** who doubts His existence.
4. **The Pantheists,** who, by identifying God with the world, and the materialistic **Atheist,** who, by denying the existence of anything superior to matter, do away altogether with an infinite God.
5. **Kant** and his numerous followers who deny to "pure reason" the power of demonstrating the existence of a real God, and who in virtue of a "postulate of practical reason" invoke the aid of a god, who is really man's inferior.

Strauss calls **Kant's** "postulate" of God an "attic room where God who has been retired from His office may be decently sheltered and employed." In the same sense writes **Donat,** *The Freedom of Science,* p. 46, basing his assertion on **Kant's** own words:

> "Kant holds that there are no duties towards God, since He is merely a creature of our mind. 'Since this idea proceeds entirely from ourselves, and is a product of ours, we have here before us a postulated being towards whom we cannot have an obligation . . . to have religion is a duty man owes to himself.' "

In a scholion in which we will cite some of the opinions of modern non-Catholic philosophers on the infinity of God, we will have more to say of **Kant's** "postulate" of God.

6. Among the many present-day non-Catholic philosophers and men of note, who either do away altogether with a personal God, or if they admit that He is a person, deny either explicitly or implicitly His infinity, may be mentioned **James, Höffding, Bergson, Schiller, Conybeare, Wiener, Royce, Paulsen, McTaggart, Corrance, Rashdall, T. H. Green, Overstreet, Lucius Miller, Drake, Leuba, John Burroughs, H. G. Wells, George Bernard Shaw,** etc.

PROOF OF THE THESIS.

A being who possesses all possible perfection in the most perfect possible way, is, in the fullest sense of the word, infinite. But God is such a being.

Therefore God is infinite in the fullest sense of the word.

Maj. In the Major we assert that a being who possesses all possible perfection in the most perfect possible way is actually limitless in his perfection.

To establish this Major it must be made clear that possible perfection is limitless, i.e., that perfection, as such, in its concept contains nothing which would admit of its actualization up to a certain point and no further; in other words, that perfection, as such, is by its very nature capable of being actuated limitlessly. If that be true, a being who possesses, i.e., actually has, all possible perfection is actually and in every possible way infinite.

That perfection, as such, is capable of being actuated we have immediate evidence of, in the many perfections actually existing in ourselves and the beings round about us; that it is capable of being actuated limitlessly is clear from the following consideration. If perfection, as such, were limited with regard to its actuability, its concept would have to imply

such limit. This, however, it cannot do, for the simple reason that the limit of perfection, as such, is non-perfection, and the concept of perfection cannot say its contradictory, non-perfection.

The limit of perfection, as such, is non-perfection, for all particular perfections, whatever be their determined nature, fall within the concept of perfection, as such, and hence cannot limit it. Since, then, no perfection limits perfection, as such, its limit, if such were possible, would be non-perfection.

Min. In the Minor we assert that God, the only necessarily existing being that is possible, actually possesses all possible perfection. This assertion is proved in two ways:

1. If God did not possess all possible perfection, existence as found in Him would be limited, either
   a. From within, i.e., because existence, as such, by its very nature is limited, or
   b. From without, because some efficient cause limited it, or because it is limited by His essence which, in that hypothesis, would at least have to be conceived as receiving it and as being actuated by it.

   None of these reasons, however, are valid, for
   a. Existence, as such, by its nature is not limited. If it were, its concept should explicitly, or at least implicitly, express such limit. But it does not do so, seeing that the limit of existence, as such, if it were given, would be its contradictory, non-existence, which the concept of existence, as such, in no way signifies. No concept can signify its contradictory. It is evident, then, that existence of itself says no limit, that no being is of limited perfection merely because it exists.

      That the limit of existence, as such, would be non-existence, is evident from the fact the concept of existence, as such, embraces within its extension all possible existences, hence none of them can limit it.

   b, 1. God's existence can be limited by no efficient cause,

for God has no efficient cause; existence is His of absolute necessity.

b, 2. God's existence cannot be limited by His essence, which, in that hypothesis, would at least have to be conceived as receiving it and as being actuated by it, because God's existence not only is not actually received in His essence, but it cannot even be conceived as received in His essence, for in that case it would be conceived as posterior to His essence, as actuating it and hence as depending on it. This, however, as we saw in the proof of *Thesis I,* is impossible.

This first proof of the Minor is developed by **St. Thomas,** *Contra Gentiles,* Bk. 1, c. 43, as follows:

"Being itself, considered absolutely, is infinite; for it can be participated by an infinite number of things in an infinite number of ways. Hence if we take a thing with finite being, this being must be limited by some other thing which is in some way the cause of that being. Now there can be no cause of God's being, since He is necessary of Himself. Therefore He has infinite being and Himself is infinite. . . .

"Every act inherent to something else receives its limitation from that in which it is; since that which is in another is in it according to the mode of the recipient. Wherefore an act that exists in no subject has no limitations; for instance, if whiteness were *per se* existent, the perfection of whiteness therein would not be limited from having whatever it is possible to have of the perfection of whiteness. Now God is an act nowise existing in another: because neither is He form in matter, as we have proved, nor is His being inherent to any form or nature, since He is His own being, as we have shown above. Therefore it follows that He is infinite." (Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.)

2. The second proof of the Minor, in which we asserted that God possesses every possible perfection, is this:

If God were a being of limited perfection, since possible perfection, as such, is limitless, other beings of equal perfection with God, and of higher perfection, should be possible. If so, then as necessary existence is one of God's essential perfections, those other beings of equal perfection

with God, or of higher perfection, should also necessarily exist. But this is impossible, for we have already proved that there is, and can be, only one necessary being.

CONFIRMATORY PROOFS OF THE THESIS.

Though the two arguments given in the above proof solidly establish our thesis, it will be helpful to develop briefly two more, from among the many other arguments which are offered in its support.

1. **Argument derived from the nature of possible being.**

This argument supposes the unicity of God to have already been established, independently, however, of His infinity. This we have already done in *God and Reason.*

The argument may be evolved briefly, as follows:

A being in whom are found all possible perfections limitlessly, is absolutely infinite.

But all possible perfections are found in God limitlessly. Therefore God is absolutely infinite.

Maj. The Major follows immediately from the definition of absolute infinity.

Min. If any possible degree of any perfection were not found in God, the absurd conclusion would necessarily follow that that degree of the perfection would be possible and, at the same time, impossible. It would be possible, according to the supposition we make. It would be impossible, because by its very nature it would exclude the possibility of ever coming into existence. For if that perfection in that, or a higher, degree did not exist in God, since every effect must in some way preexist in its cause, God could not produce it. Nor, for the same reason, could any other being produce it, for, as God is the source of all existing reality, no other being could possess it.

Suarez, *Metaphysica* (Metaphysics) D. 30, s.2, n.23, gives this argument.

2. **Argument derived from a consideration of the primary object of God's will.**

If God's will can be satisfied only in the possession of an infinite good, God is infinite.

But, God's will can be satisfied only in the possession of an infinite good.

Therefore God is infinite.

Maj. If God's will can be satisfied only by an infinite good, that good must exist, and God must possess it, otherwise potentiality would be found in God. That, however, is impossible, as God is pure act.

God, consequently, is infinite, for that infinite good must be identified with Him. This follows from the fact that God exists by His very essence. His existence, therefore, is absolutely independent of any other being, and hence His act of will also, which is identified with it. If the infinite good, however, which God must possess were not identified with Him, His act of will would not be absolutely independent, but would depend on that good.

Min. God's will can be satisfied only in the possession of an infinite good, for just as the formal object of the intellect is not this or that particular truth, but truth in general, so the formal object of the will is not this or that good, but good in general. Hence as the intellect can present to the will for its love a good greater than any finite good it already desires, the will can never rest in the possession of a finite good. Hence not only God's will, but even man's will can never be satisfied fully in the possession of a finite good.

Corollary I. On the way in which the various perfections which creatures possess are found in God.

We have proved that God is, in the fullest sense of the word, infinitely perfect. In a subsequent thesis we will prove that He is

absolutely simple, in other words, that the divine nature, in perfection infinite, neither has nor can have parts of any kind. Since, however, every perfection that is found in creatures must be found in some way in this absolutely simple and infinite divine perfection, and since our knowledge of God is expressed in no one concept, but in many which are derived from creatures and represent perfections, all of which, as they exist in creatures, are finite, and many of which exclude one another, it is absolutely necessary for us, in order that we may avoid obscurity and contradiction in thinking and speaking of God, to make some division of perfections as they are found in creatures, and to determine just how these perfections are found in God. This we will now do.

Perfections which are found in creatures may, for our present purpose, be divided into two broad divisions:

Pure (*simple, simpliciter dicta*) perfection is one which in its formal concept, i.e., considered merely as such a perfection, involves no imperfection, i.e., no limit. For example, life, knowledge, power.

Mixed (non-simple, *secundum quid*) perfection is one which in its formal concept, i.e., considered merely as such a perfection, involves imperfection, i.e., limit. For example, vegetative life, sensitive cognition.

A perfection may be possessed by a being in different ways. It will be sufficient to mention three. It is possessed

Formally, when it is found in the being according to its strict definition;

Eminently, when it is found in the being in a way more perfect than it is in itself. When God is said to possess a perfection eminently it is to be understood that He possesses that perfection in an infinitely perfect way, that is, in such wise that all imperfection or limit is positively excluded:

Virtually, when the being has the power to produce it.

In the light of these definitions it follows, then, that

1. **Pure perfections** are possessed by God, formally and eminently:

   Formally, for since a pure perfection in its formal concept involves no imperfection, its formal possession by God involves no imperfection in Him;

   Eminently, for whilst a pure perfection in itself involves no imperfection, i.e., excludes negatively, **or prescinds from,** all imperfection or limit, a pure perfection as it is in God, i.e., in an infinite way, excludes all imperfection or limit positively. In other words, it does not merely prescind from limit, it denies it.

2. **Mixed perfections** are possessed by God not formally but eminently:

   Not **formally,** for since in their formal concept they involve imperfection, their formal possession by God would involve imperfection in Him;

   Eminently, for they are possessed by God in an infinitely perfect way, and consequently without any of the imperfection or limit that is involved in their formal concept;

3. **All perfections** that are found in creatures are possessed by God

   Virtually, for He has the power to call them all into existence.

Corollary II. How the perfections which are found in creatures are predicated of God:

1. Perfections found in creatures and predicated of God are not predicated according to name only, or equivocally, for all perfections which are found in creatures in some way really exist in God.

2. At times some mixed perfections are predicated of God; for example, God is said to hear, to speak, to walk, etc. As these perfections involve imperfection, it is quite evident that they can be rightly predicated of God only figuratively.

3. Pure perfections, since they formally exist in God, are predicated of Him according to their strict or proper signification. This does not mean, however, that they are predicated of God and creatures in exactly the same way. They are not. They are predicated of them analogically, for they are necessarily predicated of God as they exist in Him, that is, primarily, i.e., in His own right; and, hence, with absolute necessity, absolute independence, and in an infinite degree; and they are necessarily predicated of creatures as they exist in them, that is, secondarily, i.e., consequent on God's will; and, hence, contingently, with absolute and continued dependence on God, and in a finite way. As God, then, in His own right and in an infinitely perfect way possesses these perfections, and as creatures possess them as a free gift of God, with essential dependence on Him, and in a finite way, they may be said to be predicated not only properly of God, but more properly of Him than of creatures.

Corollary III. On the three principal ways in which we apply to God the concepts we derive from creatures:

1. **By negation.** Some divine perfections are expressed negatively, that is, by excluding from God by way of negation imperfections found in creatures. Thus we say that God is infinite, immutable, immense, etc.

2. **By affirmation.** As pure perfections in their formal concept involve no imperfection, they are predicated of God at times by way of simple affirmation. In this way God is said to be wise, just, merciful, long-suffering, etc.

3. **By magnification.** All perfections, which in creatures are finite, are found in God in an infinitely perfect way. This preeminence we express by magnifying accordingly those perfections of creatures which we apply to God. Hence we speak of God as being omnipotent or all-powerful, omniscient or all-knowing, all-holy, infinitely merciful, etc.

Corollary IV. Does the existence of an infinitely perfect being exclude, as impossible, the existence of other beings really distinct from Him?

Thoroughgoing **Pantheists** and not a few **Pluralists** answer this question affirmatively. As a consequence, the former, who admit the existence of an infinite being, reject as impossible the existence of any other being outside of, and really distinct from, Him. The latter, acknowledging as they do the existence of many really distinct beings, deny the existence of an infinite one. According to these **Pantheists** and **Pluralists,** then, an infinite being is one who possesses all reality, and outside of whom, therefore, no other being can really exist. For if any other being other than the infinite being really existed, something greater than the infinite would exist, namely, the infinite and the finite combined.

Our answer to these assertions, briefly, is the following: God, the only infinitely perfect being that is or is possible, does possess all reality, i.e., all perfections, not however in such wise that beings existing really distinct from him are impossible. They are possible, and they do so exist. Furthermore, as there can be nothing more perfect than an infinitely perfect being, nothing greater, it follows that the infinite and finite combined are not more perfect, contain no more perfection, than the infinite alone. In the combination we have more beings possessing perfections but not more perfection. Hence, the perfection which is found in creatures can never be so added to God's perfection that the result will be anything more perfect, no more than the moments of time can be added to eternity to lengthen it. Why this must be will be more clearly understood if we consider what the infinity of God means, in itself and with regard to the way creatures possess the perfections which through God's infinite liberality are theirs.

1. The infinity of God requires that God possess every possible perfection and in the most perfect possible way, that is, with absolute independence, without imperfection and limitlessly. As a consequence no possible perfection can be found in a creature which does not preexist in God with all imperfection

removed and limitlessly. And, what is more, no possible perfection can be found in a creature which is not possessed by such creature with absolute and complete and continual dependence on God. If this were not so, if a creature possessed any perfection independently of God, he would, in so far forth, cease to be a contingent being. The power of God would be limited in his regard. There would be at least two necessary beings, and both of them finite. Both of which conclusions, however, we have proved to be false. There is but one necessary being, and that being is infinite.

2. The infinite perfection of God demands, therefore, that every perfection which is in a creature not only preexists in God in an infinitely perfect way, but also exists in the creature with absolute, complete, and continual dependence on God. Whatever perfection a creature has is totally produced by God, and modeled in a finite way after the perfections preexisting in His infinite essence; whatever perfection a creature has is totally and continually preserved in existence by the sustaining power of God; whatever action proceeds from a creature proceeds totally from God also; whatever effect is produced by the creature's action is totally produced by God also; whatever a creature is or can do must be directed by God towards Himself as the ultimate end of all creation. God, then, is the ultimate final cause of all things; the ultimate exemplary cause of all things; the primary efficient cause of all things, giving them their being, sustaining them in that being, and concurring with them efficiently and immediately in all their actions and in all the effects produced by these actions.

3. A creature, therefore, though he be really distinct from God, and have perfections really distinct from God's perfections, has no perfection which God does not from all eternity possess in an infinite degree, and, consequently, no perfection which does not say an absolute, complete and continual dependence on God. Of himself alone a creature is nothing,

with God it is something, and that something is essentially dependent in itself and all its actions on the infinite sustaining power of God. Whilst a sign denoting addition, therefore, may be placed between God and a creature to signify an increase in the number of beings possessing perfections, it can never be so placed to signify an increase in perfection above the perfection of God. If it could, the perfection of a creature would have to possess some worth above, and independently of, God's perfection. But the perfection of a creature possesses no worth above God's perfection, for whatever perfection it has is in an infinite degree in God; it possesses no worth independently of God's infinite perfection, for because of the very nature of God's infinite perfection, whatever perfection a creature has in itself or in its actions it possesses with an absolute dependence on God. And so, in a sense most true, but in no way pantheistic, "Through Him, and in Him, and with Him are all things."

In the list of difficulties given below, this difficulty and its solution, both in form, will again be found.

Corollary V. How the infinite perfection of God can be reconciled with the presence of evil in the world, especially moral evil.

The answer to this question will be given later on, in the third part of our Natural Theology, in a thesis dealing explicitly with the so-called Problem of Evil.

Scholion. Present-day philosophy and God's infinity.

Though **Kant** in his *Pure Reason* develops the idea of a Supreme Being, one of whose attributes is infinity, and in his Practical Reason postulates that Being's existence, nevertheless he must be considered one of the chief adversaries to our thesis.

His speculative reason knows nothing, and can know nothing, of a real God, and, hence, it develops, and can develop, only an idea of the infinite to which corresponds no known or knowable reality. And the attempts of his practical reason, which is not rea-

son at all, to bring back the infinite God his speculative reason has exiled as unknowable, are vain, since a postulated being, of whose existence we neither have, nor can have, any knowledge, is, as far as we are concerned, as though he were not.

What is more, even though God could be given back to us by a postulate of practical reason, we should find that Kant has deprived Him of His infinite perfection. For if God is not the source of all morality, if there is no eternal divine law that man is bound to obey, and, consequently, if in the moral order man is a law unto himself and is bound to obey only himself and not God, if man, therefore, is morally autonomous—and Kant insists that all this is true—then God is no longer infinite, for man owing Him no duty, is morally independent of Him; is not subject to Him in those actions which are distinctively human—his free, his deliberate, actions. Nay more, God is made subservient to man, for God's existence is postulated not because without Him, as man's moral superior and the supreme lawgiver, the moral order could not be explained, but because without Him, as ruler of physical nature, all-powerful to harmonize it with man's moral endeavors, man could not hope to reach that happiness which he merits by obeying not God, but his own nature. God is man's agent in supplying the happiness which man has deserved independently of Him.

Cf. **Kant,** *Pure Reason* (**Max Müller's** Translation, 2 Ed.), pp. 512, 514 ff., 558 ff.; *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morality* (**Kant's** *Theory of Ethics,* **Abbott's** Translation, 6 Ed.), pp. 16 ff., 51; *Practical Reason* (*Ibid.*), pp. 179 ff., 206, 221 ff., 231, 240 ff.

Johnston Estep Walter, "Kant's Moral Theology," *Harvard Theological Review,* July, 1917, in the course of a searching and destructive criticism of Kant's moral proof for God's existence, presents clearly the two points we have just insisted on, namely, that Kant rejects God as a known or knowable Being and degrades Him as a postulated one. In *God and Reason,* the first part of our *Natural Theology,* we quoted some passages from this article, and as these passages have a direct bearing on the matter now

under consideration, that is, God's infinite perfection, we quote them again with some others equally pertinent:

"The first fact to be noted is Kant's view that the theoretic reason does indeed furnish us with the idea of God as the free and intelligent author of all things. This idea, it is said, is a primitive and necessary conception of reason considered as a faculty distinct from sense and understanding, and higher. If reason is excited by the understanding or acts in view of its operations, it still produces the idea from itself, it owes nothing in generating the character of the idea to any influence or communication from sense or understanding or any external source. The idea is the 'offspring of reason alone' acting according to its 'original laws.'

"But while Kant thus ascribes to the idea of God so eminent an origin and so special a character, he repeatedly and very earnestly denies that we have in the idea any ground for thinking that there is an object corresponding to it. He denies the possibility of passing, by any legitimate intellectual process from the subjective idea to an objective being. He asserts that it is 'a mere innovation of scholastic wisdom to attempt to pick out of an entirely arbitrary idea the existence of the object corresponding to it'; and again, that God is a 'perfectly unknown being,' 'a something of whose existence in itself we have not the least conception.' The question whether there is a real God, or whether it is right or permissible to believe in, or practically assume, his existence, Kant removes entirely from the determination of the intellect and speculative reason. The speculative reason creates the idea of God, but gives not the least knowledge or assurance of a being answering thereto. It cannot tell that there is such a being; yet also it cannot tell that there is not." P. 273.

"Kant comes to the general conclusion respecting the classic theistic arguments, that 'no satisfactory proof whatever, from merely speculative reason, is possible, in support of the existence of a Being corresponding to our transcendent idea.'" P. 276.

"He [Kant] withdraws true theology from the domain of the theoretical reason, and then assigns it to the domain of practical reason. The theoretical reason is supposed to have no importance for religion. It gives us not the least help to getting hold upon or discovering the primary object of religion, God; it furnishes no way of passing from the 'primitive' and 'necessary' idea of God which it itself produces, to a corresponding object. Only practical reason is of service in apprehending God. In this wise the practical reason has primacy over the theoretical. Morality, or the law of moral reason, demands for its own support or its own interests, the postulate of a God as the governor of nature; and on that ground alone, without any theoretic or scientific knowledge, the postulate deserves to be accepted as true. By this scheme Kant fulfils in religion his significant general proposition regarding the objective validity of the ideas of reason: 'I had to remove knowledge in order to make room for belief.' . . .

"From this general view we proceed to consider the peculiar character and course of Kant's moral proof of the existence of God with some special

attention, in order to obtain some idea of its real worth, and to ascertain how well it justifies the great claims made for it by Kant and his followers.

"The main line of argument runs in this wise: the moral law commands us to make the *summum bonum* the ultimate object of our endeavors. The *summum bonum* consists of two elements, morality or virtue and happiness. Virtue is the 'first and principal element' ('it is worth of the person, and his worthiness to be happy'); happiness is the inferior element, it is conditioned by virtue. Practical reason demands that the virtuous—those who are governed by the imperative and unselfish voice of duty—shall obtain a degree of happiness proportionate to their virtue. Now since it is made a duty, a moral necessity, for the finite rational agent to realize and promote the *summum bonum*, it must be possible; but it is not entirely possible for the rational agent himself, because he is not the cause of the world and nature. He cannot then make nature harmonize with his moral mission and facilitate the accomplishment of it. He cannot bring nature to favor him so that he shall receive the degree of happiness he conceives is due his virtue. Besides, unintelligent nature, could not of itself distribute happiness in exact proportion to virtue. It is, then, necessary to believe in the existence of God, a being who is the cause and ruler of nature; who possesses adequate power to control nature so that it shall be in harmony with and promote the interests of morality—the happiness of the virtuous—and possesses the intelligence necessary to understand the true relation between virtue and happiness, or the exact correspondence happiness should have to virtue. This is the substance of Kant's moral proof of the existence of God. . . .

"It should be attentively observed that Kant assumes the existence of God, not as necessary to the possibility of the whole of the *summum bonum*, but only one of its two elements, and that the inferior element, namely, happiness. Kant never postulates a God as necessary to the possibility of the 'first and principal element' of the *summum bonum*, virtue or morality. More fully it should be noted, that he does not treat God as the author of the community of moral agents in the world, or as the supreme object of their moral reverence, or as the producer of moral law, or the inspirer of moral life, or as himself having ordained that virtue shall be accompanied by proportionate happiness, or as having made it a duty to promote the *summum bonum;* that is to say, he does not postulate a God as necessary for any of the greater objects and concerns of morality, but only, or primarily, as the agent of the rather subordinate office of securing for the virtuous the happiness which they think they ought to have. Kant regards man as morally autonomous, as giving moral law to himself and obeying it himself, as the sole author of his own virtue. To assume that men are dependent on God for the moral law and for virtue would be postulating a species of heteronomy to which Kant is always decidedly opposed. He will not accept moral law even from God; he firmly claims autonomy. The supreme moral object for men is the moral law, which they produce of themselves and impose upon themselves. In his moral theory the

finite rational agent is really greater than God, for he performs a higher order of work. . . .

"As far as our investigation has gone, we seem to be justified even in the conclusion that Kant's moral theistic proof is one of the most oddly conceived and frail arguments ever offered by any philosopher for the existence of God or for belief in God. Praise has been lavished on it by some who have not studied it enough to ascertain what it is and how intrinsically poor it is." Pp. 282 ff.

"It is a hollow peace that was arranged by Kant between the theoretical reason and the practical reason, according to which we are to be satisfied to act as if there were a God [who, as postulated by Kant, is inferior to man], while we are still conscious that we have not the least theoretical or scientific knowledge of Him." P. 295.

Besides exposing the utter worthlessness of Kant's endeavors to find God through his *Practical Reason,* **Mr. Walter** in the same article touches on not a few of the other glaring and fundamental defects of Kant's philosophy, and, in addition, has this to say about the pernicious influence of that philosophy on current thought:

"Kant's division of reason, or the use of reason, into theoretical and practical, and the assignment of primacy to the practical in morality and religion, have had an immense influence upon the subsequent theistic and ethical ontology and epistemology, and seem in latter days to be more influential than ever. This is manifest in the discussions of *'Intellectualism,'* and *'Voluntarism';* in the propaganda of 'pragmatism'; in the very superior place ascribed to 'value-judgments' over intellectual or existential judgments. Practical need, serviceableness, utility, has been given primacy in general ontology and epistemology. It has been avowed that the useful is true, that practical value is the criterion of reality. Says Kaflan: 'the relation to the will and our practical purposes is the sole measure of reality given to us.'" P. 283.

Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience,* acknowledging Kant's leadership, states the case against reason much more forcibly, and with the firm assurance of one who is fully convinced of its truth. He writes:

"The intellect has evidently been assuming too much importance, not only in religion but in life at large. Hardly otherwise would so much satisfaction be taken in showing this quite human organ to its subordinate place, so much eagerness in putting our valuables into some other custody. . . .

"Since the impressive effort of Kant to mark out a strictly limited province for the valid use of the theoretical reason—a province which all our

major interests lie safely outside of—thinkers of the first rank (with exceptions, but with singular accord) have added some stroke to the picture of reason's retirement, representing it as a servant of the will, or as a tool and creature of some darker and more primal reality—blind impulse, immediate feeling, the unconscious. In religion more than elsewhere the intellectual disaffection is sweeping. One who now ventures to discuss religion from the side of cosmology as a 'theory of original causation' seems to be strangely remote from the point; the inoffensive words, creed, dogma, theology, are almost words of reproach. The whole apparatus of reason in religion has retreated in importance, in favor of a more substantial basis—which we have agreed to call feeling." P. 37.

Kant said: "I have to remove knowledge in order to make room for belief." He removed knowledge and made room, not merely for belief, but also for "instinct, the subconscious, the coconscious, feeling, will, value-judgment, social sense, intuition, mystic reason, perhaps *l'élan vital,*" i.e., for any subjective norm you please, in other words, for any whim or fancy or feeling you may choose, as a guide in religion and morality, or, for that matter, in any of the more important concerns of life. And the result in modern philosophy is simple chaos.

A fuller consideration of Kant's philosophy, especially in its bearing on Natural Theology and, more particularly, on our proofs for the existence of God, together with a sufficiently complete and vivid picture of the resulting chaos just mentioned, will be found in *God and Reason,* the first part of our Natural Theology. A thorough presentation and refutation of Kant's philosophical theories would require a special treatise. We may say in passing, however, that they are fundamentally erroneous and absolutely untenable. What is more, the very philosophers who follow Kant's lead in degrading reason are forced to admit the many obscurities, unwarranted assumptions, unsustained pretensions, and open contradictions of his philosophy.

The knowledge gained, through this momentary digression, of the hostile attitude of modern thought to reason, and, hence, to our reasoned philosophy, and of the inherent weakness of Kant's philosophy, the acknowledged source of it, will help us not a little in valuing at their true worth the views and objections of our adversaries.

Besides Kant there are many others who either explicitly or implicitly deny God's infinity. We quote from a few of the more modern ones.

Bergson, *Creative Evolution:*

"Now, if the same kind of action [creative] is going on everywhere, whether it is that which is making itself or whether it is that which is striving to remake itself, I simply express this probable similitude when I speak of a center from which worlds shoot out like rockets in a fireworks display—provided, however, that I do not present this center as a thing, but as a continuity of shooting out. God, thus defined, has nothing of the ready-made; He is unceasing life, action, freedom." P. 262.

Emil Wilm, *Henri Bergson, A Study in Radical Evolution,* makes this comment on the passage from Bergson just cited:

"God is, therefore, [according to Bergson] not a creative force in the sense of a permanent personal cause who by the action of his will once for all creates things, or continually produces them. God is not a substance, and his creatures are not things." P. 19.

Rashdall, *The Faith and the War.* (A series of essays by many authors. Edited by **Foakes-Jackson.** Reviewed in *The Church Quarterly Review,* October, 1916):

"If the limitation of power which explains the causality of evil by a perfectly righteous will is not to be explained by the existence of beings or forces which are outside of Him, it must be due to an internal or original limitation of Power. . . . God is limited simply by His own eternal nature. . . . We can only explain the presence of evil in a world which that Spirit [God] causes, either by supposing Him to have a limited amount of Power, or a limited amount of Love or Good-will." Pp. 87 ff.

McTaggart's idea of God is given by **Rashdall,** *Philosophy of Religion:*

"Dr. McTaggart is an Idealist; he recognizes the impossibility of matter without mind. For him nothing exists but spirits, but he does not recognize the necessity for any one all-embracing or controlling spirit; the only spirits in his universe are limited minds like men and animals. . . . He recognizes . . . an Absolute, but this Absolute is not a single spiritual being, but a Society; or, if it is to be called a single spiritual being, it is a being which exerts or manifests itself only in a plurality of limited consciousnesses." P. 96.

James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience:*

"The ideal power with which we feel ourselves in connection, the 'God' of ordinary men, is, both by ordinary men and by philosophers, endowed with

certain of those metaphysical attributes which in the lecture on philosophy I treated with such disrespect. He is assumed as a matter of course to be 'one and only' and to be 'infinite'; and the notion of many finite gods is one which hardly any one thinks it worth while to consider, and still less uphold. Nevertheless, . . . I feel bound to say that religious experience, as we have studied it, cannot be cited as unequivocally supporting the infinitist belief. The only thing that it unequivocally testifies to is that we can experience union with something larger than ourselves. . . . All that the facts require is that the power should be both other and larger than our conscious selves. . . . It need not be infinite, it need not be solitary. It might conceivably even be only a larger and more godlike self, . . . and the universe might conceivably be a collection of such selves, of different degrees of inclusiveness, with no absolute unity realized in it at all." Pp. 524, 525. See also *Thesis 9, Scholion.*

Schiller, *Riddles of the Sphinx:*

"It follows that God is finite, or rather that to God, as to all realities, infinite is an unmeaning epithet. . . . No evidence can prove an infinite cause of the world, for no evidence can prove anything but a cause adequate to the production of the world, but not infinite. To infer the infinite from the finite is a fallacy like inferring the unknowable from the known, and all arguments in favor of an infinite God must commit it. We argue with finite minds from finite data, and our conclusions must be of like nature." P. 304. Cf. also pp. 348 ff., 360.

Höffding, *Philosophy of Religion:*

"If God and the world are to be regarded as two different beings or powers, then they must naturally limit one another. One stops where the other begins. . . . But in that case God cannot be an infinite being." P. 62.

Overstreet, "God as the Common Will," *Hibbert Journal,* October, 1914:

"The old type of religious infinite was anti-democratic, in the sense that it required of creatures no fundamental assistance. It was a perfect reality, sufficient unto itself. Out of the fulness of its superiority it had brought into being creatures lowlier than itself. It demanded of them adoration, not cooperation. The conception, therefore, was essentially aristocratic. The universe was regarded fundamentally a devolution, not an evolution. Perfection came first, then imperfection. . . . It has been too easily assumed [?] in the past that God, the Spirit, is the creator and sustainer of all. . . . The divine life is that larger order of law and ideality which . . . is flesh of our flesh and spirit of our spirit; an order of life in which we indeed live and move, yet which in turn has its very being and growth by and through the life and achievements of all living creatures. . . . The evolution of the world, in short, is the evolution of God-life in and through us all." P. 172. See also *Thesis 7, Scholion; Thesis 9, Scholion.*

DIFFICULTIES

1. If God is infinite, i.e., if He contains all perfections, it is impossible that any perfection, i.e., that any being, exist outside of Him.

   But God contains all perfections. Therefore.

   D. Maj. It is impossible that any other infinite being exist, *C.*, that any other being exist, which is finite, *Subd.*, it is impossible that any finite being exist which in the possession of any of its perfections is independent of God, *C.*, it is impossible that any finite being exist outside of God, which in the possession of all its perfections is utterly dependent on God, and in such wise that all its perfections, looked at generically or specifically, are found in God formally and eminently, or eminently; and also virtually; and all its perfections, looked at individually or singularly, i.e., inasmuch as they are *its* perfections, are found in God not formally but eminently, and also virtually, *N. Cd. Min.*

   In the prenotes and proof of the thesis and in the corollaries will be found the reasons for all of the distinctions just given, with the exception, perhaps, of one, namely, why the perfections of finite beings, when considered individually, or as their own, cannot be found in God formally. The reason is simply this: if they were so found in God, finite beings, who are really distinct from God, would be really identified with Him.

2. If a finite being really distinct from an infinite being is possible, in the two taken together will be found more perfection than in the infinite being alone.

   But in the two taken together it is impossible to find more perfection than in the infinite being alone. (An infinite being is one than whom nothing greater is possible.) Therefore.

   D. Maj. In the two combined will be found more beings, i.e., a greater number of beings, possessing perfections, *C.*, more perfection, *Subd.*, if all the perfections in the finite being are precontained in the infinite being, with

all their imperfections removed and in an infinite degree, and consequently are possessed by the finite being with utter dependence on the infinite being, as their supreme exemplary, final and efficient cause, who as such supreme efficient cause not only brings all beings into existence but sustains them in existence and concurs with them in all their actions, *N.*, if finite beings do not in this way possess their perfections, *C. Cd. Min. Cf. Corollary 4.*

3. A being whose essence is existence, is not an infinitely perfect being. (Existence, inasmuch as it can be found in any actual being however imperfect, is not synonymous with infinite perfection.)

   But God is a being whose essence is existence. Therefore.

   D. Maj. A being—whose essence physically considered, i.e., considered as actual, is contingent existence, which is really identified with that actual essence, and which existence may, by mentally prescinding from its individuating and other determining notes, be abstractly considered as mere existence—is not an infinitely perfect being, *C.*, a being—whose essence metaphysically considered, i.e., considered absolutely or merely in itself, in other words, apart, or prescinding from existence, is found nevertheless to be absolutely necessary existence, which though determined, in the sense that it is a singular concrete existence, is not determined, in the sense that it is limited to this or that degree of perfection, and hence, whose metaphysical essence is real, actual, limitless existence—is not an infinitely perfect being, *N. Cd. Min.*

4. A being, who is so *this* being that he excludes the perfections in *that* being distinct from him, is necessarily finite. (He does not include all perfection.)

   But God is a being who is so *this* being that He excludes the perfections in *that* being distinct from Him. Therefore.

D. Maj. A being—who is so *this* being that though he does not formally contain the perfections of *that* being, looked at as its individual perfections, still contains them eminently and virtually, and who moreover contains all of *that* being's perfections, looked at generically or specifically, with all their imperfections removed, in a limitless way, and on whom, consequently, that being depends utterly and continually for every perfection it has—is necessarily finite, *N.*, a being, who is so *this* being that he is not related to *that* being in the way just noted, is necessarily finite, *C. Cd. Min.*

5. A being who is absolutely simple cannot possess all the different perfections which are found in creatures. (Many of these perfections exclude one another.)

   But God is a being who is absolutely simple. Therefore.

   D. Maj. He cannot possess all those perfections formally, *C.*, he cannot possess all of these perfections in the highest degree, and without any of their imperfections, in such wise, namely, that no one of them excludes another, i.e., he cannot possess the mixed perfections of creatures eminently, their pure perfections formally and eminently, and all of their perfections virtually, *N. Cd. Min.*

   One perfection does not exclude another because of the perfection or reality that is in it, but because of the limited nature of that perfection or reality, i.e., because of the imperfection that is involved in it. It is clear, then, that if God so possesses all the perfections that creatures have that none of their imperfections are found in Him, all of those perfections as existing in God can, without any contradiction, be really united in the one, simple, infinite perfection, which is God Himself.

6. If a pure perfection prescinds from other perfections of different kinds, and hence is by its very nature limited, it cannot be found formally in God.

   But a pure perfection prescinds from other perfections of

different natures. (Life, for instance, does not formally include, i.e., it prescinds from, holiness.) Therefore.

D. Maj. If a pure perfection, formally considered, i.e., considered merely as it is in itself, perfectly prescinded from, i.e., in no way included or expressed other perfections, it would be of its very nature limited, and so could not exist in God formally, *C.,* if a pure perfection, formally considered, does not perfectly prescind from other perfections, but so prescinds from them only when predicated of creatures, and, hence, by reason of the finite mode of existence perfections have in creatures, they cannot be found formally in God, *Subd.,* they cannot be found in God formally, and eminently, i.e., limitlessly, *N.,* they cannot be found in God formally and not eminently, i.e., in a finite degree, *C. Cd. Min. D. Con.*

Life, for instance, which is a pure perfection, formally prescinds from, i.e., does not include, holiness, as such. Life, however, considered as it exists in a limited way in a creature, prescinds perfectly from, i.e., in no way formally includes, holiness as it is found in a creature. Finally, life considered as it exists in God, i.e., limitlessly, formally excludes divine holiness, as such, but formally includes divine holiness, as something divine. In other words, all perfections considered as they exist in God, i.e., considered as divine, are not only really identified, but also so identified in concept that they prescind from one another not perfectly, but imperfectly only. The solution of this difficulty will be more clearly understood after the next thesis, on the simplicity of God, has been explained.

7. If God were infinitely perfect, and, consequently, infinitely good, holy, merciful, and powerful, neither physical nor moral evil would be found in the world.

But evil, both physical and moral, is found in the world. Therefore.

The solution of this difficulty will be given in the third part of our Natural Theology. There the question of evil in the world will be fully considered.

THESIS III

God is absolutely simple.

PRENOTES TO THE THESIS.

ANOTHER essential attribute of God, and which, like absolute infinity, is solely God's, is absolute simplicity. More than once in former theses we have referred to this perfection as a divine perfection, and taken for granted that its possession by God could be solidly demonstrated. After an explanation of some few terms, the exact meaning of which must be clearly understood if we wish for a thorough grasp of our thesis, this demonstration will be given.

Simplicity, understood in its proper or primary sense, is opposed to composition. Both are species of unity. That which is one, therefore, may be said to be simple, or compound, i.e., composite.

One. A thing is said to be one, which is undivided in itself.

Compound. It is a compound or composite thing, if, though one, it be composed of parts. It is a thing, therefore, which, though undivided in itself, is, nevertheless, divisible into the parts which constitute it such a compound.

Simple. It is simple, if, in addition to being one, or undivided in itself, it has no parts, i.e., no parts of the kind excluded by its simplicity. It is a thing, therefore, which is undivided in itself, and indivisible, in the order in which it is found to be simple.

Absolutely simple. A thing is said to be absolutely simple when it excludes parts, strictly so called, of all kinds. However, as all different kinds of parts may be gathered under two general divisions, namely, real parts and conceptual parts, i.e., parts into which an object is mentally divided, an absolutely simple thing is sometimes defined to be a thing which excludes all parts, either real or conceptual.

Why composition, strictly so called, is necessarily excluded from God. Since parts, by their very nature, if they be real, really complement and perfect one another, and hence really depend on one another, and are really finite; and, if they be conceptual, must be conceived as perfecting one another, and hence, as dependent and finite, it should be almost immediately evident to us, from what we already know of God, that neither real nor conceptual parts can be found in Him. As an absolutely necessary being, He can in no way be, nor be conceived to be, dependent; and as an infinitely perfect being, He can in no way be, nor be conceived to be, finite. The proof of our thesis will be drawn from a consideration of these two points. Before developing it, however, some further explanation of terms is required.

The relation between composition and distinction. Though it be true that wherever there is composition there is also necessarily distinction between part and part, for without distinction there can be no multiplicity, and without multiplicity there can be no union or composition, still it must not be thought that every kind of distinction, even when affecting one and the same object, necessarily implies composition in that object. With regard to God, for instance, though we insist that He is absolutely simple, still in our finite knowledge of Him we admit more than one kind of distinction.

To understand, then, just what kinds of distinctions imply composition in the objects affected by them, and what kinds do not, and hence to get a better knowledge of what composition is, it will be necessary to define distinction and give its various divisions. All this, finally, will make for a clearer understanding of simplicity, the contrary of composition.

Distinction is opposed to identity, and, hence, it involves plurality of some kind; and plurality is found where one and another and a third, etc., are found.

Real (physical) distinction. A real or physical distinction is one which exists between things which, in themselves,

or independent of and prior to all mental operation, are not identical, i.e., are this, that and the other, etc.

Mental (conceptual) distinction. A mental distinction, as opposed to a real distinction, is one which exists between different concepts of one and the same reality. It is the result of a mental act of precision by which the same object is represented by different concepts. It is the denial, then, of identity only between concepts of one and the same reality. The reality so conceived may be one with a oneness of identity or a oneness of continuity.

Mental distinction which is purely subjective (purely mental). This distinction exists between two or more concepts of one and the same reality, which have the same formal object, i.e., represent the same aspect of the object, and differ only in the subjective way in which that aspect is viewed; for example, when the same objective aspect, i.e., the same formal object, is expressed subjectively more clearly in one concept than in another. This happens when I conceive John as a man, and as a rational animal.

Hence, when two concepts of the same object are given, which are distinct with a mental distinction which is purely subjective, the object is not mentally divided, but the same objective mental aspect is represented by both concepts in subjectively different ways.

This is expressed technically by saying that this distinction is given when an object which is really one is conceived by two or more subjective concepts which represent differently the same formal object, i.e., the same objective aspect of the object so conceived.

As an object so conceived is in no way objectively distinguished or divided, it is quite evident that a mental distinction which is purely subjective in no way implies composition in its object.

Mental distinction which is also objective (subjective and objective; called also virtual extrinsic). This dis-

tinction, the result of an act of mental precision, is one which exists between different objective concepts, i.e., different mentally conceived objective aspects, of one and the same object or reality. This distinction, then, is not only subjective, i.e., on the part of the mind representing, but also objective, i.e., on the part of the object represented. The object is mentally divided, either perfectly or imperfectly.

The objective concepts, or conceived aspects of the object so divided, which are really one, may be one with a oneness of identity, as, for instance, are animality and rationality in a given individual man; or one with a oneness of continuity, as, for instance, are the conceived and mentally distinct right-hand and left-hand parts of a one continuously extended material object.

Besides being called a mental distinction which is also objective, this distinction is sometimes called a virtual, extrinsic distinction.

It is called virtual, because, though not a real distinction, it nevertheless has, at least in one respect, the virtue or force of a real distinction. For just as contradictory predicates may be predicated of really distinct objects, so may they also be predicated of different mentally conceived objective aspects of one and the same reality. For example, I may say that a man by reason of his animality is like to a brute, though by reason of his rationality he is not like to it.

It is called extrinsic, because the actual, or proximate, virtue, or capacity, of receiving contradictory predicates which the object so distinguished has, is extrinsic, or comes from without. It is had only after an act of mental precision. The reason, however, why such an act of precision is possible, i.e., the fundamental, or remote, capacity of receiving such predicates, is intrinsic to the object, and may be, for example, the possession of a perfection which contains within itself perfections which are found

really distinct from one another in other beings, etc. So, for instance, animality which is really identified with rationality in man, is found really distinct from it in a brute. Hence in the man, where they are really identified, the mind may make a precision and consider animality in one concept and rationality in another. The result is a distinction which is mental and objective.

We noted above that a mental distinction which is also objective may be either perfect or imperfect. These divisions must now be explained.

Mental distinction which is objective and perfect. This distinction is had when the different objective concepts, i.e., the different mentally-conceived objective aspects, of the object, so prescind from, or exclude each other, that no one of them in any way formally includes another, i.e., no one of them, when considered according to that which is properly and necessarily signified by it, in any way includes another. For example, if I consider John as a rational animal, animal formally, i.e., when considered according to that which is properly and necessarily signified by it, in no way includes rational. If it did, the concept animal could not be predicated of a brute.

As this distinction is objective and perfect, i.e., as the object is mentally divided into completely and perfectly distinct parts, it is quite evident that an object so distinguished may be conceived as a compound. This composition is generally called metaphysical composition, whether the object considered be one with a oneness of identity or with a oneness of continuity. Some, however, in the latter case call it mathematical composition, and restrict the name metaphysical composition to the former.

Mental distinction which is objective and imperfect (logical). This distinction is had when one objective concept, i.e., one mentally conceived objective aspect of an object, really identified with another, so prescinds

from it that it formally, i.e., considered according to that which is properly and necessarily objectively signified by, or included in it, does not include the other conceived aspect or perfection, as such aspect or perfection, though it does include it totally, implicitly and obscurely, however, as a perfection of the being of whom both are predicated. An example of this distinction as applied to the perfections of God will help to a better understanding of its nature. That God's perfections can be so distinguished by us, nay more, that the limited capacity of our intellects and God's infinite nature necessitate such a distinction will be shown later.

When, then, I conceive, for example, divine mercy, since, as will be proved below, neither real nor perfect objective mental distinctions are given between the perfections of God, I necessarily conceive the whole Godhead under the formality or aspect of mercy. Indeed it is more true to say that God is mercy, than to say that God is merciful. Under the aspect or formality, therefore, of divine mercy, I necessarily conceive or include all the other divine perfections, e.g., divine justice, holiness, etc. I do not include then, however, *as* justice, *as* holiness, etc., i.e., as such perfections, for the concept of mercy does not represent justice, etc., as such. Hence when I conceive divine mercy, I do not conceive divine justice, etc., as such, though I do conceive it as something divine. God's perfections, therefore, we distinguish from one another with a distinction which is mental, objective, imperfect.

When considering the perfections of God, we not only may, but we must make use of imperfect objective mental distinction or precision. We may make use of such imperfect objective mental distinction when we consider God's perfections, since that distinction implies in Him no imperfection, i.e., no properly so-called composi-

tion. For, since the concept we form of each perfection of God, formally, i.e., considered according to its proper and necessary signification, expresses that perfection, explicitly and clearly, as such, and all the other divine perfections, implicitly and obscurely, not as such, and hence not according to their multiplicity, but as included in the divine reality explicitly conceived, it follows that each concept of a divine perfection formally expresses the whole Godhead, clearly under one aspect or formality; and obscurely with regard to the countless other aspects under which God may be further considered. When, therefore, two or more concepts of God's perfections are taken in combination, as each formally expresses the whole Godhead but not clearly according to all its countless aspects, the combination is not a mental union or composition of parts, but a clearer expression of the whole Godhead, totally though less clearly conceived in each single concept of the combination.

What is more, when considering God, not only we may, but we must make use of this imperfect objective mental distinction. The infinite simplicity of God and the limited capacity of our intellect demand it. For, just as our limited intellect is incapable of expressing in one concept all the finite perfections of a finite being, so when it conceives the infinite simplicity of God, by means of concepts derived from creatures, it is infinitely less capable of conceiving it in one concept. If then we wish to come to a fuller knowledge of God, we must necessarily multiply our concepts of Him, in such wise, however, that no composition, strictly so called, results from such multiplication. Hence, when we consider God we are forced to make use of mental distinction which is objective and imperfect.

Logical composition and God's absolute simplicity.

The term, logical composition, is sometimes given to the combination of the imperfectly distinct objective concepts, i.e., conceived aspects, of God mentioned above. In other words,

what are not conceptual parts of God are considered as if they were such parts. It is evident that this composition is not a true mental composition. It implies no imperfection in God. Hence it can be admitted.

The different species of real and conceptual composition. In excluding all real and conceptual composition, God excludes:

I. Substantial composition.

1. **Real or physical,** both integral and essential.
2. **Conceptual—Metaphysical;** between essence and existence; genus and its differentiating note or perfection; nature and singularity or individuality; nature and personality.
3. **Conceptual—Mathematical;** between the extended parts of a continuously extended body, i.e., of a body which is one with a oneness of continuity, looked at as such.

II. Accidental composition, i.e., between substance and accident.

1. **Real or physical;** between substance and accident really distinct from one another.
2. **Conceptual or metaphysical;** between substance and accident distinct from one another with a perfect, objective, mental distinction.

ADVERSARIES.

Practically all the adversaries to the preceding thesis may be cited as adversaries to the present thesis also. They do not deny it directly, and explicitly, or in so many words, for the simple reason that they are not concerned with the truth it asserts. But they do deny it implicitly, both indirectly and directly, in many ways: by denying the existence of a real, personal God; by asserting that the human intellect cannot naturally come to a sure knowledge either of His existence or of His wonderful attributes; by setting up as God a finite, changeable being, limited in all his powers, etc. Among the above are to be included almost all modern

non-Catholic philosophers. The names of some are mentioned in the preceding thesis. In a *scholion* to the same thesis, and in one to the following thesis, some of them are briefly quoted.

PROOF OF THE THESIS.

A being who necessarily excludes all composition, both real and conceptual, is absolutely simple.

But God necessarily excludes all composition, both real and conceptual.

Therefore God is absolutely simple.

Maj. All composition may be divided into real and conceptual. For a being is either really composite or not. If it is not, any other composition that might possibly be attributed to it could be mentally apprehended. In that case the intellect would necessarily so mentally divide the object that the divisions would be distinct from one another with a perfect objective distinction. The result would be a conceptually composite being. As all composition, then, is either real or conceptual, a being which necessarily excludes both, is necessarily absolutely simple.

Min. 1st Part. God necessarily excludes accidental composition, both real and conceptual.

An accident modifies its substance; really, if it is real, conceptually, if it is conceptual. Since God, however, by His very essence is infinitely perfect, He cannot be really modified, nor can He be conceived as though He were modified.

2nd Part. God necessarily excludes substantial composition, both real and conceptual.

Real substantial parts really perfect one another; conceptual substantial parts must be conceived as though they perfected one another. In God, however, who is infinitely perfect, everything that is must be infinitely perfect. Hence nothing in God can be really perfected; nothing can be conceived as though it were perfected.

Scholion I. The virtual, intrinsic distinction.

We spoke of an imperfect, mental, objective distinction which our limited intellects are forced to make between many of God's perfections. This distinction was called a virtual distinction, because, though not actually real, it might be said to be virtually real, since it had, at least in one respect, the virtue or force of a real distinction, seeing that by its use a thing really one was enabled to receive contradictory predicates. This distinction was also called extrinsic, because the actual or proximate virtue, or capacity, of receiving contradictory predicates, came from without, i.e., after an act of mental precision. For instance, after making an imperfect, objective, mental precision between God's mercy and justice as conceived by us, we may say in God is mercy and a perfection which is not mercy, namely, justice; by this of course meaning that God's mercy, considered as such, is not His justice, considered as such.

In addition to this virtual, extrinsic distinction, we must admit between certain perfections of God, another virtual distinction, objective and imperfect, which, however, is not extrinsic but intrinsic. It is intrinsic because it is independent of, and prior to, any act of mental precision on our part. On this account it is sometimes called a real distinction. As it cannot, however, be a real and actual distinction, and yet has, in some respects, the virtue of a real and actual distinction, it is fully named a virtually real distinction, or a virtual and intrinsic distinction. The perfections which are thus virtually and intrinsically distinguished are mentally apprehended by us through concepts which are, as *concepts,* objectively, imperfectly, actually, distinct. On this account, some who derive the generic name of a distinction from the order in which it is actual, would call the virtual, intrinsic distinction generically a conceptual or mental distinction. Later on more will be said of this distinction. It is sufficient to note at present that, though it be objective and intrinsic, still it is not a perfect distinction, and hence, implying no true composition, its admission in God in no way contradicts God's absolute simplicity.

Scholion II. What modern philosophy thinks of God's simplicity and other attributes.

The God, whose existence, and whose attributes, in part, are demonstrated in our Natural Theology, is none other than the God of the Nicene Creed; and the God of the Nicene Creed does not suit Modern Philosophy at all.

"The simple fact is," says **Professor Beckwith,** Illinois Professor of Christian Theology, Chicago Theological Seminary, in *The Idea of God,* "that the Nicene idea of God does not interpret the world to the modern man. . . . If the alternative is either that idea of God unmodified or none, then the conclusion must be—no God. . . . Religious education is in exigent need of a restatement of the idea of God. . . . What is required is some conception of God which shall make him real, attractive, and helpful. . . . An idea of God which suffices for one people cannot answer for another people at the same time or at another age of the world, nor indeed for the same people at a further stage in its own history." Pp. 3, 32, 17.

Modern Philosophy quite generally is in substantial agreement with **Professor Beckwith.** As a consequence, the God of the Nicene Creed must go, for Modern Philosophy knows nothing of absolute, stable truth. That only is true which suits its varying whims and fancies. Modern Philosophy makes its god to suit itself. Or, to put it more accurately, each individual modern philosopher makes, or knows that his philosophy permits him to make at any moment, his own individual god to suit his own individual taste.

In *God and Reason,* the first part of our Natural Theology, we dwelt at length on this lamentable state of present-day philosophy, and cited passages from many recent philosophical works showing its existence. To read these is to be convinced that Modern Philosophy has rejected the God of our fathers, the God of the Scriptures, the true God. In confirmation we subjoin a passage from **James,** *The Varieties of Religious Experience,* in which he makes no pretense of hiding his contempt for our Philosophy, the Philosophy of Reason, and for the reason-proved attributes of God which it defends, and with which we are at present concerned. These attributes, together with reason, he weighs in the balance

of Pragmatism, and he finds them absolutely wanting. Here is his judgment:

"If we apply the principles of pragmatism to God's metaphysical attributes, strictly so called, as distinguished from his moral attributes, I think that, even were we forced by a coercive logic to believe them, we still should have to confess them to be destitute of all intelligible significance. Take God's aseity, for example; or his necessariness; his immateriality; his 'simplicity' or superiority to the kind of inner variety and succession which we find in finite beings; his indivisibility, and lack of the inner distinctions of being and activity, substance and accident, potentiality and actuality, and the rest; his repudiation of inclusion in a genus; his actualized infinity; his 'personality,' apart from the moral qualities which it may comport; his relation to evil being permissive and not positive; his self-sufficiency, self-love, and absolute felicity in himself: candidly speaking, how do such qualities as these make any definite connection with our life? And if they severally call for no distinct adaptation of our conduct, what vital difference can it possibly make to a man's religion whether they be true or false?

"For my own part, although I dislike to say aught that may grate on tender associations, I must frankly confess that even though these attributes were faultlessly deduced, I cannot conceive of its being of the smallest consequence to us religiously that any of them should be true. Pray, what specific act can I perform in order to adapt myself the better to God's simplicity? Or how does it assist me to plan my behavior, to know that his happiness is anyhow absolutely complete? In the middle of the century just past, Mayne Reid was the great writer of books of out-of-door adventure. He was forever extolling the hunters and field-observers of living animals' habits, and keeping up a fire of invective against the 'closet-naturalists,' as he called them, the collectors and classifiers, and handlers of skeletons and skins. When I was a boy, I used to think that a closet-naturalist must be the vilest type of wretch under the sun. But surely the systematic theologians are the closet-naturalists of the deity, even in Captain Mayne Reid's sense. What is their deduction of metaphysical attributes but a shuffling and matching of pedantic dictionary-adjectives, aloof from morals, aloof from human needs, something that might be worked out from the mere word 'God' by one of those logical machines of wood and brass, which recent ingenuity has contrived, as well as by a man of flesh and blood. They have the trail of the serpent over them. One feels that in the theologians' hands, they are only a set of titles obtained by a mechanical manipulation of synonyms; verbality has stepped into the place of vision, professionalism into that of life. Instead of bread we have a stone; instead of a fish, a serpent. Did such a conglomeration of abstract terms give really the gist of our knowledge of the deity, schools of theology might indeed continue to flourish, but religion, vital religion, would have taken its flight from this world.

"What keeps religion going is something else than abstract definitions and

systems of concatenated adjectives, and something different from faculties of theology and their professors. All these things are after-effects, secondary accretions upon those phenomena of vital conversation with the unseen divine, of which I have shown you so many instances, renewing themselves *in saecula saeculorum* in the lives of humble private men.

"So much for the metaphysical attributes of God! From the point of view of practical religion, the metaphysical monster which they offer to our worship is an absolutely worthless invention of the scholarly mind.

"What shall we now say of the attributes called moral? Pragmatically, they stand on an entirely different footing. They positively determine fear and hope and expectation, and are foundations for the saintly life. It needs but a glance at them to show how great is their significance.

"God's holiness, for example: being holy, God can will nothing but good. Being omnipotent, he can secure its triumph. Being omniscient, he can see us in the dark. Being just, he can punish us for what he sees. Being loving, he can pardon too. Being unalterable, we can count on him securely. These qualities enter into connection with our life, it is highly important that we should be informed concerning them. That God's purpose in creation should be the manifestation of his glory is also an attribute which has definite relations to our practical life. Among other things it has given a definite character to worship in all Christian countries. If dogmatic theology does really prove beyond dispute that a God with characters like these exists, she may well claim to give a solid basis to religious sentiment. But verily, how stands it with her arguments?

"It stands with them as ill as with the arguments for his existence. Not only do post-Kantian idealists reject them root and branch, but it is a plain historic fact that they never have converted anyone who has found in the moral complexion of the world, as he experienced it, reasons for doubting that a good God can have framed it. To prove God's goodness by the scholastic argument, that there is no non-being in his essence, would sound to such a witness simply silly. . . .

"We must, therefore, I think, bid a definitive good-by to dogmatic theology. In all sincerity our faith must do without that warrant. Modern idealism, I repeat, has said good-by to this theology forever." Pp. 445 ff.

This frankly irreverent and wholesale rejection, on pragmatic grounds, of reason's endeavors in building up the science of Natural Theology, demands an immediate answer. A brief one will serve our purpose.

While insisting that the pragmatic value which may attach to our knowledge in no way makes it to be true—and in the passage above cited Professor James himself implicitly admits this; and while calling attention to the fact that the substitution, in place of reason, of the countless, worthless guides to knowledge

of modern philosophy, has led to intellectual chaos, and in great measure to the moral and religious chaos nowadays so prevalent, seeing that it gives to every man the right to make his own god, and, hence, his own morality, his own religion—we desire to join issue with **Professor James** only on the question of the practical value of the metaphysical attributes of God which scholastic philosophy demonstrates.

Professor James has insisted that these attributes are of no value in the shaping of man's religious life. If he is speaking of the man who is the product of modern philosophy, the man, namely, who makes his own god, and who, as a consequence, must place little or no value on his religion, what **Professor James** says is absolutely true. It is absolutely false, however, in the case of the man who has not made his God, but has by his reason discovered Him to be what He is, the Alpha and Omega, the Beginner and Finisher of all things.

The central Fact of all religion and morality is God, and on the knowledge of His existence and His nature and attributes, and the relations that necessarily exist between Him and us, is founded our religious and moral world. It is of vital import to us, therefore, after having proved that God exists, to discover what kind of being He is, and how we depend on Him. This knowledge, however, is naturally acquired by a reasoned development not only of the attributes of God which **Professor James** calls moral, but also, and principally, by a like development of the attributes which he calls metaphysical, which he treats with such contempt, and rejects as valueless in the shaping of man's religious life.

To take an example. To know that God is a being who is *a se*, that is, a being who owes His existence to no one, but exists by His very essence, and, hence, of His own right and with absolute necessity—an item of knowledge which **Professor James** says has no practical value—is to know that God is a being apart from all other beings; to know that there can be only one such being, one God; to know that He is infinite in perfection; to know further that all other beings absolutely and continually depend on Him for all that they are and have and can do, and, hence, to know

that honor, and love, and service, and adoration are due Him. If these truths have no practical value, then no truth has, for on them religion and morality are built. Their practical acknowledgment means true success here and happiness eternal hereafter; their practical rejection, failure here, and hereafter eternal failure.

DIFFICULTIES

1. If one perfection of God can be known without his other perfections being known, composition is possible in God.

   But one perfection of God can be known without His other perfections being known. Therefore.

   D. Maj. If one perfection can be known without the others being in any way known, composition, etc., *C.*, without the others being known explicitly, as such and such perfections, and as many perfections, though they all are known implicitly as something divine, composition is possible in God, *Subd.*, composition, strictly-so-called, i.e., real or metaphysical or mathematical, *N.*, composition, loosely-so-called, i.e., logical composition, which implies no imperfection in God, *C. Cd. Min. D. Con.*

2. A being that can be classed in a genus with other beings admits metaphysical composition.

   But God may be classed in a genus with other beings. (God may be classed under the genus, substance.) Therefore.

   D. Maj. A being that may be classed with other beings under a genus, strictly-so-called, admits, etc., *C.*, that may be classed under a loosely-so-called genus, admits, etc., *N. Cd. Min.*

   A true generic note is predicated, of the beings classed under it, univocally and not analogically, i.e., in exactly the same sense, not in a sense somewhat the same. Substance, however, as predicated of God, since it cannot prescind perfectly from the perfection of self-existence, cannot be predicated of God and creatures in exactly the same sense. God is a transcendent being; out-

side of all genera and species; a unique being; the only possible being in the order in which He is found; a being existing by His very essence; the only possible self-existent being.

3. If God is the infinite exemplar in whose likeness all beings other than God are fashioned, God may be classed under a true genus with those beings. (They must be like unto God; hence they may be classed under a true genus with Him.)

   But God is the infinite exemplar in whose likeness all beings other than God are fashioned. Therefore.

   D. Maj. If beings other than God are fashioned in perfect likeness of Him, God may be, etc., *C.*, if that likeness be imperfect, God may be, etc., *N. Cd. Min.*

4. If accidental composition is found in man because of the habits of prudence, wisdom, knowledge, etc., he has acquired, composition must be found in God also, in whom like perfections are found.

   But accidental composition is found in man because of the habits of prudence, etc., he has acquired. Therefore.

   D. Maj. Composition would be found in God if those perfections existed in Him in the same way as in man, *C.*, if these perfections exist in God in a very different way, i.e., if in God they are really identified with His essence, and distinct from it only mentally, objectively and imperfectly, in God must be found composition, *Subd.*, logical composition, which is not strictly speaking composition, and involves no imperfection in God, *C.*, composition of any other kind, *N. Cd. Min. D. Con.*

5. If, then, there are no accidents in God, we are forced to hold that in Him all acts of intellect and will are identified with one another and also with His essence.

   But it is impossible that all acts of intellect and will in God should be identified with one another and also with His essence. (For example, the free act and necessary act of God's will cannot be identified.) Therefore.

D. Maj. We are forced to hold that in Him all acts, etc., are identified both really and conceptually, *N.*, really identified but mentally, objectively and imperfectly distinct, with both extrinsic and intrinsic virtual distinctions, and this, because God's divine and absolutely simple essence, by reason of its infinite perfection, is necessary intelligence, and necessary will with regard to some objects, and contingent or free intelligence, and contingent or free will with regard to others, and in such wise, that without real and actual loss of any reality, and without any imperfection in itself, the contingent or free divine knowledge and will, formally as such, could have not existed in God, and so God could have not willed the existence of this world, and, consequently, could have not known this world as existing, *C, Cd. Min.*

This solution will be better understood later when we give *ex professo* our explanation of how God's immutability can be reconciled with His freedom.

6. If we conceive the attributes of God to flow from His metaphysical essence, we must make a perfect mental precision between His essence and His attributes, i.e., we admit metaphysical composition in God.

But we conceive the attributes of God to flow from His metaphysical essence. Therefore.

D. Maj. If we conceive the attributes of God, and likewise His metaphysical essence, to be attributes and essence respectively, only according to that which explicitly as such is formally expressed by them; and so understanding them, if we conceive the attributes of God to flow, etc., we must make a perfect mental precision, etc., *N.*, if we conceived the attributes of God, and likewise His metaphysical essence, to be attributes and essence respectively, according to all that both explicitly and implicitly is expressed by them, and so understanding them, if we conceive, etc., we must make, etc., *C. Cd. Min.*

7. If there are no accidents in God, and hence no accidental composition, the world must have been created by God from all eternity. But the world was not created by God from all eternity. Therefore.

D. Maj. The world must have been created from all eternity, i.e., creation if it be considered subjectively, i.e., as the creative act in God, must have been from all eternity, *C.*, if it be considered in its term or in its effect, which is the existence of the world, it must have been from all eternity, i.e., the world itself must have come into existence from all eternity, *N. Cd. Min.*

God from all eternity decreed not the existence of the world from all eternity, but its existence in time, or with time.

THESIS IV

God is intrinsically immutable, both physically and morally.

PRENOTES TO THE THESIS.

MODERN philosophy, we said a moment ago, though it in many ways impliedly denies the absolute simplicity of God, explicitly does not do so. It has given no direct thought to the matter. Emphatically explicit, however, and intensely eager is its attack on God's immutability, both physical and moral. A writer in *The American Journal of Theology,* October, 1915, for example, who, with others, will be more fully cited in a *Scholion* to the present thesis, in an article entitled, "The Doctrine of Evolution and the Concept of God," boldly tells us:

> "[Theology], to be in line with and represent helpfully the evolutionary view of the world, must abandon its traditional way of conceiving God in terms of dualistic supernaturalism and must think of Him as imminently active in the world of nature and man. . . . Consequently, God should be conceived under the category not of completeness and of immutability, but of becoming and development. This conception of God in terms of evolutionary experience, rather than under the category of some metaphysical absolute, is demanded by our religion and ethics." Pp. 569, 572.

Our answer to these unproved and unprovable assertions is that a self-existent being, such as God is, is necessarily an infinitely perfect being, and because self-existent, and because infinitely perfect, is necessarily an absolutely immutable being; excluding as absolutely impossible all physical change, i.e., any change in the reality by which He is what He is; and excluding as absolutely impossible also all moral change, i.e., any loss or gain in a knowledge which, in its infinity, embraces in one act all things knowable; and any movement in a will which, in its infinity, embraces in one act whatever it wills.

Immutability is a perfection which excludes from the being possessing it mutability, or the possibility of change. When we

predicate immutability of God, we mean that change of any kind in Him is not merely impossible, but absolutely and essentially impossible. If change in Him were possible, He would not be a self-existent, infinitely perfect being; He would not be God. A clear understanding of what change is, and of its various divisions, will give us a clear understanding of the various divisions of that perfection which excludes its possibility, namely, immutability.

Change is the passage of a being from one state to another. A being, then, is said to be changed when it is in any way different from what it formerly was.

Extrinsic change is the acquiring by a being merely of a new relation, i.e., of a new relation and nothing more than a new relation, to another being. The being which is said so to change, then, in itself, or intrinsically, neither loses nor acquires any perfection; not so, however, the being towards which it bears the new relation. That being in some way is intrinsically modified, i.e., in itself it loses or gains some perfection. Thus when an object has passed from the shade into the sunlight, the sun, which thereby has in itself been in no wise changed, may, nevertheless, be said to be changed in its relation to such an object, seeing that now it illumines it whilst before it did not. By the same kind of change, i.e., merely a change of relation and nothing else, a man may be said to be now on the right side of an object and later on its left, when not the man, but the object, has changed its position.

It is quite evident that this kind of change, which implies in no way imperfection in the being so changed, may be predicated of God because of the varying relations He has towards creatures, which are due not to any change in God, but to the countless changes that creatures undergo. These varying relations of God towards His creatures are most commonly technically called not real, but mental relations only; and this, because, according to most philosophers, a being really related to another, truly and really depends on

that other with a dependence that implies imperfection. God, however, cannot so depend on anything.

An example of such extrinsic change attributed to God is this: The act of will by which God created the world is in God immutable and eternal; its effect, the existence of the world, occurred in time, years ago. Viewing God according to the relation existing between Him and the moment of time when His creative act was objectively completed by the appearance of the world, we may say that He has extrinsically changed, for we say, and truly, if properly understood, that God did not create the world today, nor yesterday, nor the day before; He created it years ago.

Intrinsic change is the acquiring or losing of some perfection in, i.e., internal to, the very being itself which is said to be changed. Thus an advance in knowledge is an intrinsic change in a being.

Intrinsic change, improperly-so-called, is the passage of a being from total non-existence to existence, or from existence to total non-existence. In neither case is the being, strictly speaking, said to be changed. In the former case, it is created; in the latter case, it is annihilated.

Intrinsic change, properly-so-called, is the passage of a being actually existing from one state of existence internal to the being to another internal state of existence. In this case, existence is neither totally acquired nor totally lost; the subject of the change, or that which changes, actually remains whilst it passes from the state in which it actually was before the change, to the state in which it actually is after the change.

Intrinsic change, properly-so-called, which is physical, is the actual acquiring or losing, or acquiring and losing, by a being of some internal entity, i.e., some absolute reality. This change may be substantial, as, for example, when food is assimilated and becomes the living flesh of an animal; or accidental, as, for instance, when a bell is caused to vibrate.

Intrinsic change, properly-so-called, which is moral. Restricting our definition to the limits of our present inquiry, this change may be said to be one which, when the intellect acquires or loses knowledge, and the will issues into act or ceases from action, affects those faculties, not however with regard to the entity or reality of their acts, the acquiring and loss of which constitute physical changes, but respectively with regard to the knowledge as such, and the willing as such, i.e., with regard to the cognitive contact and volitional contact which those faculties respectively make with their objects. This explanation of what a moral change is will be more clearly understood if we recall to mind that in an act of the intellect we must distinguish between the entity of the act and the knowledge of the object acquired by it, i.e., between the entity of the act and cognitive contact made by it with a definite object, or, in other words, between the entity of the act of cognition and the cognition, as such. A similar distinction is also to be made between the entity of the act of the will, and the willing as such.

After having proved that God is physically immutable, and hence, that neither His intellect nor will can suffer any physical change, the question concerning His moral immutabilitay may be stated as follows: Supposing that God be physically immutable, is it possible for Him:

1. To advance in knowledge or to lose, even temporarily, knowledge once acquired;
2. To acquire a new attitude of will toward objects or to lose one already acquired;

   Or rather—and this alternative we choose in our thesis—

   1. Is God's knowledge such that in one eternal act He immutably knows all things knowable, no matter how changeable in themselves these things are?
   2. Is the divine will such that whatever God wills He wills from all eternity and immutably, and this for the simple reason that infinite knowledge preceded His choice, and hence

He so provided for every event and contingency, that a change of the divine will could be attributed only to vacillation or an arbitrary manner of acting on the part of God? Both of which modes of action, however, are impossible in an infinitely perfect being.

What physical immutability excludes from God, and what, moral immutability.

As God is a necessarily existing being, the reality which constitutes Him, i.e., His physical entity, is what it is with absolute necessity. Hence, He could not have been, nor can He be in any physical state other than that in which He eternally is. Physical immutability, therefore, excludes from God not only the possibility of passing from His present physical state to any other one, but also the possibility of His having been in any other physical state.

Moral immutability, however, though it excludes from God the possibility of passing from the attitude which His intellect and will have for their respective objects to another, still it does not, nor can it, exclude from Him this possibility, namely, that He might have had an attitude of intellect and will towards actual finite objects other than that which He now has. For this last possibility does not imply moral mutability in intellect or will, it merely implies that God's will was free in the creation of the world, and that His knowledge of all created things was not necessary, but contingent; contingent, namely, on the exercise of His free will, and also on the exercise of the free will of His creatures. That God freely created the world will be proved later on.

Moral immutability of God's knowledge; some notions to be explained before its proof.

In our proof of the moral immutability of God's knowledge, we shall assert that God knows all things knowable, and from eternity. To understand this proof, then, we should have some knowledge of the different classes of objects that comprise all things knowable, and of the way in which the knowability of these objects from eter-

nity, i.e., their eternal objective truth, may be established. A fuller explanation of these points will be given later when the question of God's knowledge will be taken up.

The different classes of objects that comprise all things knowable; their knowability from eternity.

All things knowable are included in these divisions of being:

1. **God.** In this class God alone is found; the only necessary being, the source of all being, the conserver of all being, the immovable mover of all being, the most real of all real being. It is quite evident that this being is knowable. That He is knowable from eternity is equally evident, since existence is absolutely essential to Him, i.e., His existence is eternal. This will be proved explicitly later.

2. **All the possibles:**

   A possible is anything that is intrinsically capable of receiving existence.

   A pure possible is anything that is intrinsically capable of receiving existence and does not actually exist.

   A non-pure possible is anything that is so capable of existing and which moreover does exist. In this class, then, are found all pure possibles, and all non-pure possibles, i.e., all actual finite things, considered, however, not as actual but merely as possible. That all produced things may be so considered, follows from the fact that existence is not absolutely necessary, i.e., not essential, to any of them.

   That pure possibles and all actual produced things, considered merely as possible beings, are knowable, must be admitted if it can be shown that they are something, i.e., not nothing. And they are something, i.e., not nothing, for nothing cannot be conceived in a positive concept, nor can it say a positive relation to existence; pure possible beings, on the contrary, can be so conceived, and can say such a relation. For example, a man, either a purely possible one, or an actual one considered merely as a possible, is conceived positively as

a rational animal and is intrinsically capable of existence. So of all other possible things; substantial beings, accidents, actions, etc.

The eternal knowability of the possibles is shown in this way. The intrinsic capacity that a possible has for existence is independent of any determined time, i.e., a definite time-element does not enter into the question of its capacity for existence. Hence no possible moment of time can be assigned as the first moment when a possible becomes a possible. Therefore a possible is such from eternity, hence its objective truth, i.e., its knowability, is also eternal.

3. **All the futuribles:**

A futurible is that one free act from amongst those. in any possible definite set of circumstances, possible to a finite intelligent being, which would *de facto* be chosen by him, if in virtue of God's creative decree he were ever placed in those circumstances.

A pure futurible is such an act which would be so conditionally chosen, but which will never be so chosen because the condition will never be verified, i.e., the individual in question will never be placed by God in those circumstances.

A non-pure futurible is such an act which would be so conditionally chosen, and which *de facto* will be so chosen because the condition will be verified, i.e., the individual in question will at some time be placed by God in those circumstances.

Since this class includes all futuribles, it includes not only all pure futuribles but also all non-pure futuribles, considered, however, not as non-pure futuribles, but merely as futuribles, i.e., precision having been made from their absolute future existence, considered merely as free acts which would be conditionally. That non-pure futuribles may be so considered must be admitted, seeing that actual future existence is not absolutely necessary to a futurible.

That all futuribles, both pure and non-pure, considered

merely as futuribles, are knowable must be admitted if it can be shown that the proposition in which a futurible is expressed enunciates an objective determined truth. In other words, we must show that the following proposition, for example, is objectively true: If John were to be placed by God in a definite set of circumstances, and given all the aids necessary for the eliciting a free action, though he has the power to choose any one of the many possible courses of action open to him with regard to the matter about which he is deliberating, *de facto* he would choose this definite one.

To prove this we appeal to two undeniable principles. The first is: Whatever exists must at each moment of its existence be in one definite state. The second, is the principle of contradiction: A thing cannot at the same time be and not be; be this and not be this; be in this definite state and not be in this definite state.

In the light of these two principles, considering our example, we find that though John, at the moment we are considering, might freely be in any one of the many states presented to his choice with regard to the matter under his deliberation, in virtue of our first principle, and supposing that he elicited a free act, which is the only case we are supposing, he would *de facto* be freely in one definite state, and, in virtue of our second principle, in the hypothesis that he would be in one definite state, it is absolutely impossible at the moment in question that he could be in any other. The state in which John would be in we call, in our example, this definite one. Which one, of the many states John might have chosen, it is, is unknown to us. It would, however, be knowable in itself, for it would be a definite state. Consequently it would be known to God, who, since He is infinite actual knowledge, necessarily knows all things knowable. A futurible, therefore, as such, is knowable, for it is something. It is something, for it can be conceived in a positive concept which represents the definite action which conditionally would *de facto* be chosen; moreover it says a positive relation with regard to

existence, for it is that act which *de facto* would exist if the free agent were put in the definite set of circumstances considered. Nothing, however, cannot be represented in a positive concept, nor can it say a positive relation to existence.

A futurible, in reality, is more than a possible, for it is not only one of the possible actions which a free agent is capable of choosing if placed in a definite set of circumstances, it is more; it is that one which *de facto* he would choose.

The futuribles are eternally true, as are the possibles; and for the same reason, namely, their objective truth is independent of any definite time. This is evident from a consideration of the proposition in which the truth of the futurible is enunciated, and which makes no mention of any definite time. It is evident also if we consider that neither the objective truth of the possibles, nor the objective truth of the futuribles, tie God down to any determined moment for the bringing of the world into existence by His creative decree. Therefore, neither the possible nor the futurible demand any definite time for their existence, in other words, their objective truth is independent of any determined time.

4. **All things that will be:**

Under this heading are included all things that at any time actually exist. They are all called future things, and only future things, with regard to all points of possible time which preceded the beginning of the world, i.e., the beginning of actual time. With regard to all points of time after the world's beginning, i.e., with regard to all points of actual time, each one of them may be considered as future, present, past. As future, with regard to all points of time preceding their existence; as present, with regard to the time of their actual existence; and as past, with regard to all points of time following their existence. Hence:

A future thing is a thing not now existing but which will exist.

A present thing is a thing now existing.

A past thing is a thing not now existing but which has existed.

The objective truth of all things actual, considered as future, present and past in their different relations to different points of possible and actual time, may be shown thus.

With a full knowledge of everything that is knowable prior to His decree of creation, i.e., with a full knowledge of all the possibles, and all the futuribles, God decrees the existence of every being, and of every action of every being, that will exist, including free agents, with all the different circumstances of their existence; and all this, for every moment of that existence. Immediately, with regard to all objects affected by that decree, and with regard to them only, new relations arise. They are no longer merely possibles and merely futuribles, but with regard to each one of them for the points of time preceding, coinciding with, and following its existence, the following propositions are respectively true: This object will be; This object is; This object was. The objective truth, therefore, of a future thing as such, a present thing as such, a past thing as such, is established.

The same proof a bit further developed establishes also the eternal nature of this truth, and hence the knowability from eternity of everything actual considered under its various relations to different points of time, as future, present, past. The further development of the proof is this: The eternal truth of the future, present and past, considered as such, is established, if we can prove that God's creative decree, which determines that truth, is eternal. This will be done in our proof for the moral immutability of God's will. What God decrees, He decrees from eternity, immutably, for all creatures, under all circumstances, for all time.

5. **All relations, and all entities (things) fashioned by the mind:**

A relation is an accident the whole essence of which, when it is looked at merely as a relation, consists in referring one

thing to another, i.e., in expressing the bearing of one thing on another, or the comparative state of one thing with respect to another, or the connection of one thing with another. The thing referred is called the subject of the relation, the thing to which it is referred, the term of the relation, and the particular perfection or aspect or formality in virtue of which the reference is given, the foundation of the relation. There are real relations, and, logical relations, i.e., relations fashioned by the mind. What constitutes the one and the other is fully explained in Ontology. In Ontology also will be found other divisions of relations and a full explanation of the whole question. Some few examples of relations both real and logical, from among the many that might be mentioned, are those of equality, likeness, greaterness, lessness, causality, finality; relations between father and son, master and servant, genus and species, subject (logical) and predicate, etc.

Entities fashioned by the mind are entities (things), which, consequent on a consideration of some aspect of reality as found in the several orders of possible, futurible, and actual beings, the mind forms, and which consequently so exist objectively in the intellect that they cannot exist outside of it. They are also called logical entities, conceptual entities; the phase, or objective aspect, of reality, the consideration of which is the basis in their formation, is called their foundation. They are to be clearly distinguished from entities sometimes called conceptual entities, which, however, are not rightly so called, seeing that they have no foundation in reality and are nothing but impossible combinations of objective concepts; e.g., a square circle.

Some examples of rightly called logical beings or entities are:

a. blindness, i.e., the privation of vision, considered as a thing;
b. darkness, i.e., the absence of light, considered as a thing;
c. the objective concept "animal," looked at in its universality, and considered as a thing, i.e., a genus.

The knowability of relations and logical entities is clear from the description of them just given. They assuredly are not absolute nothing; moreover, man can know them. What is more, as real relations are given just as soon as the objective truth of the realities on which they depend is given, and as logical entities can be made by the intellect just as soon as the real foundation for their making is given, it follows that relations and logical entities are also eternally knowable; and this, because, as we have already proved, all those realities on which they depend, namely, God, the possibles, the futuribles, and all actual beings, future, present and past, are eternally knowable.

ADVERSARIES.

Indirectly or directly opposed to this thesis are to be numbered all those who deny or doubt or profess ignorance of the existence of God; all who admit His existence but insist that reason cannot demonstrate it; all who attribute to God a nature incompatible with His immutability; and, finally, all who explicitly affirm that the only god conceivable is an evolving, struggling, growing god. Many modern philosophers belong to one or another of the above-mentioned divisions, e.g., **Bergson, James, Corrance, Rashdall, Schiller, Royce, Eucken, Wilm, Miller, Hoernlé, Leuba, Drake, Höffding, A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, Paulsen, Hocking, Alexander, Morgan,** etc. Some direct and explicit denials of our thesis will be found below in a Scholion.

PROOF OF THE THESIS.

Part I. All intrinsic, physical change, both that which is improperly and that which is properly so called, is absolutely impossible in God.

All intrinsic, physical change, both that which is improperly, and that which is properly so called, is absolutely impossible in a being who exists by his very essence, i.e., a being whose existence is absolutely necessary to it. But God is a being who exists by his very essence. Therefore all intrinsic, physical change, both that

which is improperly, and that which is properly so called, is absolutely impossible in God.

Maj. a. Intrinsic, physical change, improperly so called, i.e., the passage from total non-existence to existence, or from existence to total non-existence, is absolutely impossible in a being who exists by his very essence, for otherwise existence would not be absolutely necessary to him, i.e., he would not be a being who exists by his very essence, but one who owes his existence to some other being, his cause.

b. Intrinsic, physical change, properly so called, i.e., the acquiring or losing by an existing being of some physical reality or perfection is impossible in a being who exists by his very essence, for

1. Otherwise, neither the definite concrete, physical existence which he had before the change, nor that which he has after the change would be essential to him; would be his of absolute necessity. The existence, however, which a necessarily existing being has, and which is essential to him is not existence in general, nor an indefinite existence—no being can so exist—but a definite or singular, concrete existence. As this existence, then, is his of absolute necessity, he cannot suffer any intrinsic, physical change in it.
2. If such a change were possible, real, or physical composition would be possible in a necessarily existing being. This, however, has been proved false in the preceding thesis.
3. If such a change were possible, a being who of absolute necessity exists, i.e., a being who by his very essence has a definite, singular, concrete existence, would be in passive potency, or, non-technically, would have a capacity, for the reception of the new reality to be acquired in such change. A capacity for the reception of any reality, however, is impossible in such a being, for at the same time

it would be a capacity and it would not be one. It would be a capacity *ex hypothesi*. It would not be a capacity, for in a necessarily existing being its satisfaction or impletion in any way would be intrinsically impossible, and a capacity for the reception of anything which by its very nature excludes the possibility of such reception, is surely no capacity. The impossibility of satisfying such a supposed capacity in a necessary being flows from the very nature of that being, since of absolute necessity he has a definite, singular, concrete existence. If then in that existence there were a capacity for the reception of some reality, that capacity by its very nature would exclude the possibility of its own satisfaction, for of absolute necessity it must remain non-satisfied.

Min. The minor, viz., God is a being who exists by His very essence, has been proved in the first part of our Natural Theology.

Part II. God is morally immutable.

a. **With regard to His knowledge.**

If all things knowable are known by God from all eternity, and if God can lose no knowledge, He is morally immutable with regard to His knowledge.

But 1, all things knowable are known by God, from all eternity, and, 2, God can lose no knowledge. Therefore God is morally immutable with regard to His knowledge.

Maj. The Major is self-evident.

Min. 1. All things knowable, i.e., God, the possibles, the futuribles; things past, present, and future; all relations, all logical entities, are, as was shown in the prenotes, knowable from all eternity. God, therefore, must know them from all eternity, otherwise He would not be infinite in His perfections, as He has been proved to be.

2. God can lose no knowledge. If He could His knowledge would not be infinite.

b. **With regard to His will.**

If God were morally mutable in willing, whilst remaining the same physically, He would be able to will something not previously willed or to cease from willing something already willed.

But it is impossible that God, 1, should will something not previously willed, or, 2, should cease from willing something already willed. Therefore, God is necessarily morally immutable.

Maj. The Major is evident from the definition of moral mutability.

Min. 1st Part. God cannot will something not previously willed.

If God could will something not previously willed, some time would have elapsed during which God's will would have been suspended with regard to that object, and the reason for such suspension would be either—

1. Because God's knowledge was not sufficient from all eternity for the exercise of His will with regard to that object. This reason, however, is invalid, for God, as we have seen, having an eternal knowledge of all the possibles, and futuribles, has a full and perfect knowledge of everything that could possibly happen to every possible being, either free or not-free, under every possible circumstance; or, supposing that God has such knowledge—
2. Because the divine will was subject to vacillation. This reason too is invalid, for in God, a being infinitely wise and with an infinitely perfect will, vacillation is impossible—or, supposing neither want of knowledge nor vacillation of will in God—
3. Because God arbitrarily, i.e., without any objective reason, suspended His will. Such action, however, would imply weakness of His nature, and hence is

impossible in God. This last reason, therefore, is also invalid.

Min. 2nd Part. God cannot cease from willing something already willed.

If God could cease from willing something already willed, the cause would be either the loss of the knowledge on which the action of His will depended, or inconstancy in the divine will, or an arbitrary mode of action. All these reasons, however, have been shown above to be invalid.

Corollary. Immutability and free-will in God.

God is absolutely immutable, as we have shown, nevertheless in the action of His will with regard to beings other than Himself He is absolutely free. He freely willed the existence of this world. He could, therefore, have not willed it. Had He not willed it, assuredly, with regard to His willing it, things would not be as they are now. In what way would they be different? The various answers given to this question by philosophers, are so many attempts of our limited human intellect, to explain the difficulty which meets it, in its endeavor to reconcile God's immutability with His freedom of will. None of the explanations offered are certain. To deny, however, on that account, either God's immutability or His free-will, would be equivalent to asserting that man's finite intellect is the measure of infinite Truth. Even the mysteries of finite nature baffle us.

Briefly, the difficulty to be solved is this—If God is immutable not only morally but also physically, how can any act of His will possibly be free, for freedom, which is a perfection in the strictest sense intrinsic to the free being, seems to require that not only the moral tendency of the free act towards its object could have not been given, but also the physical entity of the act with which its moral tendency is really identified. In other words, freedom of will in a being seems to require that that being be physically mutable. Or to put the difficulty in another way. God, who now is really and actually the Creator of this world, could have been really and actually either not a Creator at all, or the Creator of

some other world. Are we then to say that the free act by which God created this world could have not been present in God? If we answer in the negative, and assert that the free act by which this world was created must with absolute necessity be ever present in God, how could God possibly have been not the Creator of this world?

We said above that if God had not created the world, assuredly things would not be as they are now. In what way would they be different? And among the things which would be different, what is that one which by its presence makes God really and actually the Creator of the world, and by its absence would leave Him the non-Creator of the world, and at the same time in no way affect His absolute immutability?

Many answers, as was noted above, have been given to this question. We give only the one which appears to us most satisfactory.

If God were not the Creator of this world, then

1. The world surely would not exist. As the existence of the world, however, which is the effect of God's free action does not constitute that free action, so the non-existence of the world would not be that which would constitute God the non-Creator of the world.
2. With the non-existence of the world, the relation between God and the world would of necessity not exist. As this relation is also an effect of the creative act, viz., a mediate effect, neither by its presence nor by its absence is God constituted respectively either the Creator or the non-Creator of the world.
3. Not only would the world and the relation just mentioned not exist but also the moral direction of God's efficacious will calling the world into existence would really and actually not be given. Now as the moral tendency of the act of God's will is really identified with the physical entity of that will, to explain how that moral tendency could really and actually be not given, in the hypothesis that God had not created the

world, it appears to us necessary to admit what follows with regard to that physical entity.

4. In God there is one physical entity, absolutely simple, and excluding, as a consequence, all actually real distinction, and all perfect mental distinction. This physical entity is God Himself, and the intellect of God, and the will of God. As St. Thomas tells us in his *Contra Gentiles,* Bk. 1, cc. 72, 73, "As His [God's] intellect is His very being or essence, so His being is also His will."

   This divine will, which is absolutely simple, is both a necessary will in God and also a free will. Now, one and the same entity, of which absolute necessity and freedom or contingency may be predicated, admits contradictory predicates. Contradictories, however, may not be predicated of one and the same entity under the same aspect. Hence, it appears necessary to admit some distinction between the necessary will in God and His free will, and a distinction, too, which is prior to all mental consideration or precision. This distinction, therefore, must be in some sense real. It cannot be real and actual, as we have already seen; since, however, it has, independently of any mental precision, the force or virtue of a real and actual distinction, inasmuch as prior to any mental consideration in virtue of it contradictories can be predicated of God, and without the loss of any reality He could have been actually not the Creator of this world, we call the distinction an intrinsic distinction which is real and virtual, or a virtual intrinsic distinction. In God's free act, therefore, a distinction is to be admitted between the entity of the act, and the formality which constitutes it a free act. This formality is really and actually identified with the entity of the act, and really and virtually distinct from it. If God, then, had not willed the existence of this world, the entity of His free act would be unchanged, the formality which makes it a free act would not have been present in God; in which case, however, no reality would have been really and actually absent from

God, but only really and virtually, that is, God would be as though some reality really and actually were absent from Him. With this virtually real absence of the reality formally constituting God the Creator of the world, the moral efficacious tendency of God's will, really identified with it, would be really and actually absent from God, and, hence, God really and actually would not be the Creator of the world.

Many different arguments are used in urging the difficulty we have just been considering. An application to some of them of the solution we offer will help to its clearer understanding:

1. If God freely created the world, His creative decree could have been absent from Him.

   God's creative decree, however, could never have been absent from Him. (His immutability makes it impossible.) Therefore.

   D. Maj. His creative decree could have been absent with regard to its entity *N.*, with regard to the formality which constituted it a free decree, *Subd.,* His creative decree could have been absent if the absence of this formality meant that some reality really and actually was absent from God, *N.*, if it meant only that some reality was virtually absent, i.e., that God, in that hypothesis, would have been as though some reality were really and actually absent, *C. Cd. Min.*

2. If a necessary will and a free will could exist in God, contradictories could be predicated of one and the same simple act, moreover, the only distinction which could solve the difficulty would be one which would permit that the formality which constituted God's will a free will could have been not present in God.

   But it is impossible that contradictories should be predicated of one and the same simple act, or that any formality could have been not present in God. Therefore.

   D. Maj. If a necessary will and a free will could exist in God, and if they were in no way distinct, contradictories

could be predicated of one and the same simple act, and it would be possible that any formality could have not been present in God, *N.*, if the free will and necessary will of God, though really and actually identical, are distinct, in the sense that the formality which constitutes His will a free will is really and virtually distinct from His necessary will, *Subd.*, contradictories would be predicated of one and the same simple act under the same aspect, and the absence of the said formality would suppose that some reality could really and actually not be present in God, *N.*, contradictories would be predicated of that simple act but under distinct aspects, and the absence of the said formality would suppose that some reality could be virtually not present in God, i.e., that God would be as though some reality could be actually not present in Him, *C. Cd. Min.*

3. If only a virtual distinction is supposed to exist between the free will of God and His necessary will, where the necessary will of God is there also His free will must be.

   But the free will of God might not have been given at all. Therefore.

   D. Maj. If the distinction was supposed to be a virtual and extrinsic one, i.e., a distinction given only after an act of mental precision, *C.*, if the distinction is virtual and intrinsic, i.e., one prior to all mental precision and hence real but only virtual, not actual, *Subd.*, where the necessary will of God is there also is the entity of the free will, *C.*, the formality which makes it to be a free will, *Subd.*, there also would be the formality if its absence supposed God to be really and actually different physically, *C.*, really and virtually, i.e., as though He were really and actually, *N. Cd. Min.*

4. The formality which makes the act of God's will to be a free act is either something or nothing.

   But it cannot be either the one or the other. Therefore.

D. Maj. with regard to its first assertion, namely, that that formality is something.

It is something which is really and actually identified with the necessary will of God, from which, however, it is virtually and intrinsically distinct, i.e., inasmuch as it is distinct it is virtually something, *C.*, from which it is really and actually, or only virtually and extrinsically distinct, *N. Cd. Min.* with regard to the same member.

Scholion. What present-day philosophy thinks of an immutable God.

For not a few modern philosophers, as we noted in *God and Reason,* the first part of our Natural Theology, the name, God, stands not for a real being at all, but for an ideal, a lofty, supereminent ideal, for the attainment of which man is ever striving onward and upward.

For others, the name God stands for a real being. Of these, some, the **Pantheists,** make of God and the world one being; others admit the existence of a God distinct from the world. The **Pantheists,** by identifying God and this mutable world of ours, certainly do away with an immutable God. In fact, as we showed in *God and Reason,* they do away with God altogether, and should be classed with the **Atheists.**

These modern philosophers who admit God to be a real being, distinct from, and superior to, the world, may again be divided. Some few of them admit their God to be immutable, others do so verbally only, while others frankly proclaim God to be a finite, ever-changing being, great enough, however, to control, at least in the long run, the world over which He rules.

James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience:*

"Meanwhile the practical needs and experiences of religion seem to me sufficiently met by the belief that beyond each man and in a fashion continuous with him there exists a larger power which is friendly to him and to his ideals. All that the facts require is that the power should be both other and larger than our conscious selves. Anything larger will do, if only it be large enough to trust for the next step. It need not be infinite, it need not be solitary." P. 525.

In *A Pluralistic Universe,* **James** tells us further:

"I can hardly conceive of anything more different from the absolute than the God, say, of David or of Isaiah. That God is an essentially finite being in the cosmos, not with the cosmos in him, and indeed he has a very local habitation there, and very one-sided local and personal attachments. . . . I hold to the finite God. . . . Yet because God is not the absolute, but is himself a part when the system is conceived pluralistically, his functions can be taken as not wholly dissimilar to those of the other smaller parts—as similar to our functions consequently. Having an environment, being in time, and working out a history just like ourselves, he escapes from the foreignness from all that is human of the static, timeless, perfect absolute." Pp. 111, 318.

Ukichi Kawaguchi, "The Doctrine of Evolution and the Concept of God," *American Journal of Theology,* October, 1915, brings out clearly the drift of Modern Philosophy away from an immutable God. He first presents the traditional view of God, and then shows how Absolute Idealism, as evolved by **Royce,** and the Philosophy of Life worked out by **Eucken,** whilst striving to save the nature of God as a Being, conceived by **Royce** as Absolute, "eternally what He is," "no change or increase in His Being," "morally perfect," and by **Eucken** as "The Absolute Spiritual Life above the limitations of time and history"—when pushed by difficulties, give way and incline to more or less evolutionistic explanations that make of God a finite, changing, evolving being. He notes too the fact that:

"An increasing number of theological thinkers, who have felt the power of scientific investigations, especially in the field of religion, can no longer follow the traditional method. These men feel that theology . . . should employ the method demanded by the evolutionary theory. . . .

"[Theology] to be in line with and represent helpfully the evolutionary view of the world, must abandon its traditional way of conceiving God in terms of dualistic supernaturalism and must think of Him as immanently active in the world of nature and man. . . .

"Consequently, God should be conceived under the category not of completeness and of immutability, but of becoming and of development. This conception of God in terms of evolutionary experience, rather than under the category of some metaphysical absolute, is demanded by our religion and ethics." Pp. 566 ff.

Wilm, *Henri Bergson:*

"If we are to adopt the flowing philosophy of Bergson, we must eliminate the last vestige of the static and permanent whether it exist in the

form of a first and stable cause of things, a fundamental substance which underlies all change, or even in the form of a plan or purpose which nature through its various mutations is striving to fulfil. The only thing permanent in the midst of change is, as Heraclitus long ago said, the law of change itself. Stability anywhere else is mere appearance, the illusion of an imperfect human faculty." P. 19.

Lucius Hopkins Miller, Assistant Professor of Biblical Instruction, Princeton University, and a very sympathetic critic of **Bergson's** unstable, non-omniscient, non-omnipotent, pantheistic god, writes in *Bergson and Religion:*

"The thought of the unchangeable God, 'the same yesterday, to-day and forever,' has been a rock of defence; the thought of Him as 'infinite in His being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness and trust,' a source of solace and strength to the humble worshiper conscious of his own finiteness, limitation and weakness. If God grows, does He not become too like ourselves to command the final homage of the heart? If God grows, how can we ever tell just what He is? . . . Is not all final truth and certainty placed in jeopardy, and our religious pyramid turned upon its apex? Such are the fearsome thoughts which assail us as we consider this phase of Bergson's teaching, and here many who might otherwise go with him will depart from him. Those who have all their days trusted in the omnipotence and omniscience of God can at most say: If this be true, at least give us time to make our readjustments lest all go down in wreck during the transition.

"Let us try to look at the matter calmly and honestly. The prevailing theory [?] has not been without its difficulties. It lays everything at the door of Providence, the good and the bad alike. In so doing it has been obliged to escape from a difficult dilemma. Either God is the author of evil, at the least *particeps criminis,* or He is not omnipotent. . . . Even the most believing sometimes experience difficulty in trying to cover existing evils with the mantle of faith in an all-wise, all-powerful, not to say all-loving God. At such times they would be relieved to put aside that faith in favor of one which did not ascribe so much to God. . . .

"At any rate our final answer is that the Bergsonian theory of evolution is compatible with religion and with a Christian faith." Pp. 116-147, passim. See also *Scholion, Thesis* 9.

DIFFICULTIES

1. A being who wills freely is physically mutable.
   But God wills freely. Therefore.
   D. Maj. If he is a finite being, whose free act is really and actually distinct from his essence, *C.,* if he is an infinite

being, whose free act is entitatively identified with his essence though distinct from that essence with regard to the formality which constitutes the act a free act, *Subd.*, if that distinction were real and actual, *C.*, if it is a virtual intrinsic distinction, i.e., intrinsically virtually real, *N. Cd. Min.*

2. A being who wills freely is, at least, morally mutable.
   But God wills freely. Therefore.
   D. Maj. Prescinding altogether from the consideration of the physical entity of the free act, such a being would be morally mutable if the passage from some former intentional attitude of his will to the present one, or from the present one to some other, is admitted to be possible, *C.*, if it is held to be impossible, *N. Cd. Min.*
3. A being who at one time acts one way, at another time, another, is changeable.
   But God at one time acts one way, at another time, another. Therefore.
   D. Maj. He is changeable if he is a finite being, whose acts are really distinct from his nature and from one another, and, hence, are elicited at different points of time, *C.*, he is changeable if he is an infinite being, in whom is only one act of will, which is identified really with his absolutely simple nature, and which though unchanged and absolutely unchangeable in itself, nevertheless, because placed in the light of infinite knowledge, makes provision for all the changeable events of time, and thus gives ground for our speaking in terms denoting time of the timeless duration of that being—if he is such a being, we repeat, he is changeable, *Subd.*, extrinsically, *C.*, intrinsically, *N. Cd. Min. D. Con.*

The application of this solution to one or two concrete cases will help very much to a clearer understanding of it.

Let us consider a man whom we shall call Peter. Peter was in the state of grace yesterday, and yesterday was an

object of God's love; today Peter is in the state of mortal sin, and today, as a sinner, he is an object of God's hate; tomorrow Peter will be again in the state of grace, and tomorrow Peter again will be an object of God's love.

All these different states in which Peter is found on the days noted, are known to God by His one, infinite, immutable act of knowledge; and the different attitude of love and hate of God's will for Peter on those several days are embraced in the one, infinite, immutable act of that divine will. Hence God does not pass from knowledge to knowledge, nor from one attitude of will to another, as Peter changes from day to day. As Peter changes from day to day, however, and so on different days is a different object of God's eternal knowledge and will, it is rightly said, using the terms strictly and not figuratively, Peter yesterday was an object of God's love; today he is an object of God's hate; tomorrow he will be again an object of His love. In these expressions no change in God is signified. However, as Peter yesterday was the object of God's love, etc., we may transfer the terms which properly signified time or change in the object of God's act to God's act itself, understanding, however, that the terms so used signify no intrinsic time or change in God and are used figuratively only and as implying only an extrinsic change in God. In this sense, then, we say, and in this sense only we say rightly—God loved Peter yesterday; God does not love Peter today; God will love Peter again tomorrow.

Another example will be sufficient. Guided by His eternal infinite knowledge of every possible thing that might happen under all possible circumstances in any one of the possible creations that He might select, God from eternity decrees to create the world. The decree of creation is eternal, the effect of that decree is in time. At a definite moment of time, therefore, the world came into existence. If we speak, then, of the creation of the world, considering merely the decree of creation as it is in God, we must say that God is

the creator of the world from all eternity. If we speak, however, of creation, considering not only the decree of creation but also its actual effect in time, we may say, and rightly, if we understand that we use the terms of time only as an extrinsic measure of God's eternal immutable duration, God created the world in time, at such a definite moment, neither before nor after.

Whenever, therefore, we use, in speaking of God, expressions denoting the succession of time, e.g., before, after; today, yesterday, tomorrow; was, is, will be, it is always to be understood that we are using terms of time as an extrinsic measure of God's changeless eternity. Such expressions denote a change of creatures in time; they denote no change in God. Or, to speak technically, they signify that God has changed extrinsically not intrinsically. *Cf. Corollary* 3, *Thesis* 6.

4. If God, by an eternal immutable decree, decrees, before the actual existence of the world, eternal happiness for some men and eternal pain for others, the gift of grace to some men, and the denial of grace to others, man's merits are useless, his prayers are useless.

   But neither man's merits nor his prayers can be said to be useless. Therefore.

   D. Maj. If God, without any regard for the merits, demerits, and prayers of men, immutably decreed eternal happiness for some men, etc., man's merits are useless, etc., *C.*, if in so decreeing God has regard for the merits, etc., man's merits are useless, etc., *N. D. Con.*

   God sees that if he placed Peter, for example, in a definite set of circumstances, and offered him a certain grace, Peter would correspond with that grace, pray, and merit the bestowal of other graces. He sees also that if certain graces were to be given to Paul, Paul would refuse to correspond with them, and would not merit greater and more abundant ones. God sees also that if Peter, at the end of the span of

life to be allotted to him, were to receive certain graces which he would have merited, he would die in the state of grace; He sees, on the contrary, that if Paul, at the end of his life, were to receive the grace to repent, he would reject that grace and die in the state of grievous sin.

In the light of this knowledge God decrees the creation of Peter and Paul in these circumstances, and the consequent giving and refusing of graces, and rewarding and punishing for eternity. This immutable decree, therefore, determines the graces to be given to these men, and their lot in eternity, but only consequent on the use they will make of their free will in meriting or demeriting, praying, or not praying.

5. If God at one time expressed a regret for something He had done, He is changeable.

But God at one time expressed such a regret. Therefore.

D. Maj. If, using words in their proper and primary sense, it could be said of God that He had expressed a regret, etc., He would be changeable, *C.*, if, using the words figuratively or metaphorically, God Himself said He regretted something He had done, i.e., He regretted having made man, He is changeable, *N. Cd. Min.* The metaphorical use of the words in question, as applied to God, is explained as follows.

The very same knowledge which directed God in His creation of man for a given point of time and under certain conditions, showed Him also, among other things, how mankind, as time would go on, would hearken to or disobey His law. It showed Him, then, that at a certain point in the history of the world almost all men would of their own choice be living in flagrant violation of His law, and that, in that event, He would decree the deluge. By one and the same immutable act of His will, then, He decreed the creation of the world, the gift of all those graces which He saw would be refused by man, and finally the deluge. All

these events, of course, were decreed to happen at the successive points of time at which they did happen. Genesis, c. 6, tells the story in part this way:

> "And God seeing that the wickedness of men was great on the earth, and that all the thought of their heart was bent upon evil at all times, it repented Him that He had made man on the earth. And being touched inwardly with sorrow of heart, He said: I will destroy man, whom I have created, from the face of the earth."

Now, he who regrets, or repents for something he has done, if these words are used in their proper, i.e., non-figurative, sense, is one who has undergone a change in knowledge, will and, if the case demands it, behavior also with regard to the matter repented for or regretted. In God, however, there can be no change in knowledge, will or action with regard to anyone or anything. Hence the verbs to repent for or to regret, taken in their proper or non-figurative sense, cannot be said of God. Nevertheless, since the different objects or terms of God's immutable knowledge, will, and power, according to the different states in which they exist, are affected just as they would be if there were real changes in God, to regret or repent for having done something may be said of God, as is said in the above passage from Genesis, metaphorically.

6. If God is the Prime Mover of all things moved, He also must move, i.e., change.

   But God is the Prime Mover of all things moved. Therefore.

   D. Maj. If He is the absolutely immobile Prime Mover of all things moved, and, hence, if, whilst excluding as absolutely impossible any physical or moral change in Himself, by the act of His efficacious will, which is identified with Himself, He moves all things moved, He also must move, *N.*, if He moved all things moved by an act or acts really distinct from Himself, He must also move, *C. Cd. Min.*

7. A being that lives is changeable.

   But God lives. Therefore.

   D. Maj. A finite living being, i.e., a being who in acting

vitally passes from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality, seeing that its actions are really distinct from itself, is changeable, *C.*, an infinite living being, who is in a state of pure actuality, and whose vital action, as a consequence, is really identified with his essence, and excludes absolutely all potentiality, is changeable, *N. Cd. Min.*

8. If God cannot will anything unless He has previously known it, a succession of acts must be admitted in Him, in other words, He is changeable.

But God cannot will anything unless He has previously known it. Therefore.

D. Maj. If that priority were real in God, in Him would be found successive acts, *C.*, if that priority is one merely conceived by us, and in such wise that not only is there no real distinction between God's act of understanding and act of willing, but also no perfect mental distinction, in Him is found a succession of acts, *N. Cd. Min.*

9. If in God there is no succession of acts, the same act is at the same time an act of love and of hate.

But the same act even in God cannot be at the same time an act of love and of hate. Therefore.

D. Maj. The same act would be one of love and hate with regard to the same object considered under the same aspect, *N.*, with regard to the same object considered under different aspects, or with regard to different objects under different aspects, *Subd.*, it would be an act of love and hate the same in nature as these acts are in finite beings, *N.*, of a different nature, i.e., the same absolutely simple act in God would contain in an infinitely perfect way, and, hence without any imperfection or limit, all the perfections found in those acts as they exist in finite beings, *C. Cd. Min.*

10. If God wills freely, one and the same act in God is both contingent and absolutely necessary.

But one and the same act in God cannot be both contingent and absolutely necessary. Therefore.

D. Maj. The same act in God is both contingent, i.e., free, and absolutely necessary under the same aspect, *N.*, under different aspects, *C. Cd. Min.*

The same act in God which, with regard to its entity and with regard to its tendency toward God as one of its objects, is absolutely necessary, is, with regard to its tendency towards beings existing outside of God, contingent, i.e., free. This freedom, it is true, supposes that the formality, which constitutes the act a free act, could have not been in God, but it in no way supposes that, on this account, any entity could have been really and actually not in God, it merely supposes that, if God had not exercised His freedom He would have been virtually other than He is now, i.e., that God would have been as though some entity now present were absent.

THESIS V

God is immense.

PRENOTES TO THE THESIS.

WE proved in a previous thesis that God is, by His very essence, actually and in every way infinite, that is, that He possesses every possible perfection limitlessly. In theses which followed, two of those perfections, namely, His absolute simplicity and absolute immutability, were explained and arguments advanced which showed how they flowed from the very essence of God, i.e., His necessary existence, and from His infinity.

In the present thesis there is question of another of God's essential infinite perfections, that perfection, namely, which shows forth His infinity considered from the viewpoint of extension, in other words, that perfection in virtue of which God, in His very being, is extended in every direction limitlessly. It is called immensity. Hence:

Immensity is that essential, infinite perfection of God, in virtue of which in His very being He is extended in every possible direction limitlessly, and in such wise that, having no parts, He is everywhere totally.

Describing this same perfection with respect to the relations it bears towards space, we may say that immensity is that perfection in virtue of which God, considered according to the extension of His being in space, is independent of space, in the sense that, owing to His simplicity or want of parts, He cannot be measured in terms of space, and owing to His infinity, He cannot be enclosed within any actual or possible spatial limits. Or, to put it in another way, immensity is that internal, essential, incircumscribed mode of existence of the divine nature, by reason of which God, without movement or approach of any kind, is, in His very substance or being,

totally wherever anything is, or wherever anything possibly could be.

This mode of existence is internal and essential to God, hence it is a necessary and absolute perfection. At times it is called God's absolute ubiquity, His absolute everywhereness. It is to be clearly distinguished from another of God's perfections closely connected with it. This perfection is God's omnipresence, called sometimes God's relative ubiquity, His relative everywhereness. It belongs to God because of His immensity, but unlike His immensity, it is not an absolute perfection of God, but a hypothetical or conditioned one, not essential but accidental, not intrinsic but extrinsic. It is that perfection in virtue of which God is present to and in every creature that is, no matter where it may be.

Omnipresence, therefore, is the actual co-existence of God in space with all things existing, or the actual presence of God to and in all things that exist.

The hypothetical, accidental, extrinsic nature of this perfection is quite evident from the fact that it depends for its existence on the existence of creatures. If creatures did not exist, God could not be present to anyone.

From this it is easily gathered that omnipresence, looked at in itself, is a relative perfection or a relation; the relation of co-existence in space between God and His creatures. The close connection between this perfection and immensity lies in this, that immensity is the foundation of the relation of omnipresence. Because of His immensity, then, just as soon as creatures come into existence, God is present to, and in them.

ADVERSARIES.

Gnostics and **Manicheans.** Consequent on their postulate of the existence of a supreme being to whom all the evil in the world is to be ascribed, the Gnostics and Manicheans, though they admitted that God was extended limitlessly in space, are said to have held that this extension was only in

three directions, His extension in the fourth direction being prevented by the existence there of the supreme cause of evil.

Newton and not a few others who identified God's immensity with absolute space.

Alexander, who asserts that God is the infinite world, i.e., the universe of Space-Time with its nisus towards Deity.

All **Pantheists** and those **Pluralists** who make of God a finite being.

PROOF OF THE THESIS.

That being is immense who so exists that in his very substance or being he is extended in every direction limitlessly, and in such wise that he is everywhere totally.

But God is a being who is so extended.

Therefore, God is immense.

Maj. The Major follows immediately from the definition of immensity.

Min. 1st Part. God in His very substance or being is extended in all directions limitlessly.

To be able to be present in person where other existing beings are is a perfection. As God is infinitely perfect He must possess this perfection in the most perfect possible way, i.e., without any imperfection. If, however, God were not in His very substance extended in all directions limitlessly, some creatures might possibly exist at a distance from God.

God, therefore, could never be present in person where those creatures happened to be, for the only way God could be so present to them would be by passing from one place to another. This, however, is impossible, and for two reasons; first, because it would show God's existence in space to be that of a finite being, and, secondly, because it would suppose God to be mutable. We have proved, however, that God is infinite in perfection and immutable.

Min. 2nd Part. God is everywhere totally.

We have just shown that God is everywhere; that He is every-

where totally follows immediately from His absolute simplicity. As He has no parts, wherever He is, He is totally.

Corollary I. How different beings may be said to exist in a place.

A place is a part of space enclosed by the immediate surfaces of the body or bodies surrounding it. Bodies move from place to place; a place itself is immovable. Place, however, as we reckon it on this moving world of ours, is only relatively immovable, that is, with regard to other places in the world. The relative positions of places on the earth are designated not infrequently by their longitude and latitude. These few notions are sufficient for our present purpose. A full treatment of the questions of space and place will be found in Cosmology.

Properly speaking, only a body can be said to be in a place, or to occupy a place, for only a body is so included within the limits of a place that not only every part of it is within those limits but every part of it is in a corresponding part of the place. The limits of the place, then, are the same as the limits of the body; the place and the body have exactly the same dimensions, exactly the same measure.

Less properly speaking, a finite spirit is said to be in a place or to occupy a place, as, for example, the soul of man is in the place occupied by his body. This is a less proper use of those expressions, for though it is true that a finite spirit is so included within the limits of a place as to have no physical existence outside of it, still, having no parts, it is not commensurate with the place it occupies. It is not only totally in the whole place, but also totally in every part of it.

Still less properly, God the infinite spirit, is said to be in a place, for He is not only totally in the whole place, and totally in every part of it, but also totally in every other place, and part of a place, either real or possible. Hence He is not so included within the limits of any place that He is not outside of those limits, nor is He commensurate with any place. He is, in His very

being, totally in all space both actual and possible, and in every part of the same.

Corollary II. To be everywhere belongs to God alone.

St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica,* 1, q. 8, a. 4, writes:

"To be everywhere, primarily and absolutely (*primo et per se*), is proper to God. Now to be everywhere primarily (*primo*) is said of that which in its whole self is everywhere; for if a thing were everywhere according to its parts in different places, it would not be primarily everywhere, forasmuch as what belongs to anything according to part does not belong to it primarily; thus if a man has white teeth, whiteness belongs primarily not to the man but to his teeth.

"But a thing is everywhere absolutely (*per se*) when it does not belong to it to be everywhere accidentally, that is, merely on some supposition. . . . It belongs therefore to a thing to be everywhere absolutely when, on any supposition, it must be everywhere; and this properly belongs to God alone. For whatever number of places be supposed, even if an infinite number be supposed besides what already exist, it would be necessary that God should be in all of them; for nothing can exist except by Him.

"Therefore, to be everywhere primarily and absolutely, belongs to God, and is proper to Him: because whatever number of places be supposed to exist, God must be in all of them, not as to a part of Him but as to His very self." (Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.)

Corollary III. The various ways in which God is in all things.

St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica,* 1, q. 8, a. 3, says:

"God is in all things by His power, inasmuch as all things are subject to His power; He is by His presence in all things, as all things are bare and open to His eyes; He is in all things by His essence, inasmuch as He is present to all as the cause of their being. . . .

"A thing can be said to be present to another when in its sight, though the thing may be distant in substance, . . . therefore, [answering the objection that to be present by essence and presence mean the same thing] two modes of presence are necessary; viz., by essence, and by presence." (Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.)

As God's presence in His creatures is proportioned to their perfection, and as man is the most perfect creature in this visible creation and is destined for God Himself, God exists in man by His essence, power, and presence, in a way more perfect than in other creatures; and particularly by His presence, inasmuch as God by His infinite knowledge, to which all things in the world, all the

actions of man included, lie bare and open, has a special providence over man, directing him in a special way towards the end for which he was created, the possession of God Himself.

St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles,* Bk. 3, c. 116, writes on this point:

"In things which are moved by a prime mover, the more perfectly one shares in the motion of the prime mover and in likeness to him, the more perfectly one is moved by him. Now, God, who is the giver of the divine law, does everything out of love. The one, therefore, who tends towards Him in this way, that is, out of love, is most perfectly moved by Him."

And again in Bk. 3, c. 111:

"It is evident that divine providence reaches out to all things; it is necessary, however, that a special providence be exercised with regard to intelligent and rational beings, for they are superior to other beings in the perfection of their nature, in virtue of which only rational beings exercise dominion over their own acts. . . . Only the intelligent creature by his actions, that is, by knowing and loving God, reaches the last end for which all things were made; all other creatures can reach that end only in as much as they participate in some likeness of it."

Corollary IV. The very special way in which God is present in the just.

St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica,* 1, q. 43, a. 3, tells us:

"God is in all things by His essence, power, and presence, according to His one common mode, as the cause existing in the effects which participate in His goodness. Above and beyond this common mode, however, there is one special mode belonging to the rational nature wherein God is said to be present as the object known is in the knower, and the beloved in the lover. And since the rational creature by its operation of knowledge and love attains to God Himself, according to this special mode God is said not only to exist in the rational creature, but also to dwell therein as in His own temple. So no other effect can be put down as the reason why the Divine Person is in the rational creature in a new mode, except sanctifying grace. . . . The Holy Ghost is possessed by man, and dwells within him, in the very gift itself of sanctifying grace."

Corollary V. What is meant when we say that God enters into the heart of the just man and departs from the unjust.

When God is said to come into the heart of the just man and depart from the unjust, no change in God is denoted but a change

in man, consequent on which, God, who is always present to both of them, is now present in a special way in the heart of the just man, and no longer present in a special way in the heart of the unjust one.

St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica,* 1, q. 43, a. 2:

"That a Divine Person may newly exist in anyone, or be possessed by anyone in time, does not come from change of the Divine Person, but from change in the creature."

The creature, then, according to the different states in which at various times he exists, is differently affected by the efficacious will of God which in itself is one, eternal, infinite, immutable act, having the power so to affect creatures in time.

DIFFICULTIES

1. A thing which is wholly in one place cannot be wholly in every other actual or possible place.
   But God is wholly in one place. Therefore.
   D. Maj. A thing which is wholly in one place cannot be wholly in another by reason of any reality other than that possessed in the first place, *C.,* by reason of the same reality, *Subd.,* it cannot be present in every other actual and possible place if it is finite, *C.,* if it is infinite, *N. Cd. Min. D. Con.*
2. A being who is immense is an extended being.
   But God is not an extended being. Therefore.
   D. Maj. He is formally extended, *N.,* virtually extended, *C. Cd. Min.*
   A being is said to be formally extended when it has parts which naturally are outside of one another spatially, i.e., when it so occupies a place that its parts are in the corresponding parts of place. Length, breadth, thickness, are properties of formally extended things.
   A being is said to be virtually extended when, though not having the properties of a formally extended being, i.e., length, breadth, and thickness, it, nevertheless, occupies

that of which formal extension is predicated, i.e., space. It occupies space, then, in such wise that it is not commensurate with space, it cannot be measured as space can. It is whole in the space it occupies, and whole in every part of it.

3. If God is omnipotent He should be able to act where He is not.
   But God is omnipotent. Therefore.
   N. Maj. The Major is denied because it rests on a false supposition, namely, that it is possible to find a place in which God is not. God, as we proved in our thesis, is necessarily in every place, actual and possible, and in such wise that, having no parts, He is, in His whole self, everywhere.
4. If God is immense, when creatures begin to exist God begins to exist in them.
   But God cannot begin to exist in creatures. Therefore.
   D. Maj. And this connotes an intrinsic change in God, *N.*, an intrinsic change in creatures and in God an extrinsic change only, *C. Cd. Min.*
5. If God is immense He is necessarily present in many unholy, etc., places.
   But God cannot be in such places. Therefore.
   D. Maj. He is in such places as the infinite and all-seeing Lord and Master of all things who is in no way tainted by their unholiness, *C.*, who is tainted by it, *N. Cd. Min.*

THESIS VI

God is eternal.

PRENOTES TO THE THESIS.

IN the preceding thesis God's infinity looked at from the viewpoint of extension was established, in the present thesis we are to consider God's duration. This is also infinite in perfection, and is called, using the word in the strict sense, eternity. Eternity, strictly so called, belongs to God alone, and hence though it falls under the general notion of duration, it is not truly a species of duration, but only a quasi-species, for duration, considered as embracing both God's duration and that of creatures, is not, strictly speaking, a generic notion, but only a quasi-generic one.

Duration, taken in its widest sense, signifies permanence in existence.

Eternity, strictly so called, is that duration or permanence in existence which excludes from the being who enjoys it, as absolutely impossible, not only beginning and end, but also intrinsic change of any kind, either substantial or accidental. God, therefore, who is eternal in the strict sense, is actually without beginning, without end, and without intrinsic change of any kind, and this because by His very essence it is absolutely impossible that He should be otherwise.

Here we have a permanence in existence than which no greater can be conceived, an infinitely perfect permanence, i.e., an essential permanence in existence which excludes, as absolutely impossible, any possible want of permanence, i.e., beginning, end, intrinsic change of any kind.

If, then, it were possible, as some theologians hold, for God to create a being who would actually be without beginning, end, and change of any kind, though such a being would be said to be eternal, his eternity would fall as far short of God's

eternity as the finite does of the infinite. As a contingent being, his existence would not be essential to him, hence his permanence in existing would not be essential, nor would it exclude the possibility of change.

Boethius has given us a definition of strictly-so-called eternity, i.e., God's eternity, which is classical. He tells us that Eternity is *"Interminabilis vitæ tota simul et perfecta possessio,"* i.e., "Limitless life perfectly possessed as a simultaneous whole."

Life. The term, life, is used in place of existence or duration, because the only existence or duration that is eternal, in the strict sense, is God's existence, and God's existence is that of a living being, or to speak more correctly, God's existence is Life, for God is not merely living, He is Life.

Limitless, i.e., actually unlimited, i.e., actually without beginning or end.

As a simultaneous whole, i.e., not realized in successive stages, in other words, excluding all intrinsic change. A being, whose whole existence is simultaneous, excludes before and after, and, hence, excludes the succession of any state to that already had, in other words, excludes all intrinsic change in his existence, even an accidental change.

Perfectly possessed, i.e., essentially possessed, in other words, not received from another, but possessed by reason of the very essence of the being who is eternal, and, in addition to this, so excluding beginning and end and change of every kind, that not only are they actually excluded but they are excluded as absolutely impossible.

Eternity, in its broad sense, is the duration, or permanence in existence, of a finite being, which, though it is capable of change and capable of end, is, nevertheless, called, and deserves to be called, eternal, inasmuch as, and according to the measure in which, it imitates the immutability of God's eternity. For example, if it endures for length of days more or less unchanged, and, more so, if it will endure forever,

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and still more so, if, in addition to enduring forever, it excludes change in some degree.

In this broad sense our existence in the world to come will be eternal; an existence finite in itself, inasmuch as it is the existence of a finite being, and finite also in its duration, which, though it will never end, is in some ways ever changing, ever increasing, or ever capable of doing so, and therefore, at no moment is fully realized, and so at every moment is actually finite, though destined to go on forever.

St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica,* 1, q. 10, a. 3, puts it this way:

> "Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability from Him [God], they share in His Eternity. Thus some receive immutability from God in the way of never ceasing to exist; in that sense it is said of the earth, that it standeth forever (Eccl. 1, 4). Again some things are called eternal in Scripture because of the length of their duration, although they are in nature corruptible; thus (Ps. 75, 5) the hills are called eternal, and we read of the fruits of the eternal hills (Deut. 33, 15).
>
> "Some, again, share more fully than others in the nature of eternity, inasmuch as they possess unchangeableness either in being, or further still in operation; like the Angels, and the Blessed, who enjoy the Word, because as regards that vision of the Word, no changing thoughts exist in the Saints, as Augustine says (De Trin. 15). Hence those who see God are said to have eternal life; according to that text, this is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only true God, etc. (John 17, 3). . . . The fire of hell is called eternal only because it never ends. Still, there is change in the pains of the lost, according to the words, 'To extreme heat they will pass from snowy waters' (Job 24, 19). Hence in hell true eternity does not exist, but rather time; according to the text of the Psalm, 'Their time will be forever' (Ps. 80, 16)."

Differing from eternity, taken in the strict sense, are two other kinds of duration, or permanence in existence, viz., that of finite spirits and that of material beings, which, though they may be called eternal in the broad sense for the reasons just given, are, nevertheless, infinitely inferior to eternity taken in the strict sense, that is, to God's eternity, God's permanence in existence.

The duration of a finite spirit is called by philosophers, in

Latin, *ævum*. As the strict English equivalent for *ævum*, which is age, is not used in English in the restricted sense given by philosophers to *ævum*, we will use in its place æviternity, the term, namely, commonly used to designate the duration of finite spirits. The duration of a material being is called time.

To bring out clearly the distinction between eternity in the strict sense and æviternity and time, we will give again the distinguishing marks of eternity, and then those of æviternity and time.

Eternity, strictly so called, is permanence in existence, which is essential to the being possessing it, i.e., which flows from his own essence and, hence, is not received from another, and which excludes beginning, end, substantial change, accidental change, as absolutely impossible. This is absolutely perfect duration, absolute permanence in existence; greater cannot be conceived.

Æviternity, the duration or permanence in existence of a finite spirit, is a duration which is not essential to the being possessing it, i.e., which is received from another, and this, because every finite being is a produced being; which has a beginning, which absolutely speaking admits of an end, but naturally excludes one, i.e., no natural cause can bring about its non-existence; which excludes substantial changes but admits accidental ones. This is an infinitely less perfect duration, a permanence in existence in no sense absolute.

Time, the duration or permanence in existence of a material finite being, is a duration which is not essential to the being possessing it, i.e., which is received from another, and this, because a material being is a produced being; which has a beginning, and according to its nature admits of an end, and which admits of both integral substantial, and accidental change. As a finite material being admits integral substantial change and can naturally cease to exist, its permanence in existence is less perfect than that of a finite spirit, which excludes

both one and the other. Time is the lowest form of duration or permanence in existence, since the being enjoying it is subject to change not only accidental but also integral substantial, i.e., in the parts that make it an extended being, and naturally may cease to exist.

Time is continuous successive duration, or motion measured according to before and after. Now though a finite spirit may be the subject of continuous accidental change, and though that change may be measured in terms of time, still as that change is only accidental and not substantial or in the very being of such spirit, the duration of such spirit is not measured by time. On the other hand, a material being, which may be subject to a continuous change in its very substance, is said to exist in time, since, not only its accidental but its very substantial existence may be measured, according to before and after, i.e., according to time.

St. Thomas, *loc. cit.*, aa. 4, 5, speaking of Time, Æviternity and Eternity, says:

"As eternity is the proper measure of permanent being, so time is the proper measure of movement; and hence, according as any being recedes from permanence of being, and is subject to change, it recedes from eternity and is subject to time. Therefore, the being of things corruptible, because it is changeable, is not measured by eternity, but by time; for time measures not only things actually changed, but also things changeable; hence it not only measures movement, but it also measures repose, which belongs to whatever is naturally movable, but is not actually in motion. . . .

"Since eternity is the measure of a permanent being, in so far as anything recedes from permanence of being, it recedes from eternity. Now some things recede from permanence of being, so that their being is subject to change, or consists in change, and these things are measured by time, as are all movements, and also the being of all things corruptible. But others recede less from permanence of being, forasmuch as their being neither consists in change, nor is the subject of change [i.e., substantial]; nevertheless they have change annexed to them [i.e., accidental] either actually, or potentially. This appears in . . . the angels, who have an unchangeable being as regards their nature, with changeableness as regards choice; moreover they have changeableness of intelligence, of affections, and of places, in their own degree. Therefore these [the Angels] are measured by

æviternity which is a mean between eternity and time. But the being that is measured by eternity is not changeable, nor is it annexed to change. In this way time has before and after; æviternity in itself has no before and after, which [before and after] can, however, be joined to it; while eternity has neither before nor after, nor is it compatible with such at all.

"Spiritual creatures as regards successive affections and intelligences are measured by time. . . . But as regards their nature they are measured by æviternity; whereas as regards the vision of glory, they have a share of eternity."

ADVERSARIES.

All **Pantheists** and all **Pluralists** who say that God is mutable.

PROOF OF THE THESIS.

A being whose existence is such that it excludes, as absolutely impossible, beginning, end, and intrinsic change of all kinds, is eternal.

But God is a being of that kind.

Therefore God is eternal.

Maj. The truth of the Major follows immediately from the definition of eternity, strictly so called.

Min. God is a being who exists with absolute necessity, hence His existence could have had no beginning, and can have no end. That His existence, moreover, excludes, as absolutely impossible, all kinds of intrinsic change, has already been proved.

Corollary I. God alone is, in the strict sense, eternal.

St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica,* 1, q. 10, aa. 3, 2:

"Eternity, truly and properly so called, is in God alone, because eternity follows on immutability. . . . But God alone is altogether immutable. . . . Hence, as God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be eternal. Nor is He eternal only; but He is His own eternity; whereas no other being is its own duration, as no other is its own being [existence]. Now God is His own uniform being [existence]; and hence, as He is His own essence, so He is His own eternity." (Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.)

Corollary II. In what sense God may be said to have already existed through an infinite stretch of time.

Time is continuous, successive duration; it is motion measured in terms of before and after the indivisible moment which is called now. In other words, it is continuous change viewed according to what was, is, and will be. It is said to be intrinsic to a being, when the continuous, successive duration is that of the being itself; extrinsic, when the duration of the being is measured by a continuous, successive duration which is extrinsic to it. As God's eternity is an actual, limitless, wholly simultaneous duration, and as it is such with absolute necessity, and, hence, excludes as absolutely impossible not only beginning and end but also change of any kind, i.e., any before or after, it is quite evident that it is absolutely impossible that time should be intrinsic to it. Nevertheless we may speak of God's eternity in terms of time which is extrinsic to it, just as we measure our own duration by the motion of the earth on its axis and around the sun. In this way we may say that God has already existed through an infinite stretch of time; with one other restriction, however, namely, that that infinite time be conceived not as actual but as possible. For, though we consider actual time without a beginning to be impossible, still as no moment in the past can be assigned as the first when time might have begun, i.e., when time was possible, so possible time may be conceived as stretching back indefinitely, i.e., in a broad sense infinitely. It has no limit in its possibility; God's eternity is actually limitless. So, the latter may be conceived in terms of the former.

Corollary III. In what sense, when speaking of God, we use terms denoting the past, the present and the future.

The only duration of which we have immediate knowledge is that of time, with its past, its present, and its future. Quite naturally, nay, even necessarily, when we wish to speak of God's timeless duration, of which we have only mediate knowledge, i.e., knowledge gained by demonstration, we make use of terms denot-

ing time. When we define God's eternity, for example, we do so by excluding from it the limitations of time-duration. We say it is a duration which excludes, as absolutely impossible, beginning, end, and intrinsic change of every kind. What is more, when treating of the attitude of God, who is changeless, towards the changeable things of time, economy of words obliges us to speak of God as though His duration were not eternal but temporal. We say, for instance, in the case of Peter who yesterday was, today is not, and tomorrow will again be, in the state of grace, God loved Peter yesterday, He does not love him today, He will again love him tomorrow. Quite evidently, in so speaking, we cannot mean that God passes from a state of love, to one of not-love and again to one of love, for the infinite will of God, which is God Himself, is absolutely changeless. These terms then do not denote any intrinsic change in God, but a change which is extrinsic to Him and intrinsic to Peter. Since, however, because of the intrinsic change in Peter, the attitude of God's will, which is changeless in itself, is one of love towards Peter as he was yesterday, is one of not-love towards Peter as he is today, and is one of love towards Peter as he will be tomorrow, we transfer the terms of time which strictly signify the different attitudes of God's will as affecting Peter, to the will of God itself. Hence when we say God loved Peter yesterday, we do not signify a past act of God's will, but briefly state, that Peter yesterday co-existed with God's changeless will as an object of love; when we say that God does not love Peter today, we do not signify that there is a present will of God different from a past one, but state briefly that Peter today co-exists with God's changeless will no longer as an object of love; when we say God will again love Peter tomorrow, we do not signify that there will be a new act of will in God tomorrow, but briefly state that Peter tomorrow will again co-exist with God's changeless will as an object of love. In like manner, desiring to express, not change in God, i.e., past, present, and future in His duration, but His attitude towards changing creatures whose past, present, and future states respectively co-existed, co-exist, and will co-exist with His changeless duration, we transfer for brevity's sake, the terms denoting

past, present, and future to God from creatures. For example, in place of saying: "The world came into existence many years ago as the result of God's eternal creative act," "The proud will receive humiliations from God," "I shall receive an answer to my prayers tomorrow," we say "God created the world many years ago," "God will humble the proud," "God will answer my prayers tomorrow."

DIFFICULTIES

1. If we may rightly predicate of God terms denoting the past, the present, and the future, His duration is not eternal. But we may rightly predicate such terms of God. Therefore.

   D. Maj. If we may rightly predicate such terms of God because of change intrinsic to Him, His duration is not eternal, *C.*, if we may rightly do so because of change not intrinsic to God but to creatures, whose co-existence in varying temporal states with God's changeless eternal duration gives sufficient ground for such predication, properly understood, God's duration is not eternal, *N. Cd. Min. Cf. Corollary* 3.

2. If God's duration is wholly simultaneous, and hence excludes both before and after, every existing creature co-exists with the whole of eternity.

   But it is impossible that every existing creature should co-exist with the whole of eternity. Therefore.

   D. Maj. Every existing creature co-exists with the whole of eternity, and wholly, i.e., with eternity inasmuch as, by reason of the changeless limitlessness of its duration, it includes, without any of the imperfections of time, the limited duration of each creature, and all actual and possible temporal duration both before and after it, *N.*, every existing creature co-exists with the whole of eternity, but not wholly, i.e., it co-exists with the whole of eternity but not inasmuch as eternity includes in an eminent way all actual and possible time before and after the limited duration of every creature, *C. Cd. Min.*

Eternity is absolutely necessary, actual, changeless, limitless duration; actual time is changeable, limited duration. As eternity has neither before nor after, i.e., as it has no parts, every actual finite duration must co-exist with the whole of it. As eternity, however, because of its limitlessness, stretches beyond the limited duration of any finite being, and includes, as a consequence, though without the changeable imperfection of time, not only the limited duration of every creature, but also all actual and possible duration both before and after it, no finite duration, though it co-exist with the whole of eternity, can co-exist with it wholly.

3. If God created the world in time, He is not eternal.
But God created the world in time. Therefore.

D. Maj. If God created the world in time, i.e., if the creative act itself was placed in time, God is not eternal, *C.*, if, whilst the creative act itself is eternal, its effect, namely, the coming into existence of the world, was in time, God is not eternal, *N. Cd. Min. Cf. Corollary* 3.

THESIS VII

God's knowledge, identified as it is with Himself, is a single, simple, immutable and infinitely perfect act, by which God knows, in the most perfect way possible, all things knowable.

PRENOTES TO THE THESIS.

THE question of God's knowledge is of supreme importance. Our treatment of it, for many reasons necessarily limited, for the present will be confined to this rather general thesis. In the concluding part of our Natural Theology, which we hope to publish later, some of its more difficult points will be considered.

The purpose of the present thesis, however, is not to demonstrate that God is an intelligent being. That fact was conclusively established in *God and Reason,* the first part of our Natural Theology, and is assumed here as so established. What we purpose, then, is to demonstrate explicitly, and in a special thesis treating formally of God's knowledge, that that knowledge is identified with Himself, and hence that it is a single, simple, immutable, and infinitely perfect act. We say, explicitly, and in a special thesis, for all these truths have already been implicitly proved in one or another of our previous theses treating of God's absolute infinity, absolute simplicity, and absolute immutability. In the last-named thesis, moreover, the immutability of God's knowledge was also explicitly proved.

God's knowledge is identified with Himself. The identity here referred to is real identity. In other words, God and His knowledge are not two things, but one thing. God is divine knowledge, and divine knowledge is God. What is more, since, as was explained and proved in the thesis on the absolute simplicity of God, all of our mentally conceived aspects of God are distinguished from one another only imperfectly, my

concept of God's knowledge formally represents identically the same object which is represented in my concept of God, though under a different aspect. Hence, when I have a concept of divine knowledge, this concept formally represents God—the whole Godhead—not, however, under all aspects but only under the aspect of knowledge.

God's knowledge is a single, simple act, that is, there is and can be only one act of divine knowledge, and that, an absolutely simple one. This act is eternal and embraces all things knowable in every possible way in which they are knowable.

God's knowledge is immutable and infinitely perfect. The theses on God's immutability and infinity, together with the explanations given here, should make these terms clear.

God knows all things knowable. A list of the classes of objects that comprise all things knowable, together with all necessary explanations concerning them will be found in *Thesis* 4.

God knows all things in the most perfect way possible. This means that:

1. God's knowledge is comprehensive, that is, He has a full and exhaustive knowledge of all things knowable, both in themselves and in every possible relation they may say to other things.
2. God's knowledge is immediate, that is, it is not acquired from another, or by any kind of reasoning process.
3. God's knowledge is not analogical, that is, it represents all things knowable according to the perfections which are proper to each one of them.
4. God's knowledge is not acquired by judgments, as man's knowledge is; for a judgment presupposes concepts of the subject and predicate, which he mentally joins if it is an affirmative judgment, and mentally separates if it is a negative one. God's knowledge is one simple act.
5. As God is infinite actual knowledge no object is a cause

of that knowledge, nor is there formal representational equality between that knowledge and any finite object.

ADVERSARIES.

Either directly or indirectly, the infinite knowledge of God, in itself, or as provable by unaided human reason, is denied either explicitly or implicitly quite generally by modern non-Catholic philosophers of all schools. Among these are professed **Atheists** of all types; **Pantheists**; those who deny that reason can demonstrate the existence of God, and, in a special way, those who deny the infinite perfection of God. Cf. *Thesis 2, Adversaries;* also the *Adversaries* mentioned in *God and Reason.*

PROOF OF THE THESIS.

The knowledge of the only infinitely perfect being that is possible, identified as it is with Himself, is a single, simple, immutable, and infinitely perfect act, by which, as a consequence, all things knowable are known by Him in the most perfect way possible.

But God is the only infinitely perfect being that is possible. Therefore God's knowledge, identified as it is with Himself, is a single, simple, immutable, and infinitely perfect act, by which, as a consequence, all things knowable are known by God in the most perfect way possible.

Maj. The knowledge of the only infinitely perfect being that is possible, God,

1. Is identified with Himself. If anything not Himself were found in God, He would not be an absolutely simple being. We have proved, however, that He is absolutely simple.
2. Is a single, simple act. Otherwise, God would not be, as we have already proved Him to be, absolutely simple.
3. Is an immutable act. The absolute intrinsic immutability, both physical and moral, of God proves this.

4. Is infinitely perfect. And this, because God is infinitely perfect.
5. Is an act by which He knows all things knowable in the most perfect way possible. Otherwise His knowledge would not be infinitely perfect.

Min. The Minor has been proved in previous theses.

Corollary. Some points of difference between God's knowledge and that of man.

Man's knowledge begins with concepts which are derived through his sense cognition, that is, with intellectual images or representations of various objects, by which those objects are known. Each concept has its own proper or formal object, that is, an object which it immediately represents, and between which and itself there is a perfect representational equation. This formal object may be found to exist in many different things, for example, the concept which represents a white thing may be predicated of a man, a horse, a swan, a wall. These different things are in that case material objects of the concept. A concept, then, may have different material objects but only one formal object, that is, one proper object; one object which it must always represent because between it and that object there exists a perfect representational equation.

By means of its concepts man's intellect forms judgments. In true judgments, as we know from *Criteriology,* intellectual or logical truth, which consists in a perfect representational conformity, or equation, between the act of knowledge and the formal object of that act, exists more perfectly than in the simple apprehension, or concept. Without pursuing this point further, it is sufficient for our purpose here to realize that when our intellect forms a concept or a true judgment there is a perfect representational conformity, or equation, between it and the formal object respectively of such concept or judgment.

In the formation of our concepts or judgments, which are immediate, that is, derived from objects without any process of rea-

soning; or mediate, that is, the result of reasoning, not only the intellect plays the part of a cause but the object also. How the object acts as a cause with regard to our immediate knowledge; and, through judgments already made, with regard to our mediate knowledge, is fully explained in *Rational Psychology,* and *Criteriology.*

Our intellect, then, acquires knowledge, that is, it passes from a state of not-knowing to one of knowing. It does this by countless acts in each of which there is a perfect representational equation between the act and its formal object. In the formation of these acts both the intellect and the object concur as causes.

God, on the contrary, acquires no knowledge. He is knowledge, infinite actual knowledge. In God, therefore, there can be no passing from a state of not-knowing to one of knowing. His knowledge is all-embracing, comprehensive, changeless, eternal. It is His by one act, not by many. It is His by an absolutely simple act; He forms no judgments. It is His immediately; He reasons not, nor is His knowledge from another. By this one, actually infinite, and, hence, absolutely simple, all-embracing, comprehensive, changeless, eternal act of knowledge, then, God of Himself from all eternity knows every possible knowable thing, under every possible knowable aspect, acquiring no knowledge, losing no knowledge, forming no judgments, reasoning not.

The primary and principal object of this one infinite act of God's knowledge is God Himself, also infinite. As both are infinite, between them there exists a perfect representational equation. Hence the primary object of God's knowledge may also be called its formal object. In this object, or through this object known, God, by His one simple act of knowledge, knows all other knowable objects; not all, however, in the same way, as will be shown later.

The secondary objects of God's single act of knowledge are all finite things. As these objects are finite and God's act is infinite, though it represents most perfectly every possible finite object as it is in itself, it is impossible that there should be a perfect or formal representational equation between it and any or all of those

objects. Since, however, it represents perfectly every finite object as it is itself, and, hence, does in an infinite, eminent, or more perfect way, what finite concepts, through formal representational equation with their objects, do in a finite or less perfect way, between it and the finite objects it represents there may be said to exist a representational equation not formally but eminently. In the same way we say that God possesses the power of reason, not formally as it is found in man, but in an infinitely superior way or eminently, seeing that He understands immediately what man knows only through reasoning. If we wish, then, to apply to God's knowledge our definition of logical truth, namely, a representational equation between thought and its object, we must understand that, as far as finite objects are concerned, it cannot be applied to God's knowledge and man's in the same way. In man's knowledge there is a formal representational equation between thought and object, in God's knowledge of finite objects, there is no formal representational equation between thought and object, but what may be called a representational equation in a more perfect, an eminent way.

Finally, as God is infinite actual knowledge, He is in Himself, i.e., subjectively, fully determined to know whatever is knowable. No object, therefore, can, in the strict sense of the word, determine, i.e., be a cause of, God's knowledge. However, as God's knowledge, in common with all knowledge, presupposes its object, it is absolutely impossible that God should know a definite object unless the objective truth of that object be already determined. In the case of God's knowledge, therefore, the object is required not as a cause of the knowledge, but as a condition absolutely necessary for the knowledge of that definite object. This dependence of God's knowledge on its object, not as on a cause, but as on an absolutely necessary, i.e., a *sine qua non,* condition of that knowledge, implies no imperfection in God. Without this dependence God could have no knowledge. The dependence of God's knowledge on its object as a condition requisite for that knowledge is sometimes expressed in this way: the object is said to be the term of God's knowledge; to terminate it; to extrinsically determine it.

Scholion I. The thesis just explained and proved is quite general. Some rather difficult points with regard to God's knowledge from eternity of the possibles, the futuribles, and all existing things, especially the free acts of man, demand further treatment. Something too must be said of the way in which God objectively comprehends these various objects. As these questions are rather closely connected with those to be treated in the third part of our Natural Theology, they will be taken up there.

Scholion II. St. Thomas on God's knowledge.

St. Thomas, *Summa Contra Gentiles,* Bk. 1, cc. 44-71 inc., and *Summa Theologica,* 1, q. 14, treats at length the question of God's knowledge. We quote a few passages bearing on our thesis from the *Summa Contra Gentiles,* literally translated by the English Dominican Fathers. It may be well to note in passing that these same fathers have also published a translation of the *Summa Theologica:*

"God lacks no perfection that is to be found in any genus of things. . . . Now the greatest among the perfections of things is that a thing is intellectual, because thereby it is, after a fashion, all things, having in itself the perfection of all. Therefore God is intelligent." *C.* 44.

"Intelligence is the act of an intelligent being, existing within that being and not passing on to something outside of it, as heating passes into the thing heated; for the intelligible suffers nothing through being understood, but the one who understands [if he be finite] is perfected. Now whatever is in God is the divine essence. Therefore God's act of intelligence is the divine essence, the divine existence, and God Himself: since God is His essence and His existence. . . .

"If, however, God's act of intelligence is His existence, His act of intelligence must be simple, eternal, unchangeable, existing only in act, and all those things which have been proved about the divine existence. Wherefore God is not in potentiality to intelligence, nor does He begin to understand a thing anew, nor is His act of intelligence subject to any change or composition whatsoever." *C.* 45.

"Everything, in whatever way it exists, is known by God, inasmuch as He knows His essence." *C.* 68.

"If God's knowledge extends to all things that exist, in whatever way they exist, as we have shown, it follows that He knows not only actual being but also potential being. Now in natural things there is the infinite potentially although not actually. . . . Therefore God knows infinite things." *C.* 69.

Scholion III. Some modern philosophers on God's knowledge.

Not a few present-day philosophers reject altogether the notion of an intelligent God, and for the simple reason that God for them is not a real being at all, but merely an ideal something for the achievement of which man is ever striving. Others, who admit that God is a real being, and intelligent, but finite, deny, as a consequence, at least implicitly, His knowledge to be infinite. The views of some of this class have been cited in the preceding theses on the infinity, the simplicity, and the immutability of God. In the citations which follow God's infinite knowledge is explicitly rejected.

Ukichi Kawaguchi, "The Doctrine of Evolution and the Conception of God," *American Journal of Theology,* October, 1915, makes clear the tendency of contemporary philosophy to conceive God as a finite, changing, evolving being. He there tells us:

"The futility of the traditional view of God as the absolute being who has determined the course of the world and of human history in accordance with his eternal plan becomes self-evident when we see that our moral life demands that it ought to and really can change the character of our moral universe. . . . But thus to bring relativity and becoming into the very being of God means, of course, that we must abandon that absolute ground of religious and ethical assurance which is believed to be given to us by traditional conceptions of God, as the absolute controller of the world and human life. An evolving God does not guarantee beforehand the ultimate success of our moral universe." P. 573.

We quoted in a prior thesis some passages from *Bergson and Religion,* in which its author, **Lucius Hopkins Miller,** commented approvingly on **Bergson's** notion of a mutable, evolving god. We quote here some further passages from the same work approving also of **Bergson's** non-omniscient god:

"According to Bergson, the great Life Power, the Vital Impetus, is neither omniscient nor omnipotent. Evolution is not due, as the finalists say, to an original plan (and Planner) which foresees every detail and plans each modification with an end in view. . . . This inner Life Power does not foresee or plan the particular effects it will produce. In fact, it cannot. It drives ahead to unforeseen and unforeseeable results. There is a progressive growth of the Absolute itself and, in evolution, a continual invention of forms ever new. 'God is unceasing life, action, freedom. He

had no beginning nor can we conceive of His having an end. He is not omnipotent; He is doing the best He can with stubborn substance. He has not created the world yet; it is being created under our very eyes.' (Cf. *Current Literature,* May, 1911.)

"Now there is no doubt that this viewpoint is very disturbing to customary religious feeling; to many it will seem downright blasphemous. If there be no omniscience anywhere in the world, how can we be sure that 'all things work together for good' even 'to them that love God'? Even if there were omniscience, but without omnipotence, how could we be sure that the omnisciently wise plan could be carried out?" Pp. 116 ff.

"The belief in a Providence which maps out every detail of our life is undoubtedly a belief full of energizing power and, to many, a vital thing. On the other hand, it is a matter of common observation that it often results in a practical fatalism which induces laziness and a general irresponsibility necessitating extra activity and care on the part of those most nearly in contact with the 'believers.' . . . A faith that would not easily allow men to make religion an excuse for laziness, or a substitute for personal responsibility, would have its advantages.

"Then, too, belief in the existence of a divine plan, complete in all its details, has constantly engendered, as a corollary, faith in certain men's ability to acquire secret and relatively complete information regarding this plan, especially as regards impending events, or even those of the far distant future, including detailed knowledge of the lot and activities of the souls of men in the next world. This faith needs but its common accompaniment, an 'exaggerated ego,' to blossom out into the surreptitious or openly avowed assumption of omniscience by these men. They alone are the appointed channels for the dissemination of inspired information regarding the details of God's future plans. Sow the seed of this unsound theory of revelation in the fertile soul of credulity, still so marked a characteristic of the mass of religious believers, and there results a harvest of unlovely dogmatism, tyrannical domination, crass superstition, weakened will-power, and religious deterioration.

"Belief in a Providence which consciously and purposely embraces every detail of existence has also widely influenced the prayers of religious people, and not always helpfully. . . .

"Further, the thought of an omnipotent, omniscient, and unchanging Being is one that leaves us cold." Pp. 122 ff.

"Therefore, in spite of a hesitancy which, indeed, may be due to the unearned increment of mere custom, we may safely conclude that Bergson's philosophy is generally compatible with theism; that it avoids some of the religious dilemmas favored by other systems; that it has some distinct advantages of its own in relation to religion.

"But one naturally raises the question: Is Bergsonism compatible with Christian theism? The important point here is, whether any limitation of knowledge and power in God would be compatible with the Christian idea of God. And by the Christian idea of God I mean that idea which emerges, crystal clear, from the teaching of Christ himself; not the more

metaphysical idea elaborated by the Church in her historic creeds. . . Undoubtedly he [Christ] did accept and teach an omnipotence and omniscience of God, as for instance, where he says, 'With God all things are possible.' This fact, however, does not settle our present question, which is primarily metaphysical. Apart from the diverse content of the terms, then and now, any such dogma in Jesus' teaching would be religious rather than metaphysical. Indeed I see no reason why a Bergsonian also could not consistently express himself religiously in the language of omniscence and omnipotence." Pp. 133 ff.

According to **Professor Miller,** then, a Bergsonian, if asked: "Is God omnipotent and omniscient?" might truthfully answer, if he spoke as a philosopher, "No;" if he spoke as a Christian, as a believer, "Yes." This is Modernism pure and simple; and Modernism, as was shown in *God and Reason,* the first part of our Natural Theology, is a system which is utterly destructive of all truth.

In our thesis on the infinity of God we quoted a passage from **Wilm,** *Henri Bergson.* In the following passage from the same work **Professor Wilm,** who rejects some of **Bergson's** fundamental notions, but who appears to have a very poor opinion of old-time theology, has this to say of **Bergson's** idea of God's knowledge:

"But if Bergson's system is unfriendly to absolute creation theories, it is equally unfriendly to all forms of absolute theology. If there is no absolute creation in the sense of traditional theology, there is also no absolute predestination. The course of evolution is not mapped out, as it were, beforehand, so that no one, not even God, 'can see the end from the beginning.' The life of God himself lies before him largely in the form of an unrealized possibility, like the life of the youth whose vast and ill-defined aspirations and impulses are symptomatic of certain energies and tendencies, without, however, offering any clear hint or sign of the final outcome of the great adventure of life which he confronts." P. 145.

Corrance, "Bergson and the Idea of God," *Hibbert Journal,* January, 1914, interpreting **Bergson** tells us that an all-knowing God is an impossibility:

"The idea, then, of God as a Being, who gathers up all succession, past, present and future in one simultaneity of consciousness, amounts to nothing more than the complete and absolute spatializing of duration. No jugglery of logic can ever unite such totally and essentially opposed ideas as those of succession and simultaneity." P. 380.

Schiller, *Riddles of the Sphinx,* asserts emphatically that it is impossible for an infinite being to be an intelligent being. Hence he denies, as we have already seen, the infinity of God. He tells us:

"It is easy to show that every one of the religious attributes must be excluded from an infinite Deity. Thus an infinite God can have neither personality nor consciousness, for they both depend on limitation. Personality rests on the distinction of one person from another, consciousness on the distinction of Self and Not-Self.

"Neither can intelligence or wisdom be ascribed to an infinite God. For such a God could have neither personality nor consciousness; his intelligence would have to be impersonal and his wisdom unconscious, and to such terms our minds can give no meaning. And moreover, what we understand by wisdom or intelligence is an essentially finite quality, shown in the adaptation of means to ends. But the Infinite can neither have ends nor require means to attain them." P. 307.

James, *The Will to Believe, and other Essays,* insists that if we hold that man is endowed with free-will we must also hold that God cannot foresee with absolute certainty the definite act which man will freely put in a definite set of circumstances. In other words, if man is free, then God's knowledge is necessarily limited. This, however, does not mean, says James, that God could not control the final outcome of things. He explains it this way:

"The belief in free-will is not in the least incompatible with the belief in Providence, provided you do not restrict the Providence to fulminating nothing but fatal decrees. If you allow him to provide possibilities as well as actualities to the universe, and to carry on his own thinking in these two categories just as we do in ours, chances may be there, uncontrolled even by him, and the course of the universe be really ambiguous; and yet the end of all things may be just what he intended it to be from all eternity.

"An analogy will make the meaning of this clear. Suppose two men before a chessboard, the one a novice, the other an expert player of the game. The expert intends to beat. But he cannot foresee exactly what any one actual move of his adversary may be. He knows, however, all the possible moves of the latter; and he knows in advance how to meet each of them by a move of his own which leads in the direction of victory. And the victory infallibly arrives, after no matter how devious a course, in the one predestined form of check-mate to the novice's king.

"Let now the novice stand for us free agents, and the expert for the infinite [?] mind in which the universe lies. Suppose the latter to be thinking out his universe before he actually creates it. Suppose him to say, I will lead things to a certain end, but I will not now decide on all the steps thereto. At various points ambiguous possibilities shall be left open,

either of which, at a given instant may become actual. But whichever branch of these bifurcations become real, I know what I shall do at the next bifurcation to keep things from drifting away from the final result I intend.

"The creator's plan of the universe would thus be left blank as to many of its actual details, but all possibilities would be marked down. The realization of some of these would be left absolutely to chance; that is, they would only be determined when the moment of realization came. . . . So the creator himself would not need to know all the details of actuality till they came." Pp. 180 ff.

Clarence Augustine Beckwith, *The Idea of God,* shows quite clearly that he is a Pantheist. Hence, though he attributes infinite power, wisdom, and goodness to God, he really holds that God is a finite being; finite in intelligence and finite in power. We subjoin some passages from *The Idea of God* which are unmistakably pantheistic:

"According to the traditional view which arose when God was conceived of as independent of the world and essentially separate from it, he was the absolute, self-conscious, originating cause of all. The belief found expression in the doctrine of decrees: before the creation of the universe God determined within himself what he would have come to pass with every single thing. Naturally there was no proof of such a doctrine; although the authors of it claimed to draw it from the Scriptures, yet the biblical writers had no means of discovering or by revelation becoming aware of it. Prophecy as predictive, which was formerly urged in support of divine foreknowledge, is itself hopelessly in need of corroboration. . . .

"The doctrine of omniscience may be so defined as to assert that all the changes and events of the universe, past, present, and to come, are eternally in the divine mind, but the definition is purely *a priori* and can never be substantiated in experience. There is, however, in this conception the presentiment of a deep truth: reality, as a whole, being infinite, of which the visible universe is a part, is marked by intelligence or order not only in what it is by reason of all the past, that is, it contains the past in its entirety, but also bears within it the promise and potency of all that is to be." Pp. 141, 142.

"Theologians have affirmed that every event in man's earthly existence was foreknown and predetermined in the thought of God; the life of each man therefore simply repeats in earthly form what was eternally present as a purpose in the mind of God. Of such a plan, however, in the mind of God, in the sense outlined, we have and can have no knowledge. What we know is that in the successive generations of living men, there is something which for the want of a better word we call 'plan,' according to which personality and character develop. . . . We see, therefore, that 'plan' is not necessarily dependent on forethought, whether perfect or par-

tial. . . . The question of its absolute origination is irrelevant—there is no such origination; such origination as there is is progressive and may be traced in the stages of its development. Accordingly, the originative activity is immanent, gradual, continuous, ever changing, yet ever the same, without beginning and without end." P. 153.

"The unity of the world, and indeed the whole process of evolution, can be referred to one principle only, that is, to an inner tendency to unity and coordination, and development. . . . This tendency is in every atom, but it is super-atomic; it is in every inorganic combination, but it is super-inorganic; it is in every organic existence, but it is super-organic; it is the ethical endeavor of every individual, but it is super-individual; it is the secret force in all social progress, but it is super-social. . . . The conviction is irresistible that here we have to do with a unitary force whose activity is twofold,—toward individuation by which the organism comes into and is maintained in existence, and toward totality in which the individual becomes an integral part of an harmonious whole. For this we invoke no external power, arbitrarily manipulating the ultimate particles of the universe; instead, we discover that we are here in the presence of a fundamental characteristic of Reality, namely, a creative tendency towards ends of whatever kind. We may define this tendency by various terms, as Nature, Cosmic Force, the Will to Live, Creative Impulse, Infinite and Eternal Energy, or, taking into consideration the ethical values which have emerged in evolution, we may say the Power, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness, or, having regard to the experience and custom of the Anglo-Saxon people, we may call it God. . . . In this unifying activity we may find a part of our definition of God [cf. *God and Reason,* p. 55, for Professor Beckwith's full definition, or rather description of God]. And we need have no fear lest we belittle God if we think of his working as completely absorbed in the universe. A universe infinite in space and time, with an infinite possibility of combination and system, is a field broad enough for infinite power, wisdom, and goodness. Moreover, if any energy were to be alleged in addition to what is here involved, it would be purely supposititious; it could never come within the scope of human experience or apprehension." Pp. 155 ff.

See also *Thesis 2, Scholion.*

DIFFICULTIES

1. If knowledge consists in a perfect similarity, that is, equation, between the act of knowledge and the object represented in it, God cannot know finite things.

   But knowledge consists in a perfect similarity, that is, equation, of this kind.

   Therefore, God cannot know finite things.

D. Maj. If knowledge consists in a perfect similarity in entity between the act of knowledge and the object represented in it, God cannot, etc., *C.;* if it consists in a perfect similarity in representational value between the act of knowledge and the object represented in it, *Subd.;* if it consists in this perfect similarity in the case of a finite act of knowledge, God cannot know finite objects, *N.;* if it consists in this perfect similarity in the case of God's knowledge, God cannot know finite objects, *C. Cd. Min.* In the corollary to this thesis will be found an explanation of this solution.

2. If in all knowledge there is a necessary dependence of the act of knowledge on the object known, God cannot know finite objects. But in all knowledge there is a necessary dependence of the act of knowledge on the object known.
Therefore, God cannot know finite objects.

D. Maj. If in all knowledge there is a necessary dependence of the act of knowledge on the object known, as a partial cause of the act, and hence a dependence which implies that the act is produced, and therefore necessarily finite, God cannot know finite objects, *C.;* if in all knowledge other than God's knowledge there is such a dependence, whereas God's knowledge, which is from eternity unproduced, actual and in every way infinite, supposes merely that the object be given in order that it be known, and, hence, it depends on the object not as on a cause, but as on a condition absolutely necessary for the knowing of it, God cannot know finite objects, *N. Cd. Min.*
Cf. the *Corollary* to this thesis.

3. If a being necessarily exists before he can know anything, God's knowledge is not identified with Himself.
But a being necessarily exists before he can know anything.
Therefore, God's knowledge is not identified with Himself.

D. Maj. If a finite being necessarily exists before He can

know anything, God's knowledge is not identified with Himself, *N.;* if an infinite being, i.e., God, necessarily exists before he can know anything, God's knowledge is not identified with Himself, *Subd.;* if His existence is really prior to His knowledge, *C.;* if it is prior not really but only conceptually, i.e., according to our way of viewing it, God's knowledge is not identified with Himself, *Subd.,* it is not really identified with Himself, *N.;* it is not conceptually identified with Himself, in other words, according to our way of viewing God, placing an imperfect mental distinction between God and His knowledge, we conceive His existence as prior to His knowledge, *C. Cd. Min. D. Con.*

There are many other difficulties which might be urged against our thesis, for example, difficulties with regard to God's foreknowledge of the future free actions of man. These difficulties will be answered in the third part of our work, to be published later, in which, as we stated in the *General Prenotes,* will be treated some of the more difficult questions concerning God's knowledge.

THESIS VIII

God's will, identified as it is with Himself, is a single, simple, immutable, and infinitely perfect act, by which God loves, primarily, His own Goodness for Itself, and, secondarily, through love of His own Goodness, all things else.

PRENOTES TO THE THESIS.

THAT God has a will is quite evident from not a few of the proved conclusions of former theses. He is the intelligent, personal cause of the ordered world and of intelligent personal beings in that world; a being to be reverenced, supplicated, adored; the source of morality, writing His law in the hearts of men, binding them in conscience to do good and avoid evil; an infinitely perfect God—all of which conclusions demand that God be possessed of a will.

St. Thomas in the *Summa Contra Gentiles,* Bk. 1, c. 72, gives this proof:

"From the fact that there is intelligence in God it follows that in Him there is will. Because, since the good understood is the proper object of the will, it follows that the good understood, as such, is willed. Now understood indicates a reference to one who understands. It follows therefore of necessity that one who understands good, as such, has a will. Now God understands good; for since He is perfectly intelligent, as shown above, He understands being simultaneously with the notion of good. Therefore in Him there is will. . . .

"Further. A form considered by the intellect neither moves nor causes anything except through the medium of the will, whose object is an end and a good by which one is moved to act. . . .

"Again. The first of motive powers in intelligent beings is the will: because the will applies every power to its act: for we understand because we will, we imagine because we will, and so forth. . . . Therefore it is especially fitting that the first mover should have a will."

The object of our present thesis, then, is not to prove that God has a will, but to establish in a formal and explicit way some

general truths concerning that will. In prior theses these truths have already been demonstrated more or less implicitly.

God's will is identified with Himself. This identity is the same as that which exists between God's knowledge and Himself. Cf. *Thesis* 7.

God's will is a single, simple act, that is, there is and can be only one act of willing in God, and that, an absolutely simple one. This act is eternal and embraces all things that are or can be, inasmuch as they are good.

God's will is immutable and infinitely perfect. The theses on God's immutability and infinity, together with the further explanations given in the course of this thesis, should make these terms clear.

The primary object of God's will is Himself; the secondary objects, loved because of the primary object, are all things else.

The one, immutable, infinitely perfect act of God's will, which, according to our limited way of viewing things, is conceived as following after God's infinite act of knowledge of all things, inasmuch as they are true, embraces likewise all things, inasmuch as they are good; goodness being the proper object of the will.

Not in the same way, however, do all these various objects fall under the will of God. With regard to some objects, His will is not free, with regard to others, it is; some objects He wills efficaciously, calling them by the act of His will into existence at the time He ordains, and by the same act preserving them therein, concurring with all their actions and wisely governing them; others are objects of His will of mere complacency; He wills some things absolutely, others conditionally, etc. Leaving some of these points for consideration in the corollaries to the present thesis, and others for explanation later on, our present concern is with the division of the objects of God's will into primary and secondary, formal and material.

The primary object of God's will is that object which is not only primary or first in the sense that it excels all other objects in point of goodness, and hence is loved by God above all other things, but also primary or first in the sense that it is the immediate object of God's will, and hence is loved by God for itself before or prior to all other things; not, however, prior in point of time, for God's single act of will is eternal, but inasmuch as all other things are loved by God mediately, i.e., through, by reason of, dependently on, His love for it.

It will be quite evident, then, from the definitions which follow of the formal and material objects of God's will, that its primary object is not only its most excellent material object but also its formal object.

The secondary objects of God's will, therefore, are secondary in both of the senses just noted with regard to the primary object, that is, they are secondary in point of excellence, seeing that they are finite in perfection whereas the primary object is infinite, and secondary in the sense that they are mediate objects of God's will.

The material objects of God's will are those objects which in any way whatsoever fall under its action. Every bit of reality, since by the very fact that it is real it is also good, is to be included in some way or other among the material objects of God's will. All actual beings are certainly to be so included; and, according to the opinion which appears to be more probable, all possible beings, inasmuch as they are possible, are also to be so included, since, as such, they are possible imitations of the divine Goodness, and in so far forth participate in that Goodness. God's love, however, for possible beings, as such, is not an efficacious love, i.e., it does not render them actual, but a love of mere complacency, i.e., a love by which God takes pleasure in them inasmuch as they show forth the countless possible ways in which His infinite Goodness may be imitated. It is needless to say that

God who is actually infinite, or limitless in perfection, and so is infinite Reality, and hence infinite Good, is infinitely above all other objects of God's will. In fact whatever of goodness these various objects possess is but a participation in an infinitely inferior degree of the divine Goodness.

The formal object of God's will is that object which is immediately willed or loved by God, and for Itself, and through, by reason of, dependently on, His love for which, all other objects are in different ways loved by Him. As the formal object of an act specifies it, i.e., distinguishes it from all other acts, and as the will of God is distinguished from all other acts of will inasmuch as it is infinite actual will, it follows immediately that its formal object must be infinite actual Good, i.e., God Himself.

ADVERSARIES.

The adversaries mentioned in the preceding thesis are in the same way adversaries to this thesis also.

PROOF OF THE THESIS.

The will of the only infinitely perfect being that is possible, identified as it is with Himself, is a single, simple, immutable, and infinitely perfect act, by which He loves, primarily, Himself, and, secondarily, and through love of Himself, all things else.

But God is the only infinitely perfect being that is possible. Therefore God's will, identified as it is with Himself, is a single, simple, immutable, and infinitely perfect act, by which God loves, primarily, Himself, and, secondarily, and through love of Himself, all things else.

Maj. The will of the only infinitely perfect being that is possible —God,

1. Is identified with Himself. If any perfection not identified with Himself were found in God, He would not be an absolutely simple being. We have proved, however, that He is absolutely simple.

St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles,* Bk. 1, c. 73, gives this proof:

> "It belongs to God to have a will in as much as He has an intellect, as proved above (Ch. 72). Now He is intelligent by His essence, as we have already shown (Chs. 45, 46): and, consequently, will also is in Him by His essence. Therefore God's will is His very essence. . . .
>
> "Again. If will were something added to the divine substance, since the divine substance is complete in being, it would follow that will would be adventitious to Him like an accident to its subject; that the divine substance would be compared thereto as potentiality to act; and that there is composition in God. All of which have been disproved above (Chs. 16, 18, 23). It is therefore impossible for the divine will to be something in addition to the divine essence."

2. Is a single, simple act. Otherwise God would not be, as we have already proved Him to be, absolutely simple.
3. Is an immutable act. This truth has already been established in the thesis in which we demonstrated the intrinsic immutability of God, both physical and moral.
4. Is an infinitely perfect act. It is identified with God Himself, who has been proved to be infinitely perfect.
5. God loves, primarily, his own Goodness for Itself, and, secondarily, through love of His own Goodness, all things else.
   a. God loves His own Goodness, and all things else. The truth of this statement may be shown as follows:

      Whatever is real, inasmuch as it is real or possesses reality, is good, for reality is perfection, and perfection is goodness. Furthermore, whatever is good is lovable, for inasmuch as it is good it is an object which may be loved by the will.

      Now God is infinite Reality, and hence infinite Goodness, and as such infinitely lovable. All things else, inasmuch as they possess reality, are also good, showing forth, each in its own way the infinite goodness of Him who made them. Hence the warning cry of *Wisdom,* c. 13:

"But all men are vain, in whom there is not the knowledge of God: and who by these good things that are seen, could not understand him that is, neither by attending to the works have acknowledged who was the workman. . . . With whose beauty, if they, being delighted, took them to be gods: let them know how much the Lord of them is more beautiful than they: for the first author of beauty made all these things. . . . For by the greatness of the beauty, and of the creature, the creator of them may be seen, so as to be known thereby. . . . For if they were able to know so much as to make a judgment of the world: how did they not more easily find out the Lord thereof?"

That things which actually exist possess reality, and, so, are good, and, hence, lovable, is certain. With regard to possible beings, possible imitations in a finite way of the divine Goodness, it is the more probable opinion, as we noted above, that they also are lovable, and hence, as such, are loved by God, with a love, however, only of simple complacence. If, then, as we have shown, God Himself and all things else are lovable, since God's love is infinite actual Love—God is Love, St. John tells us (1 Ep. c. 4, v. 8)—it follows immediately that God must love Himself and all things else.

b. God loves His own Goodness primarily, and all other objects secondarily, in the sense that God's Goodness is supreme in point of excellence, whereas the goodness of all other objects is of vastly inferior worth. The reason is evident: God is infinite Goodness; all things else are finite.

c. God loves His own Goodness primarily and all other objects secondarily, in the sense that God loves His own Goodness immediately and for Itself, and all other objects mediately, i.e., through love of His own Goodness. In other words, the formal object of God's will, the object which specifies it, and so requires that it be an act of will different from every

other act of will, i.e., an infinite act, is God's own infinite Goodness. All other objects are but material objects of God's will, which He loves through love of His own Goodness. We offer the following proofs of this statement.

Goodness actually infinite, i.e., God Himself, is the formal object of God's will, for only infinite Goodness can necessarily call for an infinite act of will. With every finite good a finite act of will is commensurate. This same truth may be expressed in this way. An infinite act of will necessarily means an actually infinite object loved, otherwise a finite good could satisfy an infinite act of love.

Again, the will of God, since it is infinitely perfect, and hence conformed to infinite Wisdom, wills only that object for itself which of itself is good, and consequently of itself worthy of love. But the divine Goodness is the only object which is good of Itself, and consequently of Itself worthy of love, for all other objects are good only inasmuch as they participate in a finite way in infinite Goodness.

Therefore, God loves only His own infinite Goodness for itself, and hence all other objects of His will are willed through love of that infinite Goodness.

Scholion I. The several points just proved as discussed by St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica,* 1, q. 6, a. 2:

"God is the supreme good simply and not only as existing in any genus or order of things. For good is attributed to God . . . inasmuch as all desired perfections flow from Him as from the first cause. They do not, however, flow from Him as from a univocal agent . . . but as from an agent which does not agree with its effects either in species or genus. Now the likeness of an effect in the univocal cause is found uniformly; but in the equivocal cause it is found more excellently. . . . Therefore as good is in God as in the first, but not the univocal, cause of all things, it must

be in Him in a most excellent way; and therefore He is called the supreme good."

Ibidem, a. 4:

"There is first something which is essentially being and essentially good, which we call God. . . . Hence from the first being, essentially [i.e., *a se,* of Himself] such, and good, everything can be called good and a being [i.e., *ab alio,* not of itself, essentially depending on another, i.e., on the first being], inasmuch as it participates in it, [i.e., essential good and essential being] by way of a certain assimilation which is far removed and defective [i.e., finite]."

Ibidem, a. 3:

"Although everything is good in that it has being, yet the essence of a creature is not very being, and therefore it does not follow [as the objection here answered states] that a creature is good essentially."

Ibidem, 1, q. 19, a. 2:

"God wills not only Himself, but other things apart from Himself. . . . For natural things have a natural inclination not only towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, if possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that every agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces its like. It pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible to others the good possessed; and especially does this pertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of likeness. Hence, if natural things, in so far as they are perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it pertain to the divine will to communicate by likeness its own good to others, as much as is possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to be, and other things to be; but Himself as the end, and other things as ordained to that end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness that other things should be partakers therein. . . . 'In things willed for the sake of the end, the whole reason for our being moved is the end, and this it is that moves the will, as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of the end. . . . Hence, although God wills things apart from Himself only for the sake of the end, which is His own goodness, it does not follow that anything else moves His will, except His goodness. So, as He understands things apart from Himself by understanding His own essence, so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own goodness.

"From the fact that His own goodness suffices the divine will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from itself, but rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its goodness. . . . As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the many only in the one, in the same way the divine will is one and simple, as willing the many only through the one, that is, through its own goodness."

Contra Gentiles, Bk. 1, c. 74:

"The principal thing willed is to every willer the cause of his willing. . . . Accordingly if God wills principally something other than Himself, it follows that something other than Himself is the cause of His willing. But His willing is His being, as we have shown. Therefore something else will be the cause of His being: and this is contrary to the notion of the first being."

Ibidem, c. 75:

"Whosoever loves a thing in itself and for its own sake, loves in consequence all the things wherein it is found: thus he who loves sweetness for its own sake, must needs love all sweet things. Now God wills and loves His own being, in itself and for its own sake. . . . And all other being is a participation, by likeness, of His being. . . . Therefore, from the fact that God wills and loves Himself, it follows that He wills and loves other things."

Ibidem, c. 86:

"It is possible to assign a reason of the divine will. For the end is the reason of willing the means. Now God wills His goodness as an end, and He wills all else as means to that end. Therefore His goodness is the reason why He wills other things which are different from Him."

Ibidem, c. 87:

"Now although it is possible to assign some reason of the divine will, it does not follow that anything is the cause of that will."

Scholion II. Some further truths concerning God's infinite Will.

a. God's love for creatures is not a selfish love (*amor concupiscentiæ*), but a love which is wholly unselfish (*amor benevolentiæ*).

He is said to love another with a selfish love (*amore concupiscentiæ*) who in wishing well to another seeks to benefit himself and not the one so loved. On the contrary, he who loves another with a love wholly unselfish (*amore benevolentiæ*) wishes well to another not to benefit himself but solely to benefit the one so loved. In the light of these definitions the pure unselfishness of God's love for creatures is easily shown.

It is true, as we said above, that God wills and loves all

things other than Himself because of the love He has of His own infinite goodness, and in order that that goodness be made manifest and glorified by all His creatures. It is true, therefore, that He loves Himself first, that through love of His own goodness, and through that alone, He brought creatures into being, loves the good that is in them inasmuch as it manifests His own infinite goodness, and all this solely in order that they may tend ever towards Himself as their final end.

God, then, loves us solely through love of Himself, and He loves us solely in order that we may be united in knowledge and love with Himself for all eternity. On this account, however, it must not be thought that God's love of us is anything but the most unselfish love. For God in loving us through love of Himself can seek no benefit for Himself, since He is in every perfection infinite; on the contrary, in loving us through love of Himself and in creating us solely that we may possess Him in knowledge and love for all eternity He desires to confer on us the highest and supremest gift in His disposal, eternal union with infinite Good—eternal unalloyed happiness.

b. God wills, that is, loves, His own Being necessarily; the existence of all other being He wills freely.

St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica,* Part 1, gives the following brief and clear proof of this assertion:

Q. 19, a. 3:

"As to things willed by God, we must observe that He wills something of absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily. . . . But God wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to it, unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them. . . . Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things, inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition, for sup-

posing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change."

Ibidem, art. 10:

"Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above, He has free will with respect to what he does not necessarily will."

c. God's will is absolute with regard to some things, conditioned with regard to others.

As this point will be treated more fully in the third part of our work, when treating of God's providence, the following brief explanation will suffice for the present.

God wills absolutely, and independently of the way in which any free creature may use his free will, and, hence, will infallibly obtain, a definite degree of glory to accrue to Himself from His creatures. God wills absolutely, and independently of the way in which a free creature may use his free will, and, hence, will infallibly give to such creature, the means sufficient to reach the end for which he was created by God. God, antecedently to His foreknowledge of the state in which man will be at the moment of his death, truly and sincerely wills the salvation of all men. This will of God, however, is not absolute but conditioned; conditioned, namely, on the right use of free will. God's consequent will, which is absolute, will be treated more fully later.

DIFFICULTIES

The principal difficulties which might be urged against this thesis, inasmuch as it asserts that God is infinite love, are those derived from the presence in the world of evil, physical and moral, and especially moral. The aim of these difficulties is to show that God is either not omnipotent or not good. In impugning God's goodness they go directly counter to this thesis. They will be answered, however, not here but in the third part of our Natural Theology, where the question of world-evil in its relation to God will be fully treated. Other difficulties which attack the other assertions of the thesis have been answered in previous theses.

THESIS IX

God's power, identified as it is with Himself, is a single, simple, immutable, and infinitely perfect act, by which, as a consequence, He can bring into existence, in the most perfect possible way, whatever is in itself capable of existence. God, therefore, is Omnipotent.

PRENOTES TO THE THESIS.

THAT God must necessarily be endowed with the power to produce beings has been fully proved in *God and Reason,* the first part of our Natural Theology, for if He were not possessed of that power, He could not be, as we there proved Him to be, the sole, unproduced, intelligent, personal, first cause of all things produced. Our present purpose, therefore, is not to prove that God has this power, but rather to demonstrate explicitly, and in a special thesis treating formally of God's power, that that power is identified with Himself, and, hence, that it is a single, simple, immutable, and infinitely perfect act, by which, as a consequence, He can bring into existence, in the most perfect possible way, whatever is in itself capable of existence. We say, explicitly and in a special thesis, for all these truths have already been implicitly proved in one or another of our previous theses treating of God's absolute infinity, absolute simplicity, and absolute immutability. How God exercises this power in calling into being, preserving and governing the creatures He has made, will be considered, as was noted in the Introduction, in the third part of our work.

St. Thomas begins his treatment of God's power by proving that this perfection must of necessity be found in God. Though we have already proved this point, as we showed above, still it may be well, before we consider in greater detail the subject-matter of our present thesis, to cite the arguments which **St. Thomas** gives for it. He tells us, *Summa Theologica,* 1, q. 25, a. 1:

"Power is twofold—namely, passive [passive power is, perhaps, better called potentiality], which exists not at all in God; and active [active power is most frequently called simply power], which we must assign to Him in the highest degree. For it is manifest that everything, according as it is in act, and is perfect, is the active principle of something: whereas everything is passive according as it is deficient and imperfect. Now it was shown above, that God is pure act, simply and in all ways perfect, nor in Him does any imperfection find place. Whence it most fittingly belongs to Him to be an active principle, and in no way whatever to be passive. On the other hand, the notion of active principle is consistent with active power. For active power is the principle of acting on something else; whereas passive power is the principle of being acted upon by something else. It remains, therefore, that in God there is active power in the highest degree."

Summa Contra Gentiles, Bk. 2, c. 6:

"Pure act, which is God, is more perfect than act mingled with potentiality, as it is with us. But act is the principle of action. Since, then, by the act which is in us we are able to proceed not only to actions that abide in us, such as intelligence and volition, but also to actions that pass on to outward things, and through which certain things are made by us; much more can God, in that He is act, not only understand and will, but also produce an effect. And thus He can be the cause of being to other things."

Ibidem, c. 7:

"Whatever acts has the power to act, since that which has not the power to act, cannot possibly act; and what cannot possibly act, of necessity does not act. Now God acts and moves [as *motor immobilis*], as was proved above. Therefore He has the power to act; and active but not passive potency is fittingly ascribed to Him."

We are now ready to explain the terms of our thesis.

God's power is identified with Himself. This identity is the same as that which exists between God's knowledge and Himself. Cf. *Thesis* 7.

A further point, however, is to be noted here with regard to the power or omnipotence of God. We distinguish conceptually, with an imperfect distinction, between God and His knowledge, between God and His will, between God's knowledge and His will. It is a debated question among the philosophers who treat of these questions, i.e., Catholic philosophers, as to whether God's power should be conceptually

distinguished in the same way, i.e., imperfectly, from the knowledge of God and the will of God. This point will be considered later in a corollary. Our conclusion in that corollary will be, that the power or omnipotence of God is identified in every way, really and conceptually, with the will of God considered as efficacious; in other words when we conceive God's will as infinitely efficacious, we formally conceive His omnipotence as such.

Our reasons for this conclusion will be given in the corollary.

God's power is a single, simple act, that is, there is and can be in God only one act by which He is constituted all-powerful to call into existence, from amongst all possible beings, any being whom He freely wills to produce; and effect in them, from amongst all possible effects, any effect He freely wills to effect. This act which constitutes God all-powerful is an absolutely simple act.

God's power is immutable and infinite. The power of God is absolutely changeless in itself, and inexorably effects whatever the divine will eternally and changelessly decreed to effect. Inasmuch as it is infinite, this power can produce in the most perfect possible way whatever is in itself non-repugnant, i.e., whatever is in itself producible. The divine power, then, since it can produce whatever is in itself not repugnant, is rightly called Omnipotence.

ADVERSARIES.

The adversaries mentioned in *Thesis* 7 are, in the same way, adversaries to this thesis also. It is to be specially noted, however, with regard to God's power, that many modern non-Catholic philosophers consider that the Problem of Evil can be solved only by admitting that that power is limited. They claim, therefore, that God is finite in power. In a scholion at the end of the thesis will be found some quotations from modern writers who deny the existence of an omnipotent God.

Proof of the Thesis.

The power of the only infinitely perfect being possible, identified as it is with Himself, is a single, simple, immutable, and infinitely perfect act, by which, as a consequence, He can bring into existence, in the most perfect possible way, whatever is in itself capable of existence.

But God is the only infinitely perfect being possible.

Therefore, God's power, identified as it is with Himself, is a single, simple, immutable, and infinitely perfect act, by which, as a consequence, He can bring into existence, in the most perfect possible way, whatever is in itself capable of existence.

Maj. The power of the only infinitely perfect being that is possible—God,

1. Is identified with Himself. If any perfection not identified with Himself were found in God, He would not be an absolutely simple being, nor would He be by His very essence infinite. God, however, is, as we have proved in former theses, by His very essence absolutely simple and infinitely perfect.

   St. Thomas gives the following proofs for this point: *Contra Gentiles,* Bk. 2, c. 8:

   > "Active power belongs to a thing's perfection, . . . Now every perfection of God is contained in His very being. . . . Therefore the divine power is not other than His very being. Now God is His own being. . . . Therefore He is His own power." Again. "In those things whose powers are not their substance, their powers are accidents: hence natural power is placed in the second species of accident. But in God there can be no accident. . . . Therefore God is His own power."

2. Is a single, simple act. Otherwise God would not be, as we have already proved Him to be, absolutely simple.

3. Is an immutable act. This truth has already been established in the thesis in which we demonstrated

the intrinsic immutability of God, both physical and moral. God's will was there shown to be absolutely immutable. But God's efficacious will is His power.

4. Is infinite; hence, He can bring into existence in the most perfect possible way whatever is in itself capable of existence. God's power is identified with God Himself, who has been proved to be infinite in perfection. Inasmuch as His power is infinite, then, it can do whatever is in itself possible.

What is more, its manner of operating must be infinitely perfect. Therefore, God, who is absolutely independent of all things in His being, in the exercise of His power is also absolutely independent of all things; He needs neither instrument, nor minister, nor matter, on which to work; He suffers no fatigue, and, without difficulty of any kind, nay, rather with infinite ease, by the mere fiat of His infinitely efficacious will, He accomplishes all things; He, the only Omnipotent One.

St. Thomas, in the following passages, proves that God's power reaches to all things possible, and explains, in addition, how that statement is to be understood:

Contra Gentiles, Bk. 2, c. 22:

"Every agent acts in so far as it is actual. Wherefore the mode of an agent's power in acting follows its mode of actuality: for man begets man, and fire begets fire. Now God is perfect act, possessing in Himself the perfections of all things, as was proved above. Therefore His active power is perfect, and extends to all things whatsoever that are not incompatible with the notion of actuality. But these are only those which imply a contradiction. . . .

"It remains therefore that God's power is not confined to any particular effect, but is able to do simply all things: and this means that He is Almighty."

Summa Theologica, 1, q. 25, art. 2:

"Active power exists in God according to the measure in which He is actual. Now His existence is infinite, inasmuch as it is not limited by anything that receives it, as is clear from what has been said, when we discussed the infinity of the divine essence (Q. 7, a. 1). Wherefore, it is necessary that the active power in God should be infinite. For in every agent is it found that the more perfectly the agent has the form by which it acts the greater is its power to act. For instance, the hotter a thing is, the greater power it has to give heat; and it would have infinite power to give heat, were its own heat infinite. Whence, since the divine essence, through which God acts, is infinite, as was shown above (*l. c.*), it follows that His power likewise is infinite."

Ibidem, art. 3:

"All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists; for there may be a doubt as to the precise meaning of the word 'all' when we say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider the matter aright since power is said in reference to possible things, this phrase, God can do all things, is rightly understood to mean that God can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is said to be omnipotent. Now according to the Philosopher (*Metaph.* V, 175), a thing is said to be possible in two ways. First, in relation to some power, thus whatever is subject to human power is said to be possible to man. Secondly, absolutely, on account of the relation in which the very terms stand to each other. Now God cannot be said to be omnipotent through being able to do all things that are possible to created nature; for the divine power extends farther than that. If, however, we were to say that God is omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible to His power, there would be a vicious circle in explaining the nature of His power. For this would be saying nothing else but that God is omnipotent, because he can do all that He is able to do.

"It remains, therefore, that God is called omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible absolutely; which is the second way of saying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or impossible absolutely, according to the relation in which the very terms stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates sits; and absolutely

impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the subject, as, for instance, that a man is a donkey.

"It must, however, be remembered that since every agent produces an effect like itself, to each active power there corresponds a thing possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on which its active power is founded; for instance, the power of giving warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of being warmed. The divine existence, however, upon which the nature of power in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus of being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being. Whence, whatsoever has or can have the nature of being, is numbered among the absolutely possible things, in respect to which God is called omnipotent. Now nothing is opposed to the idea of being except non-being. Therefore, that which implies being and non-being at the same time is repugnant to the idea of an absolutely possible thing, within the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under the divine omnipotence, not because of any defect in the power of God, but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing. Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot have the aspect of possibility. Hence, it is better to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them. Nor is this contrary to the word of the angel: No word shall be impossible with God. For whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word, because no intellect can possibly conceive such a thing."

Corollary I. Power in God is the principle not of divine action, but merely of the effect produced.

St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles,* Bk. 2, c. 10:

"Since, however, nothing is its own principle, and God's action is not other than His power, it is clear from the foregoing that power is ascribed to God, not as the principle of action, but as the principle of the thing made. And since power implies relation to something else under the aspect of principle thereof,—for active power is the principle of acting on something else, according to the Philosopher (5 *Metaph.*)—it is evident that power is ascribed to God in relation to things made, according to reality, and not in relation to action. . . ."

Summa Theologica, 1, q. 25, a. 1:

"In creatures power is the principle not only of action, but likewise of effect. Thus in God the idea of power is retained, inasmuch as it is the principle of an effect; not, however, as it is a principle of action, for this is the divine essence itself."

Corollary II. God's power is not only really identified with His will, but, according to the more common and seemingly truer opinion, conceptually also.

That God's power is really identified with His will has already been proved. Our present aim is to show that there appears to be no reason for distinguishing them conceptually, i.e., for considering God's power as a faculty conceptually distinct from His absolute will.

In the production of anything by man, three distinct faculties are brought into play: the intellect, which directs; the will, which orders; and the power, which executes the command of the will, and produces the thing. Are we warranted, then, when we consider God in the light of a producer of things, in distinguishing in Him, not really but conceptually only, three corresponding faculties, namely, knowledge, will, and power? Some philosophers, with **Suarez,** claim that we are. The more common opinion, however, is, that power in God is not to be distinguished from knowledge and will. A further refining of this opinion results in two different views of the matter. The more recent Thomists claim that God's knowledge, as determined by the command of His will, is to be conceived as the efficacious principle of production in God, i.e., God's power. This opinion, however, appears to be false, for knowledge, as such, does not produce things, it represents them only. The Scotists, finally, and many others, hold that God's efficacious will is the efficient principle of all effects produced by Him, i.e., is God's power. Hence, by the very fact that God wills a thing to be, it will be. If this were not so, God's will would not be infinite. It may easily happen that a man may truly will the production of an effect, and yet be unable to produce it, for the simple reason that the other faculties which execute the command of the

will are impeded in their action. In God, however, it is impossible that His will should not of itself effect what it wills.

This opinion appears to be the true one. What is more, **Cajetan,** one of the greatest of the earlier Thomists, so considers it. What **St. Thomas** himself held seems to be doubtful, nevertheless there are passages in his writings which would lead one to judge that he considered the efficacious will of God to be the principle through which, under the guidance of His knowledge, all effects were produced by Him. We quote some such passages:

Quæstiones Disputatæ, XI, q. 2, a. 14:

"Knowledge is made manifest by this, that there exists something [as known] in the knower, and not by this, that something is produced by the knower; whence it follows that an effect is never produced by knowledge unless through the action of the will, which of itself and not through any other medium inflows in a certain way into the effects willed. . . . Between the knowledge of God, which is the cause of a thing, and the thing caused, there exists a twofold medium; one on the part of God, namely, the divine will; the other . . . secondary causes, by means of both of which, things are produced by the knowledge of God."

In this passage **St. Thomas** appears to state quite clearly that the will of God is the immediate cause of the effect. Hence we find him saying in another place, *1°, Dist.* 45, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1:

"will rather than knowledge is said to be the cause [of things];"

and again, *Contra Gentiles,* Bk. 2, c. 23;

"The intellect does not produce an effect except by means of the will."

Ibidem, c. 31:

"The end of God's will, from which things came into being, can be nothing but His goodness."

If one should wish, however, to distinguish, as we have done above, between the efficacious will of God as freely determining or decreeing the effects He produces, and His efficacious will as executing His decree, i.e., as producing the objects He wills to produce, one may say that in God are found, knowledge, will (efficacious will freely decreeing) and power (efficacious will executing this decree.) In this case, however, the power of God

is not another faculty conceptually distinct from His efficacious will.

Corollary III. The act by which God produces the effects He freely determines to produce is formally an immanent act, virtually a transient one.

The divine action by which God exercises His power is His efficacious will, which is identified with God Himself. Now the act by which God is, and the act of the will, as such, are in themselves vital, i.e., immanent acts. Since, however, the infinite perfection of God demands that the very act by which He is, have the power to produce outside of Himself what He wills to produce, this same act has all the efficaciousness of an act which in itself is a transient act. Hence the action by which God produces the effects He freely determines to produce, is said to be formally, i.e., in itself, an immanent act, and virtually a transient one, i.e., an act having all the efficacy of an act in itself transient.

St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles,* Bk. 2, cc. 23, 31, is clear on this point. He says:

"According to the Philosopher (9 *Metaph.*), action is twofold: one which remains in the agent and is its perfection, for instance, to see; the other, which passes into outward things and is a perfection of the thing done, as, to burn, in the case of fire. Now God's action cannot belong to the kind of actions which are not in the agent: since His action is His substance, as already proved. Therefore it must be of that kind of actions which are in the agent, and are as a perfection thereof."

"God does not act by an action that is outside of Him, as though it went out of Him and terminated in a creature. . . . But His will is His action, and things are in the way in which God wills them to be."

Corollary IV. God is free in the exercise of His power, i.e., He freely wills the production of things.

This assertion has already been proved in one of the scholions to the preceding thesis.

Corollary V. God's absolute power; His ordinary, or regulated or conditioned power.

God's absolute power (*potentia absoluta*) is His power considered in itself; prior, namely, from our viewpoint, to His eternal

decree preordaining the existence of the present order of things rather than any other. By His absolute power God can produce whatever is in itself possible, i.e., whatever is in itself not contradictory.

God's ordinary, regulated, conditioned power (*potentia ordinata, ordinaria*) is His power considered as regulated, conditioned by His eternal decree preordaining the present order of things rather than any other. By this power God can do all those things which in the present order of things He decreed and nothing else. This follows from the fact that God's decree, by which under the guidance of His infinite wisdom He determined the existence of all things He freely willed to exist, is absolutely immutable. God, therefore, by His absolute power could produce other beings than those He decreed to produce, by His ordinary power He cannot do so.

St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica,* 1, q. 25, a. 5, gives the same explanation of this distinction of God's power. He says:

"Because power is considered as executing, the will as commanding, and the intellect and wisdom as directing; what is attributed to His power considered in itself, God is said to be able to do in accordance with His absolute power. Of such a kind is everything which has the nature of being. . . . What is, however, attributed to the divine power, according as it carries into execution the command of a just will, God is said to be able to do by His ordinary power. In this manner, we must say that God can do other things by His absolute power than those He has foreknown and preordained He would do. But it could not happen that He should do anything which He had not foreknown, and had not preordained that He would do, because His actual doing is subject to His foreknowledge and preordination, though His power, which is His nature, is not so."

Corollary VI. God, and God only, has the power to create.

These two assertions will be proved in the third part of our Natural Theology, where the question of the creation of the world by God, and some other allied questions, will be treated.

Scholion. Present-day philosophy and God's omnipotence.

It is no exaggeration to say that present-day philosophers, with very few exceptions, make their own gods, that is, each one makes a god, or gods—for some of them seem to be polytheistically in-

clined—to suit himself. Their concern appears to be, not to discover an existing God, who has perfections which make Him to be what He is; not to discover what those perfections are, and so to conform their knowledge to His reality; not to discover the relations existing between that God and themselves, and their duties towards Him consequent on those relations; but to fashion a god who is nothing but an ideal towards which they tend; an ideal which may change, and does change, with the changing years.

Nor is all this to be wondered at, for feeling, not reason, is the guide these philosophers follow in shaping their religious belief, and the god they seek is the one who will fit in with those feelings, who will prove himself useful. And if asked, "Useful for what?" their answer is, "Useful in satisfying my own personal feelings, and not those of any other being. Hence the god that suits me may not be, and in all probability will not be, the god that suits you."

Both in *God and Reason,* the first part of our Natural Theology, and in the present work, will be found passages, taken from the writings of modern philosophers, which substantiate the truth of these statements. To emphasize this point still more strongly we quote briefly again in the same strain, repeating, perhaps, though not uselessly, some passages already given.

Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience:*

"The services of thought to religion have been subject to a justified distrust. . . . By right instinct has religion from the beginning looked elsewhere for the brunt of support—say to revelation, to faith, to feeling. . . . Our current science of religion may now assume without too much discussion that the grounds of religion are supra-rational, . . . But a vague territory, still, is this Beyond-Reason or Deeper-than-Reason. Once singly named Faith, now it has many names—instinct, the subconscious, the co-conscious, feeling, will, value judgment, social sense, intuition, mystic reason, perhaps *'l'élan vital.'* " P. V.

James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience:*

"Nothing is more striking than the secular alteration that goes on in the moral and religious tone of men, as their insight into nature and their social arrangements progressively develop. After an interval of a few generations the mental climate proves unfavorable to notions of the deity which at an earlier date were perfectly satisfactory. . . . To-day a deity

who should require bleeding sacrifices to placate him would be too sanguinary to be taken seriously. Even if powerful credentials were put forth in his favor, we would not look at them. . . . The deity to whom the prophets, seers, and devotees who founded the particular cult bore witness was worth something to them personally. They could use him. . . . In any case, they chose him for the value of the fruits he could yield. So soon as the fruits began to seem quite worthless; so soon as they conflicted with indispensable human ideals, or thwarted too extensively other values, . . . the deity grew discredited, and was ere long neglected and forgotten. . . . Protestants have so dealt with the Catholic notions of deity. . . . When we cease to admire or approve what the definition of a deity implies, we end by deeming that deity incredible. . . . Not only the cruelty, but the paltriness of character of the gods believed in by earlier centuries also strikes later centuries with surprise. We shall see examples of it from the annals of Catholic saintship which make us rub our Protestant eyes." Pp. 328-330.

Farther on in the same work we find a concrete example of a practical application of the principle laid down in the above passage. The thought of God as a strictly just judge who will demand a full accounting of man's life becoming irksome to **Luther**—and to **James**, too, for he writes approvingly of **Luther's** action—God, consequently, must be deprived of this attribute. **James** writes:

"Any God who . . . can care to keep a pedantically minute account of individual shortcomings, . . . is too small-minded a God for our credence. When Luther, in his immense manly way, swept off by a stroke of his hand the very notion of a debit and credit account kept with individuals by the Almighty, he stretched the soul's imagination and saved theology from puerility." P. 348.

Leuba enunciates in still bolder fashion the same principle, namely, that when we find that a god no longer suits us we are at liberty to do away with him. He is quoted, in abridged fashion, and with approval, by **James**, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 506, as follows:

"Professor Leuba, in a recent article ('The Contents of Religious Consciousness,' the *Monist*, July, 1901), goes so far as to say that so long as men can use their God, they care very little who he is, or even whether he is at all. 'The truth of the matter can be put,' says Leuba, 'in this way: God is not known, he is not understood; he is used—sometimes as a meat purveyor, sometimes as a moral support, sometimes as a friend, sometimes as an object of love. If he proves himself useful, the religious consciousness

can ask no more than that. Does God really exist? How does he exist? What is he? are so many irrelevant questions. Not God, but life, more life, a larger, richer more satisfying life, is, in the last analysis, religion.' "

Beckwith, *The Idea of God,* is no less outspoken in his demand for a god who can be changed to suit the changing desires of man. The God of our forefathers must go. He is no longer pleasing to us. When the god of today no longer pleases us, he too shall go. He writes:

"This work aims at such a presentation of the idea of God, as will enable it to function anew in the life of to-day." P. VI.

"Since the idea of God is functional and conditions have arisen far different from those in the earlier centuries, we must expect a corresponding change in this idea. . . . Meanwhile we must remind ourselves that an attempt so to define the idea of God as to keep it aloof from the modern view of the world is to place it in extreme jeopardy. All the sciences have been born since the fourth century, and have changed the meaning of the universe for all thoughtful men. . . . The simple fact is that the Nicene idea of God does not interpret the world to the modern man; between that idea and the world of to-day is an impassable gulf. If the alternative is either that idea of God unmodified or none, then the conclusion must be—no God." P. 3.

"The [modern] scientific spirit is marked by certain characteristic tendencies and habits. . . . It relies upon inductive verification. All questions which involve human beliefs, customs and ideals are subjected to historical inquiry. . . . The presumption is thus created that a doctrine such as the idea of God, which originated in modes of thought alien to the modern scientific spirit and world-view, requires restatement to become acceptable to the scientific temper and intelligence of to-day." P. 6.

Drake, "Seekers after God," *Harvard Theological Review,* January, 1915, quite pithily, yet comprehensively, voices the same opinion thus:

"It now seems rather needless to be an atheist. There are so many conceptions of God afloat that anyone at all widely read can scarcely fail to find someone suited to his mental outlook and convictions." P. 69.

A few words of sane criticism of these views which, if logically reduced to practice, would destroy all religion and morality, will not be out of place. **Mr. Grant Morgan,** "A Catholic Looks at the New God," *The Catholic World,* October, 1926, will speak for us. He says:

"Dr. Parrish writing in *The American Mercury* says we need a new God. Indeed so strongly do we need Him, he tells us, that we must create Him to fit our own ideas of what He ought to be. As Dr. Parrish's complaints against the older conceptions of God are well in line with the bulk of current objection, his suggestions may be examined with some profit. When that is done I think we may say in all modesty that what we need is not a new idea of God but to find the God about whom so many things are being said. Men need God and nothing else will satisfy that yearning.

"Further . . . that God can be found best, and is being found best, in the most ancient of the Christian churches. And very good evidence in proof of this assertion lies in the fact that in the Catholic Church alone is there to be found none of the religious unrest, none of the demand for restatement of dogma, none of the cry for a new God, that is tearing at the vitals of other bodies. . . .

"In the first place, the very idea of our creating a new God in our own image and likeness is a patent absurdity. Dr. Parrish has said we must believe in our God. True enough. But we cannot believe in the supernatural power of a thing of our own creation. As well ask us to carve an image, call it God, and worship it. A reasonable man can no more worship the product of his brain than that of his hands. The critics claim that the Catholic God is an invention of the theologians. What theologians? When? Where? If the critics know, and can prove the assumption, then the end of our worship is at hand. For it is as silly of me to worship an image made by my neighbor as one made by myself.

"The first and foremost thing about the God of the Catholics is that He is not the work of their hands, nor of the hands of any other human being so far as they can learn. . . . Every approved statement made of that God by theologians must be traceable by documentary evidence or tradition, to the infallible source of truth, Christ Himself. . . . When they observe hard sayings in the teaching of the Church about Him, they know that they must accept them. God is as He is, apart from what humans may think of Him. They cannot worship their own handiwork." Pp. 3, 4.

Kant saw clearly enough that a man-made god was a mockery. He saw too that the god his Practical Reason postulated was but a man-made god. He was quite logical, then, when he wrote, "Since this idea [of God] proceeds entirely from ourselves, and is a product of ours, we have here before us a postulated being towards whom we can have no obligation, . . . to have religion is a duty man owes to himself." Much of the blind groping of present-day philosophers in their search for God, due, as we have seen, to their almost universal desertion of reason as a guide, may be traced to Kant's destructive philosophy.

A corollary to all this seeking for a god who pleases is that the infinite God is no longer pleasing to the modern philosopher. The god that they have placed in His stead, whether he be conceived by them to be real or only an ideal, is a striving, changing, finite god, of finite intellect and finite power. It is true that some of them speak of the god they have conjured up as infinite; when they come, however, to explain his nature more fully we find him to be in reality but finite. We subjoin some passages from the works of present-day philosophers, in which the omnipotence of God is doubted or explicitly denied.

James, *A Pluralistic Universe:*

"When John Mill said that the notion of God's omnipotence must be given up, if God is to be kept as a religious object, he was surely accurately right, yet so prevalent is the lazy monism that idly haunts the region of God's name, that so simple and truthful a saying was treated as a paradox; God, it was said, could not be finite. I believe that the only God worthy of the name must be finite." P. 124.

"The line of least resistance, then, as it seems to me both in theology and in philosophy, is to accept, along with the superhuman consciousness, the notion that it is not all-embracing, the notion, in other words, that there is a God, but that he is finite, either in power or in knowledge, or in both at once." P. 311.

Schiller, *Riddles of the Sphinx:*

"It is not surprising that no attempt at reconciling the divine goodness with divine power has ever been successful; indeed the only way in which they have ever appeared to be successful was either by covertly limiting the divine power, or by misusing the term goodness in some non-human sense, to show a quality shown in God's action towards imaginary beings other than men." P. 307.

"The attribute of infinity contradicts and neutralizes all the other attributes of God, and makes it impossible to ascribe to the Deity either personality or consciousness or power or intelligence or wisdom or goodness, or purpose or object in creating the world; an infinite deity does not effect a single one of the functions which the religious consciousness demands of its God." P. 306.

Conybeare, a one-time Fellow and Praelector of Oxford and a Doctor of Theology, *honoris causa,* of Giessen, in the Preface to the second edition of his book, *Myth, Magic and Morals; A Study of Christian Origins,* answering a critic who had found fault with the views expressed in it, writes:

"I was much flattered when the Rev. Professor Sanday broke through the habitual silence of Churchmen and undertook to criticize my work in a pamphlet entitled *A New Marcion*. . . . I fear it has occasioned him some distress that there I repudiated the idea of a Deity at once omnipotent, creative, and all-merciful. And yet the difficulties inherent in such a belief have been widely felt in this country ever since John Stuart Mill published his *Essay on Religion*. One need not be a Hedonist either in practice or theory in order to condemn the current ideas of God. . . .

"It might be argued that evil among men is their own fault. But let Professor Sanday become a biologist and study the natural history of insects and parasitic organisms; and I question if his belief in the love and goodness of an omnipotent author of nature will not be widely put to the test. But if we reject the first article of the creed which runs, 'I believe in one God the Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth, and of all things visible and invisible,' then we reject monistic theism. There is, as I was careful to point out, plenty of room left in the universe for loving spirits, but not for omnipotent ones." Pp. XIV, XV.

"The idea of an arch-plotter or omnipotent agent making the universe will not bear examination." P. 342.

Lucius Hopkins Miller, *Bergson and Religion,* is quite right in stating that **Bergson** denies both the omniscience and omnipotence of God. What is more, **Professor Miller** appears to favor this opinion. He says:

"According to Bergson, the great Life Power, the Vital Impetus, is neither omniscient nor omnipotent. . . . Now Bergson's idea of a growing God,—one who has His limitations, battles, and even defects,—has its own difficulties to meet and is novel to our ordinary thought, but it is an idea which we occasionally wish were true. Instead of being a lapse from truly religious thinking, it may possible be on the road to new Truth. Mayhap the loss of grandeur (though we must not think that God, thus conceived, would be without power and grandeur, or without the elements of awe and mystery) might be offset by a greater sense of sympathy, companionship and cooperation. God would actually need our help, and our help would count vitally; the christian thought that 'we are co-workers with God' would then exist in fact and not merely in name. Yet the last control would remain with Him and, while He would not be all-powerful, He would be most powerful—powerful enough. Would such a conception harm religion or help it?

"All these offsets make us see that we cannot cavalierly dismiss the possibility of a vitally religious faith being maintained upon the Bergsonian basis. . . . At any rate our final answer is that the Bergsonian theory of evolution is compatible with religion and with a Christian faith." See pp. 116-147, *passim.*

Royce, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy:*

"The living God, whom idealism knows, is not the first cause in any physical sense, at all. . . . For causes are, after all, very petty and subordinate truths in the world; and facts, phenomena, as such, could never demonstrate any important spiritual truth. The absolute Self simply doesn't cause the world. The very idea of causation belongs to things of finite experience, and it is only a mythological term when applied to the real truth of things." P. 348.

And, in *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy,* he writes:

"A single Infinite Power is, properly speaking, a misnomer. If a power produces something that is external to itself, then the very idea of such an occurrence implies another power, separate from the first, and therefore limiting it." P. 287.

See also *Thesis* 2, *Scholion; Thesis* 7, *Scholion.*

DIFFICULTIES

The principal difficulties which might be urged against this thesis, inasmuch as it asserts that God is omnipotent, are those derived from the presence of evil in the world, both physical and moral, and especially moral. The aim of these difficulties is to show that if God is supremely good, He cannot be omnipotent, for supreme goodness and omnipotence leave no room for evil. These difficulties, and others also which have to do with the way God's power is exercised in the world, will be answered in the third part of our Natural Theology, where the truths they attack will be discussed. Other difficulties which are urged against the truth that God's power is identified with Himself, or against its simplicity, etc., have already been answered in previous theses.

THESIS X

Pantheism is fundamentally erroneous, hence, under whatever form it appears, it is to be rejected.

UNDER the four general headings of **Atheism, Pantheism, Polytheism,** and **Deism** may be said to be found, either explicitly or implicitly, all of the erroneous opinions advanced by philosophers concerning God. **Atheism** and **Polytheism** were sufficiently explained and disproved in *God and Reason,* the first part of our Natural Theology, **Deism** and **Pantheism** were also disproved there, indirectly, however, more or less implicitly, and not with that completeness which a fuller knowledge of God's perfections than we then had would warrant. That fuller knowledge, in as far as the rejection of **Pantheism** is concerned, we now have; hence our present thesis. As this error, however, because so ancient, so enduring, so widespread, among different philosophic schools, is of more than ordinary importance, our treatment of it here, though stressing rather its basic errors, will still be fairly complete.

Pantheism; other monistic systems; monotheism.

Pantheism. Pantheism, in general, is that system of philosophy which affirms the identity of God and the world. It insists that there is but one individual substance. This substance in itself is spiritual, unproduced, absolute, infinite (undetermined), divine—God. By a process of necessary self-determination, from this one substantial being, all things else in the world, which are evolved, relative, finite, determined beings, proceed, either as emanations, i.e., as parts or in some sense as effusions of his own being projected outward and existing distinct from it, or as its intrinsic determinations, i.e., modes, aspects, moments, modifications.

In insisting that there is but one existing individual substance, and that, spiritual and divine, Pantheism sets itself up as a form of Cosmological Monism, i.e., as Spiritualistic Monism which is Pantheistic. It is sometimes called Monistic Personal Idealism. It is qualitatively monistic, admitting only one kind of substance, i.e., spiritual; and quantitatively or numerically monistic also, admitting namely the existence of only one substantial being, as the ultimate reality identified with, and the groundwork of the world. This ultimate reality is the Pantheists' God. To some of them he is a personal being; to others he is an impersonal being, the absolute. (Cf. **Calkins,** *Persistent Problems of Philosophy,* pp. 417 ff.)

Pantheism is opposed to Materialistic, Agnostic, and Phenomenalistic **Monism;** to Spiritualistic Monism which is quantitatively pluralistic (sometimes called Pluralistic Personalism or simply Pluralism. Cf. **Calkins,** *l. c.,* p. 412); and to **Theism** which at times is improperly called Cosmological Dualism, and which, in its highest and only true form, is **Monotheism.** A brief description of these systems will not be out of place.

Materialistic Monism holds that the ultimate principle of all reality is matter. In its cruder form, it claims that all world phenomena, vital and non-vital, including even sensation and intelligence, are essentially the same, and hence differ merely accidentally as modes of mechanical motion. In its less crude form, it grants that psychic, i.e., sensitive and intellectual, phenomena, are essentially different from, and higher than other phenomena; claiming, however, that the substance underlying all phenomena is the same, namely, matter. Epiphenomenalism, Psycho-physical Parallelism, etc., are varieties of this latter form. Materialism is quantitatively pluralistic, that is, whilst admitting only one kind of substance, matter, it admits the existence of many distinct beings.

Agnostic Monism, whilst admitting the existence of, and essential difference between physical and psychic phenomena,

claims that the reality underlying them, which is the ultimate principle of all things, is necessarily unknown to us. This form of Monism is unstable. Its followers generally drift into Pantheism or Materialistic Monism.

Phenomenalistic Monism, or Phenomenalism, reduces reality ultimately to a complex of psychic or conscious experiences, and these, according to most Phenomenalists, are only sense-experiences. Phenomenalists, therefore, deny the existence of any reality or self underlying these experiences; as a consequence, though Idealists, they are neither Personal Idealists, nor Idealists who admit the existence of the Absolute as ultimate reality whilst denying its personality. Furthermore, those Phenomenalists who admit no psychic experience higher than that of sense cannot rightly be called Spiritual Idealists. Phenomenalism is quantitatively pluralistic, i.e., it admits the existence of many distinct beings, or, to speak as a Phenomenalist, many distinct groups of conscious experiences.

Spiritualistic and quantitatively Pluralistic Monism, commonly called Pluralistic Personalism or Pluralistic Personal Idealism, or simply Pluralism, holds with Phenomenalism that all reality is in the nature of consciousness. It insists, however, on spiritual consciousness, and differs from Phenomenalism in asserting that consciousness implies the existence of a spiritual self or person, who is the subject of such consciousness.

It holds, furthermore, that the ultimate principle of reality is not one spiritual self, which is the doctrine of one form of Pantheism, which is common to both Monistic Personal and Monistic Absolute Idealists, but a community of related selves. This system of Spiritualistic Monism, therefore, is quantitatively pluralistic. It has many adherents among modern philosophers, e.g., **W. James, J. Dewey, G. Howison, F. C. S. Schiller, Rashdall, McTaggart,** and others. (Cf. **Calkins,** *l. c.*, pp. 411 ff., 417 ff.)

Though Pluralistic Personalism is sometimes said to be a

form of Pantheism, we have not classed it as such. First, because these Pluralists themselves seem to have no settled opinion as to the relation that their ultimate reality, i.e., the community of related selves, bears to God; and, secondly, because thoroughgoing Pantheists insist that Pluralistic Personalism is not Pantheism, though it may be an Idealistic Monotheism, or an Idealistic Polytheism. The truth of these statements is borne out in James' *A Pluralistic Universe,* in which he, a confessed Pluralist of this type, advances a Pluralism which at one and the same time may be a Pantheistic, Monotheistic and Polytheistic form of Idealism and even Atheism. Inconsistency seems never to have bothered James. A few brief extracts from him and some other authors will make clear the confusion of Pluralism. Its utter falsity is immediately evident.

James, *A Pluralistic Universe:*

"Our contemporary mind having once for all grasped the possibility of a more intimate weltanschauung, the only opinions quite worthy of arresting our attention will fall within the general scope of what may be roughly called the pantheistic field of vision, the vision of God as the indwelling divine rather than the external creator, and of human life as part and parcel of that deep reality." P. 30.

"We saw that this [spiritualistic] pantheistic belief could be held in two forms, a monistic form which I called philosophy of the absolute, and a pluralistic form which I called radical empiricism . . . [which] allows that the absolute sum-total of things may never be actually experienced or realized in that shape at all, and that a disseminated, distributed, or incompletely unified appearance is the only form that reality may yet have achieved. . . . I believe that radical empiricism . . . holding to the each-form, and making of God only one of the eaches, affords the higher degree of intimacy [with God]. . . . The pluralistic empiricism which I profess offers but a sorry appearance. It is a turbid, muddled, gothic sort of an affair, without a sweeping outline and with little pictorial ability. . . . Perhaps a little more familiarity may mitigate your first surprise at such a programme as I offer." Pp. 43, 44, 45, 46.

"The God of our popular Christianity is but one member of a pluralistic system. He and we stand outside of each other, just as the devil, the saints, and the angels stand outside of both of us. . . . We are indeed internal parts of God and not external creations." Pp. 110, 318.

"The analogies with ordinary psychology and with the facts of pathology, with those of psychical research, so called, and with those of religious experience, establish, when taken together, a decidedly *formidable* [italics *James'*] probability in favor of a general view of the world almost identical with Fechner's. The outlines of the superhuman consciousness thus made probable must remain, however, very vague, and the number of functionally distinct 'selves' it comports and carries has to be left entirely problematic. It may be polytheistically or it may be monotheistically conceived of. Fechner, with his distinct earth-soul functioning as our guardian angel, seems to be clearly polytheistic; but the word 'polytheism' usually gives offence, so perhaps it is better not to use it." P. 309.

"God, in the religious life of ordinary men, is the name not of the whole of things, heaven forbid, but only of the ideal tendency in things, believed in as a superhuman person who calls us to cooperate in his purposes, and who furthers ours if they are worthy." P. 124.

Of **James** and **Pluralism, Nicholas Murray Butler,** President of Columbia University, in his annual presidential report for the year 1921, has this to say:

"No small part of the social and political diseases and disorders that are now so generally discussed may be traced to the destruction through unsound educational methods of that common body of knowledge and intellectual and moral experience which held men together through a community of understanding and appreciation. A steadily growing unity has been displaced for a chaotic multiplicity. Pluralism the non-religious form of polytheism, is precisely what William James, who was greatly enamored of it, described it to be, 'a turbid, muddled, gothic sort of effort, without a sweeping outline and with little pictorial ability.' In all its forms, philosophical and other, it is a flat denial of all that is most worth while in human experience and an open surrender of any hope either to understand or to improve the universe. Moreover, it is self-contradictory, for if there is no One there cannot possibly be a Many." P. 30.

Calkins, *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy:*

"At this point [i.e., after having admitted the existence of partial and limited spiritual selves] the spiritualistic systems of pluralism and of monism sharply divide. The first teaches that the universe consists, in its ultimate nature, of a community of related selves. The second is the theory that ultimate reality is in its innermost nature a single individual or person, which differentiates itself into the manifold of personalities and objects of the world as empirically observed. . . . There is no more vigorous tendency in modern philosophy than the upspringing in the most distinct quarters of the academic world of a pluralistic doctrine." P. 411.

"It is necessary to notice the two forms, theistic and anti-theistic, of pluralistic personal idealism. Of these, the first affirms, and the second denies or questions or ignores, the existence of a supreme self, spirit, or person, in close relation with the finite selves . . . In opposition to this omission of God from the totality of selves, a theistic pluralist, Dr. Rashdall, calls attention to the fact that on the basis of idealism, an interrelated system can exist only as the object of a self's consciousness, and then urges that only a suprahuman mind can conceive the totality of human selves. Dr. Rashdall explicitly adopts this position in his criticism of McTaggart's form of pluralism. . . . The difficulty could only be met by making out that each soul is omniscient, and perhaps this is really Mr. McTaggart's meaning. If so, the difficulty of making each soul as an extra-temporal reality omniscient, while as occupying a position in the time-series it is all the time ignorant of much, is one which needs no pointing out." Pp. 413, 416.

"In the end, therefore, we reassert the monistic, and yet personalistic, doctrine. Ultimate reality is absolute self, not a totality of related conscious selves, but a *Self,* inclusive of the many selves, yet characterized by a single personality. . . . My consciousness, then, is 'identically a part' of the experience of the absolute self, . . . and this explains why I know the objects, though not all the objects which the absolute self knows. My distinction from the absolute self is, in part, a purely quantitative difference, shown in the fact that I do not know as much as he. In part, however, it is the difference of the *Absolute,* as self, as utterly unique personality, from any one of the totality of included selves. From this difference it follows that the lesser self does not, necessarily, feel and will with the Absolute; whereas the absolute self . . . must feel and will with every partial self." Pp. 439, 440.

Further information about Pluralism, and much information about Pantheism may be found in *The Idea of God, The Gifford Lectures,* 1912, 1913, by **A. Seth Pringle-Pattison. Professor Pringle-Pattison** rejects Pluralism in favor of Idealistic Personal Pantheism. His Absolute, i.e., God, is conscious not only in its conscious finite modes or human persons, but also in itself. As we have referred to **Professor Pringle-Pattison's** idea of God, it may be well, though anticipating somewhat, to have it in his own words. His Pantheism is that of the Ideal Immanent type, to be mentioned shortly. He writes:

"Creation, in short, if it is taken to mean anything akin to efficient causation, is totally unfitted to express any relation that can

exist between spirits. Spirits cannot be regarded as things made, detached like products from their maker; they are more aptly described in the Biblical phrase, as 'partakers of the divine nature' and admitted to the fellowship of a common life. . . . The divine life is essentially, I have contended, this process of self-communication. Or, to put it in more abstract philosophical language, the infinite in and through the finite, the finite in and through the infinite—this mutual implication is the ultimate fact of the universe as we know it. It is the eternal fashion of the cosmic life." P. 315. (See also following pages.)

"Such a theory as I have tried to expound finds it impossible to take God and the world as two separate and independently existing facts. A deistically conceived God, existing in solitary state before the world was, and to whom the finite world bears only a contingent relation is, I have insisted, a figment of the logical imagination. God exists only as a self-communicating Life: in theological language, creation is an eternal act or process—a process which must be ultimately understood not as the making of something out of nothing but as a self-revelation of the divine in and to finite spirits. . . . This, then, is the true Absolute, a term which would be inapplicable to the transcendent God of an abstract monotheism, but which is not unfitly applied to the sweep of a Life which realises itself in and through the process of the finite world, as consummated in the divine sonship of man. . . .

"It is plain that the process involves a real otherness in the finite selves, and this is strongly emphasised in my argument. I have protested against the monism which treats the individual selves as merely the channels through which a single universal consciousness thinks and acts—masks, as it were, of the one actor who takes all the parts in the cosmic drama. And I have protested equally against the opposite idea, which denies any self-consciousness except that which is realised in the finite individuals." Pp. 432, 433.

"Both God and man in fact become bare points of mere existence —impossible abstractions—if we try to separate them from one another and from the structural elements of their common life." Pp. 434, 435.

Cosmological Dualism, as it is sometimes called, asserts that reality ultimately is to be resolved into a world of many distinct beings of many different kinds, and a Being, distinct from and superior to the world, and in no sense, therefore, its groundwork, but its cause, its ruler,—God. In its true form this system, rejecting the spurious forms of it, **Ditheism, Polytheism, Deism,** holds that that ruler is a personal spiritual being, one and only one, infinite; who created the

world, and rules it with a loving providence both natural and supernatural.

The name, **Cosmological Dualism,** however, in no way properly designates this system. As a world-explanation it is really not dualistic but monistic for it reduces reality finally to one principle,—God, from whom the world proceeds, as an effect wholly distinct from Him, by creation. It is a Monism utterly distinct from all other Monisms, and as such is rightly called Monotheism.

Looking, however, at the world as an already existing effect of the creative power of God, and asking what are the ultimate principles of produced world-reality, this system answers that in the world of produced being there are two ultimate principles of reality, viz., spirit and matter, the spiritual principle being found in man. This dualism is sometimes called Anthropological Dualism, and is directly opposed to every form of Anthropological Monism. Briefly, then, this system of Cosmological Dualism teaches that there is but one ultimate principle of all reality, viz., one spiritual being, infinitely superior to, absolutely distinct from, though intimately connected with the world,—its creator, its ruler, its final cause,—God. It teaches, furthermore, that in the world of produced being there are two ultimate principles of reality, viz., matter and spirit. In its explanation, then, of the ultimate principle of all reality, this system is Monistic, i.e., Monotheistic; in its explanation of the ultimate principle of produced reality, it is Dualistic, insisting on the existence of matter and spirit in the world. Since, however, this spiritual principle exists only in man, this dualism may rightly be called Anthropological Dualism.

The different systems of Pantheism. The forms both ancient and modern under which Pantheism has appeared, are many and widely different. It is not our intention to give here a detailed explanation of them. Indeed, in some cases at least, to give such an explanation, which at the same time would be

clear, is well nigh impossible, as not a few of these forms,—and this is in a special way true of later-day Pantheism,—are all but unintelligible. It will serve our purpose, then, to give briefly its broader and more general divisions. The same method will be followed also in our refutation of Pantheism; only the broader and more general reasons for its rejection being advanced.

The emanation theory of Pantheism, sometimes called Transient Pantheism, teaches that all beings in the world emanate from the divine substance by a process of necessary self-determination or evolution. All are in substance some way divine, and numerically distinct from the substance from which they emanate and from each other. God, therefore, is not fully identified with the world. He is the soul of the world, according to some Emanationists, whilst according to others, the countless, distinct, finite beings that constitute the world are but a part only, or in some way an effusion of the divine substance, which a necessary evolution has separated from God.

Because it only partially identifies God and the world, Transient Pantheism is styled Imperfect Pantheism, or Semi-Pantheism. This form of Pantheism is now more or less obsolete.

The representation or manifestation theory of Pantheism, called also Immanent Pantheism, Perfect Pantheism, not only teaches that there exists but one kind of substance, viz., spiritual, and one kind of spirit, viz., divine, but it holds also that there is but one substantial divine being, viz., the Absolute, who by a process of necessary evolution is revealed under countless finite manifestations or modes of himself, which we call finite beings and distinguish into different kinds and species. In reality, then, what we call world-beings, are not different individual substantial beings of different kinds and species, but mere representations, manifestations, moments, or modes of the only one substantial being that exists, —a divine being—the Absolute—God.

Immanent Pantheism is of two kinds:

Real Immanent Pantheism, which holds that the modes or modifications which constitute what we call world-beings are produced by a necessary, intrinsic evolution of the Absolute, which evolution is real and physical, and produces, as a consequence, modes or modifications of the absolute which have a real and physical existence.

Ideal Immanent Pantheism, which holds that the intrinsic modes or modifications of the Absolute, which constitute what we call world-beings, are produced by a necessary, intrinsic evolution of itself, which is not real and physical but ideal or mental. It denies, therefore, any real and physical existence to these modes, and asserts that they have only a mental existence, i.e., an existence as things thought or willed, necessarily and primarily in the mind or will of the Absolute, for that is essential to their existence; and contingently and secondarily in the minds or wills of those finite conscious modes of the Absolute which happen to think or will them. These finite conscious modes of the Absolute we call human persons.

This form of Pantheism is again subdivided; some of its supporters asserting that the Absolute, Supreme Being is a person, whilst others claim that he is not a person, but an Unconscious Absolute which becomes conscious or personal only in its conscious, finite modes, i.e., in human persons. The former are sometimes called Monistic Personal Idealists, the latter, Monistic Absolute Idealists.

A very brief statement of the fundamental doctrine of Monistic Personal Idealism taken from **Calkins,** *Persistent Problems of Philosophy,* was given above at the end of the section treating of Pluralism. In the same work, p. 562, **Calkins** insists that the divergence of those who hold that the ultimate reality is an Absolute and not a person, "from the teachings of 'monistic personalism, seems . . . to be verbal." Though this may be

true, it will be instructive to hear James' description of Bradley's non-personal Absolute:

> "It is neither intelligence nor will, neither a self nor a collection of selves, neither truthful, good, nor beautiful, as we understand these terms. It is, in short, a metaphysical monster, all that we are permitted to say of it being that whatever it is, it is at any rate worth more, (i.e., to itself) than if any eulogistic adjectives of ours applied to it. It is us, and all other appearances, but none of us as such, for in it we are all 'transmuted,' and its own as-suchness is of another denomination altogether." *A Pluralistic Universe,* p. 46.

A brief history of Pantheism.

Historical records, and data gathered by trustworthy Ethnologists and followers of the new science of *Comparative Religion,* prove quite conclusively not only that Pantheism was not the primitive belief of mankind, but that it and Atheism, Polytheism, and all other false beliefs in God, are a falling away or degeneration from pure Monotheism.

Pantheism, however, made its appearance quite soon in the life of the human race. It was known, as we have seen (cf. *God and Reason, Thesis* 7), fairly early in prehistoric times, i.e., times antedating 2000 B. C., with India most probably as its cradle. Since then at different periods, under a variety of forms and in diverse places, it has been taught by not a few philosophic schools.

Within historic times the first traces of Pantheism are found in India, in the *Vedas,* a collection of the ancient religious literature of the Hindus, which for many years had been handed down by oral tradition, before they were finally committed to writing in the fourth century before Christ.

The earliest parts of this collection date from about the year 1500 B. C. In these parts are found not only theistic but monotheistic conceptions and doctrines, which in later parts degenerate into the pantheistic philosophy of the Brahmins. Later on Pantheism was taken up also by the Buddhist philosophers.

Though among the Brahminists and Buddhists Pantheism found many adherents, still it must not be thought that the rank and file of the people of India were pantheists. Pantheism was confined

mainly to the philosophers, the bulk of the common people was frankly polytheistic. Indeed the same is true of Pantheism wherever it is found. It is a doctrine which finds favor only with the warped philosopher; the man in the street rejects it. Outside of India Pantheism counts but few disciples.

The earlier Pantheism of India was of the Emanation type; the later, of the Manifestation or Immanent type. The new sect of Theosophy, brought into existence toward the end of the last century by **Madame Blavatsky,** and numbering amongst its adherents some few religious-novelty hunters in England and in our own country, is nothing but a rehash, in more or less modern scientific terms, of the Pantheism of Hinduism and Buddhism, with a mixture of Spiritism. Its Pantheism is one of the many varieties of Monistic Personal **Idealism.**

Father Hull gives the following brief yet fairly comprehensive description of it, *God, Man and Religion,* pp. 113 ff:

"There exists one absolute entity which is the source of everything. . . . The nearest picture we can form of it is one infinite mind containing one infinite thought, unbroken up into parts, and therefore perfectly uniform and without any variety; just like pure white light, about which nothing can be said except that it is light. But as pure light is capable of being divided up into all the colors of the prism, so also there exists in this absolute entity, a power to divide up the infinite thought into an immense number of finite thoughts, each of which is limited, and each of which is different just as the colors produced by the division of the white light are different.

"In this way the absolute produces the relative, the unconditioned produces the conditioned, the infinite produces the finite. But the whole process is a mental one. The universe is nothing but the thought of the Absolute working through all infinite possibilities by which it can be conditioned and limited and reduced to a finite manifold. The universe exists as an idea in the mind of the Absolute thinker, . . . and does not exist outside or apart from that mind. The world is merely God indulging His infinite mental activity by thinking Himself out piecemeal in terms of the finite—the One thinking himself as many. . . .

"Man's soul is self-conscious, but its self-consciousness is limited; and so man looks upon himself as a finite spirit, while all the time he is really the infinite spirit thinking of itself in a limited way.

"This limitation is put upon the infinite mind by its immersion in matter, which places it under the condition of time and space. The proper aim of the soul is gradually by the practice of virtue, to escape from the bondage of matter. By doing this man's self-consciousness gradu-

ally expands till at last he begins to think in terms of infinity. When finally he reaches the point of realizing that 'I am Brahma, I am the Absolute,' his mind becomes the infinite mind, and he loses his separate and finite identity."

Pantheism, after having been confined to India for many centuries, appeared in the latter half of the sixth century before Christ in the teachings of the Eleatic school of philosophy. This school was founded by **Xenophanes** (born at Colophon, in Asia Minor, 570 B. C.) at Elea in southern Italy, from which place it took its name. **Xenophanes** most probably taught pantheistic doctrine; **Parmenides** (born at Elea 540 B. C.), his disciple, the most distinguished teacher of this short-lived school, most certainly taught it. He held that Being is one, unproduced, unchangeable, undivided, homogeneous. Common opinion which holds a plurality of beings is in error. Our senses deceive us.

The Stoic School, founded some two centuries later by **Zeno** of Cittium (born at Cittium, in Cyprus, 350 B. C.), admitted the existence of matter only, which, however, was of two kinds, fine and coarse. The fine was really conceived as a spiritual substance and was considered the active principle in things. Of this finer matter God is made. He is sometimes described as Fire, Ether, Air, etc., at other times He is called Soul, Mind, Reason-containing-the-germs-of-all-things, etc. He is the author of all things, and their ultimate, active, immanent principle. He is the Soul of the world. The Stoics, then, were Semi-Pantheists.

After a lapse of something more than five centuries Pantheism was advanced as one of their fundamental doctrines by the Neo-Platonists. **Ammonius Saccas** (born in Alexandria 176 A. D.) is regarded as the founder of Neo-Platonism. **Plotinus** (born at Lycopolis, in Egypt, 205 A. D.), its leading teacher, came to Rome 244 A. D., where he taught for about twenty-five years. He has left us the first written development of its doctrine. This development is rather elaborate and minute. From it we gather that the basis of Neo-Platonism is emanatistic Pantheism, though it is not clear just how these emanations are produced or what their exact nature is. God, who is Unity and Goodness, is the source of all

things. From Him proceeds Intelligence, from Intelligence proceeds the World-Soul, from the World-Soul proceed individual souls, i.e., plastic forces, from these proceeds matter, with which they unite to form material phenomena.

Of these emanations and of the resulting relation between God and the world, **Weber,** *History of Philosophy,* writes:

"The universe emanates from the absolute as light emanates from the sun; as heat from fire; the conclusion from the axiom. . . . Intelligence is the first divine emanation and, therefore, the greatest thing in the world; the succeeding emanations are more and more imperfect. Creation is a fall, a progressive degeneration of the divine. . . . The passage of the divine unity into this first duality, the how of the emanation, is as much of a mystery as God himself. . . . If the dyad, [as] it has been said, comes from the monad, then the latter contains the former in germ. But that would make the monad a dyad and not a monad in the absolute sense. Others identify the One and the All. But if God is only the sum of existing things, then he is a mere word to designate the result of an addition, and not the supremely real principle from which the things are derived. God is anterior to the All, in dignity if not in time. Still we may call him πάν, in so far as he is the essence of everything in existence. An attempt has been made to explain emanation by calling it a partition of the original unity. But the divine unity, which is not a numerical unity, is indivisible. It has been compared with the gleaming of a bright light, with the radiation of the sun, with a cup that eternally overflows, because its contents are infinite and cannot be held in it. However beautiful these figures may be, they are taken from the material world and cannot explain the immaterial. Hence, emanation is in reality a miracle [mystery], like God himself." Pp. 170, 171, 172.

In the ninth century, **John Scotus Erigena** (born, most probably, in Ireland between 800 and 815 A. D.), one of the most learned men of his times, and, according to some, a priest, leaving his native land and coming to Paris, was placed by Charles the Bald in charge of the palace school. Led, no doubt, by the writings of Plotinus, with which he was familiar, he fell into the pantheistic errors of the Neo-Platonists. He taught openly that the world is an emanation from God, an extension and manifestation of His being, and so, that God and the world are one. His philosophical work, *De Divisione Naturæ,* was condemned in 1225. His loyalty to the Church was never doubted. **Gale,** who first

published the *De Divisione Naturæ,* wrote of him, *"Potuit ergo errare; hæreticus esse noluit."*

During the second half of the twelfth century Pantheism was again taught at Paris by **Amaury** (Amalric) of Bène, who lectured there on Theology and Dialectic. He is sometimes referred to as **Amaury** of Chartres, from the fact that most probably his early training was at the school of Chartres, which was not far from Bène. As the works of **Erigena** were widely known at this time, it is most likely that they were the source from which **Amaury** drew his Pantheism. He taught in so many words, as did **Erigena,** that all things are one, and that God is the essence of all things. His doctrine was condemned by the council held in Paris in 1210, and he was banished from the city. The same council proscribed also the pantheistic works of **David of Dinant,** a contemporary of **Amaury.** Very little is known of the life of this man; in fact it is uncertain whether his birthplace is that usually given, namely, Dinant in Belgium, or Dinan in Brittany. **St. Thomas** tells us that he identified God with the prime, or basic, matter from which all material things are made.

Three centuries later **David of Dinant** is cited as an authority by an Italian Pantheist, **Giordano Bruno** (born at Nola, in Campania, in the year 1548), a restless man, a wanderer and a pervert, who was finally arrested at Venice by the Inquisition, and burned at the stake in Rome in the year 1600.

His Pantheism is thus briefly summarized by **Weber,** *History of Philosophy,* pp. 288 ff.:

"Heaven is the infinite universe . . . the earth is a mere planet, and does not occupy a central and privileged place in the heavens. The same may be said of our sun, for the universe is a system of solar systems. If the universe is infinite, we must necessarily reason as follows: There cannot be two infinites; now the existence of the world cannot be denied; hence God and the universe are but one and same being.

"In order to escape the charge of atheism, Bruno distinguishes between the universe and the world: God, the infinite Being. or the Universe, is the principle or the eternal cause of the world: *Natura Naturans;* the world is the totality of his effects or phenomena: *natura naturata.* It would, he thinks, be atheism to identify God with the world, for the world is merely the sum of individual beings, and a sum is not a being,

but a mere phrase. But to identify God with the universe is not to deny him; it is to extend the idea of the supreme Being far beyond the limits assigned to him by those who conceive him as a being by the side of other beings, i.e., as a finite being. Hence Bruno loved to call himself Philotheos [as in the following, *Philotheos Jordanus Brunus, Nolanus, De compendiosa architectura et complemento artis Lullii,* Paris, 1582], in order to distinguish clearly between his conception and atheism. This proved to be a useless precaution, and did not succeed in misleading his judges.

"As a matter of fact, the God of Bruno is neither the creator nor even the first mover [of things], . . . he is both the material and formal principle which produces, organizes, and governs them from within outwardly; in a word, their eternal substance. . . . The conception of nature and of necessary production takes the place of the notion of a creator and free creation. Freedom and necessity are synonymous. . . . The substantial and natural omnipresence of the infinite Being both explains and destroys the dogma of his supernatural presence in the consecrated host. . . . Because of this real all-presence of the infinite One, everything in nature is alive; nothing can be destroyed; death itself is but a transformation of life."

"The human soul is the highest evolution of cosmical life. It springs from the substance of all things through the action of the same force that produces an ear from a grain of wheat. All beings whatsoever are both body and soul; all are living monads, reproducing, in a particular form, the Monad of monads, or the God-universe. . . .

"All these conceptions, especially the evolutionism of Bruno, we shall meet again in the systems of Leibnitz, Bonnet, Diederot and Hegel, which his philosophy contains in germ and in the undifferentiated state, as it were. As the synthesis of monism [pantheistic] and atomism, idealism and materialism, speculation and observation, it is the common source of modern ontological doctrines."

Bruno died in the opening year of the seventeenth century, and little more than one quarter of it had gone by when his place was taken by one who, inspired in part by him, was to become one of the most famous apostles of Pantheism, and, according to some of his admirers, the first great metaphysician of more modern times—**Spinoza.**

Spinoza was born in 1632 at Amsterdam, where his parents, Portuguese Jews seeking refuge from religious persecution, had settled. In obedience to the wishes of his father he studied theology, but soon showed a decided preference for free philosophic speculation. He was familiar with the writings of **Descartes, Bruno,**

Bacon, and **Hobbes.** At the age of twenty-four he was solemnly excommunicated by the Synagogue for his unorthodox religious views. After his expulsion from the synagogue, he remained for some few years in Amsterdam; wandered about some few years more, and finally, in 1669, settled at The Hague, where he supported himself by lens polishing till his death in 1677. In 1670, **Spinoza** published his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,* and though this was the only one of his works given to the public during his lifetime, its appearance attracted the attention of the philosophic world, and as a consequence in the year 1673, a professorship of Philosophy at Heidelberg was offered him, which he declined in favor of a life of private study. Shunned in his later years more or less by Christian and Jew alike, he devoted all the leisure moments of his lowly, lonely life to philosophic research. Our brief review of his pantheistic teaching is derived mainly from Part I of his *Ethica,* in which part he treats of God.

Descartes had defined substance as "That which so exists that it is independent of everything else for its existence." As this definition can only be applied to God, it is quite evident that if it were true, all things else are but determinations or modes of that one substance, and the outcome is Pantheism. **Descartes,** therefore, who was not a Pantheist, and who admitted the existence in the world of corporeal and spiritual beings distinct from God, impliedly withdrew his pantheistic definition of substance by granting that mind and matter since they depend on God alone for their existence may be rightly called substances, i.e., created substances.

Spinoza's definition of substance, which he arbitrarily assumes to be true, is essentially that of **Descartes,** and was probably taken from him. Its pantheistic implications, however, are not rejected by **Spinoza,** but accepted in full, and evolved and developed into a system explicitly and unmistakingly pantheistic.

We read in Definition III of Part I of his *Ethica:* "By substance I understand that which is in itself, and is conceived by itself, that is, that which can be conceived without conceiving anything else"; and in Axiom IV: "Knowledge of an effect depends on knowledge of its cause, and involves the same."

From these two unproved statements, Proposition VI: "One substance cannot be produced by another substance," and its Corollary: "Substance cannot be produced by anything else," are proved in the Corollary as follows: "If substance could be produced by anything else, the knowledge of substance would necessarily depend on knowledge of its cause (by Axiom IV), in which case it would not be substance (by Definition III)."

Hence it follows that existence is of the very nature of substance, as we are told in Proposition VII: "It is of the nature of substance to exist," in other words, substance is self-existent; there is no such thing as produced substance; no effect can be a substance. It is further shown that substance which is one and only one, is absolutely infinite and indivisible—is God. This last is enunciated in Proposition XIV: "No substance but God can be, or be conceived to be."

What, then, are creatures? To answer this question we must first know the meaning of the terms, attribute and mode, as used by **Spinoza.** "By attribute," we read in Definition IV, "I understand that which the intellect perceives in substance as constituting its essence." This definition is made clearer in Definition V, which defines God in terms of His attributes: "By God I mean a being absolutely infinite, that is a substance made up of infinite attributes, each one of which is an expression of eternal infinite essence." Of these attributes, which are numberless, two are known to us,—thought and extension. Propositions I and II of Part II: "Thought is an attribute of God, in other words, God is a thinking being." "Extension is an attribute of God, in other words, God is an extended thing."

Definition V tells us what a mode is: "By mode I understand a modification of substance, i.e., that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself."

What, then, are creatures? As creatures, from what has gone before, are neither substance nor attribute, the conclusion must be, that they are modes; i.e., finite modifications of the one substance which is God, according to those attributes under which God is manifested to us, namely, thought and extension. Spiritual things

are modifications of the divine thought; corporeal things, of the divine extension. In Proposition XV and its proof we read: "Whatever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived. . . . Modes can neither be, nor be conceived, without substance, wherefore they can be only in the divine nature, and only through it can they be conceived;" and in the Corollary to Proposition XI of Part II: "Hence it follows that the human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God; and, consequently, when we say that the human mind perceives this or that, it is the same as if we said that God, not as infinite, but as manifested in the human nature of the mind, or as constituting the essence of the human mind, has this or that idea; and when we say that God has this or that idea, not merely inasmuch as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, but also inasmuch as, while understanding with the human mind, he has moreover an idea of something else, we say that the human mind in that case has but a partial, or inadequate, idea of the perceived object."

It follows, then, as is stated in Proposition XVIII, that all things are produced by God in no sense as a transient cause, but as an immanent one, i.e., as a cause whose effects remain in it and are its modifications. God and the universe, therefore, are one and the same thing or substance under different real aspects. Substance, as unmodified, infinite, eternal, and the cause of all things, i.e., *natura naturans,* is God; substance, as modified, finite, temporal, and immanent effect, i.e., *natura naturata,* is the universe. In the Scholion to Proposition XXIX, we read: "By *natura naturans* we are to understand, that which is in itself and is conceived by itself; or this way, those attributes of substance which manifest the eternal and infinite essence, that is [by Cor. I, Prop. XIV, and Cor. II, Prop. XVII], God, considered as free cause. By (*natura*) *naturata,* on the other hand, I understand, that which, by the very necessity of God's nature, or of each one of his attributes, follows [is evolved, exists], that is, all the modes of the attributes of God, considered as things which are in God, and which without God can neither be nor be conceived."

This immanent causality of God is described as follows by **Weber,** *History of Philosophy,* p. 328:

"If we understand Spinoza correctly, God is not the cause of the world in the proper and usual sense of the term, a cause acting from without and creating it once for all, but the permanent substratum of things, the innermost substance of the universe. God is neither the temporal creator of the world, as dualism and Christianity conceive him, nor even its father, as Cabalistic and Gnostic speculation assumes; he is the universe itself, considered *sub specie aeternitatis,* the eternal universe. The words God and universe designate one and the same thing,—Nature, which is both the source of all beings (*natura naturans, sive Deus*) and the totality of these beings considered as its effects (*natura naturata*).

"In short, Spinoza is neither an acosmist nor an atheist, but a cosmotheist or pantheist in the strict sense of the word; that is to say, his cosmos is God himself, and his God the cosmical substance."

As to whether knowledge is to be attributed to God as *natura naturans* or *natura naturata* **Spinoza** is quite obscure; on some other points, however, he is quite clear, namely, that the world is not the result of any plan of God; that the world is not, in the true sense, freely produced by God, i.e., by an act of choice of the divine will, but is the product of a necessary impulse of his nature; that in the world, or specifically in man, there is no freedom of will, no faculty of choice.

Whatever happens in the world, then, happens with absolute necessity, as regards both God and man. Happiness for man consists in realizing that this life, whatever it be, is a manifestation of the supreme law; and in joyfully resigning himself to that law. This is to love God intellectually; it is the highest kind of virtue. "It not only makes man free," writes **Turner,** *History of Philosophy,* p. 483, "but also confers immortality. For this love has no relation to the body or bodily states, and consequently it cannot be affected by the destruction of the body."

On the state of the soul after death, **Turner,** *l. c.,* p. 484, says:

"On the one hand, Spinoza teaches that imagination and memory perish with the actual body; and with these faculties perish all recollections, . . . and everything else which serves to perpetuate personal traits and characteristics. On the other hand, Spinoza is careful to guard against the doctrine of the absorption of the individual in God; for he teaches that final happiness is a state in which man, in attaining the highest unity

with God, attains at the same time the highest consciousness of self, so that in this union the distinction between God and creature is not obliterated, but rather accentuated. The conclusion seems to be that the blessed life is a state in which we shall retain our individuality, but shall have, apparently, no means of recognizing ourselves as the same individuals, [who once led an earthly life]."

We have dwelt rather at length on **Spinoza's** doctrine because of its influence on modern philosophic theories, and the importance attached to it by modern Pantheists. One of them, an Idealist, **Calkins,** *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy,* p. 306, after a rather severe criticism of **Spinoza's** system, concludes:

"It does not follow from this radical criticism that the philosophy of Spinoza is of slight value; nor even that its value consists in the adequacy of its scientific conceptions, the accuracy of its psychological analysis, and the nobility of its ethical teaching. It has all these virtues, but, in addition, great metaphysical significance. For the first time in the history of modern philosophy, Spinoza formulates in definite outlines a strictly numerical monism, the conception of an all-of-reality which is also a One, of a whole of reality which is more-than-a-sum, of a unique being which expresses itself in the many finite phenomena. The mere conception, though insufficiently established, is of real value. Idealistically interpreted, it becomes the central truth of the post-Kantian philosophy, for Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, and, above all, Hegel, attempt the demonstration, lacking in Spinoza, of the existence of an absolute substance, and conceive this substance as absolute self."

To the Idealistic Pantheism of these post-Kantian philosophers, we now turn. Modern, or post-Kantian, Idealistic Pantheism is sometimes called Transcendental Pantheism, because of its implication in a greater or less degree of the philosophy of Kant, which was called by him *Transcendental Philosophy,* or a *Transcendental Criticism of Reason,* i.e., an examination of knowledge for the purpose of determining the *a priori* elements, which condition knowledge, and are independent of, i.e., transcend, experience.

These modern systems of Pantheism are all but unintelligible to the Realist, i.e., to the philosopher who is quite convinced that if his cognitive faculties, i.e., his senses, intellect, and reason, are of any worth at all, they put him in touch, with a real and actual world, i.e., a world existing outside of, and distinct from the thought of any being, in which are found real and actual finite,

sensible, and spiritual substances and accidents; and, what is more, with a real and actual infinite spiritual Being, distinct from every other being, infinitely above them, their creator and last end—God.

Owing to this unintelligibility of Idealistic Pantheism from the viewpoint of our philosophy, we will give only the general outlines of the system, and the fundamental distinguishing marks of some of the many forms under which it is proposed; those, namely, of its principal exponents, **Fichte, Schelling, Hegel,** and **Schopenhauer.**

Idealistic Pantheists generally agree in admitting, as **Spinoza** did, that the ultimate ground of all reality is some one, non-material, i.e., spiritual, thing, in itself absolute (undetermined), limitless—God; they differ, however, in explaining what this Absolute is.

Fichte (born in Rammenau, in upper Lusatia, 1762) tells us that this ultimate reality is the Pure Ego, i.e., the Absolute, Impersonal, Undetermined Self,—Pure I-ness, the self-containing source of all Individual, or Determined Selves or I's, and all other determined beings. The Undetermined Self is, in itself, unconscious, and becomes conscious only in determining itself.

"Whatever you are looking at as outside yourself," writes **Fichte,** "is always your own self; whatever you are conscious of in it, is really your own self which you are contemplating."

Schelling (born in Leonberg in Würtemburg, 1775) claims that the ultimate reality is an Absolute which is neither the Ego nor the Non-Ego, but a something Indifferent to both, in which are identified the I and the Not-I, the ideal and the real, spirit and nature, finite and infinite. In this system, then, subject and object are identified in the Indifference of the Absolute. Because of its indetermination or indifference **Schelling's** Absolute was compared by **Hegel** to the night in which all cows are black. The evolution of this Absolute was explained by **Schelling** in different ways as years went on.

Hegel (born in Stuttgart, 1770) proposes as the ultimate ground of reality an Absolute of activity, a dynamic Absolute. Nature and spirit proceed from it through a process of immanent evolution; it

becomes nature and spirit. **Fichte's** Absolute was the Pure Ego, which produced the non-Ego by an unconscious necessary evolution; **Schelling's** is neither the Ego nor the Non-Ego, but the Indifferent, in which a thinking subject and a thought object disappear in a perfect indifference; a neutral principle transcending all reality. **Hegel's** Absolute is not the Ego, nor the Indifferent, nor is it a common source of the Ego and Non-Ego, i.e., spirit and nature, which transcends reality; but it is their common source immanent in it. Mind and nature are not so much aspects of the Absolute as its constituting modes. The Absolute is not immovable, but creative, it is not the principle of nature and mind, but, as it evolves, is nature, is mind. The Absolute, then, is not so much a thing as a process—the perpetual generation of things; it does not produce movement and life, it is movement and life, it does not exceed things, but is wholly in them, nor does it exceed the intellectual capacity of man. With **Hegel** thought is reality, hence his Absolute is the thought or Idea containing and becoming all reality, i.e., the dynamic Idea, Being as such, i.e., Being as such in process of becoming.

In the beginning of its evolution, the Absolute is dynamic Being as such, i.e., dynamic Being most abstract, most undetermined; as it evolves itself it is the fulness of all reality that is, the identity of all opposites, for no matter how things may differ, they are necessarily identified inasmuch as they are Being. The Absolute then "is the result together with its becoming."

"The idea, i.e., *To fieri,*" says **Driscoll,** *God,* p. 215, "by a constant process evolves itself into all that is. . . . The terminus of evolution is reached in self-consciousness. The idea with Hegel is God, but God viewed as abstract and universal. As such He is pure potency, containing in Himself the power to become all things. What we grasp is the becoming, the *To fieri,* a divine process, God realizing Himself in the world of nature and of man. With Hegel the highest manifestation or evolution of the idea, i.e., God, is found in self-conscious mind. Now the conception of a potential God realizing Himself in nature and in man is a travesty of truth. . . . It represents a conception of God at first indeterminate, imperfect, vague and indefinite, who by a perpetual process of evolution becomes definite, more perfect, more determined."

According to **Hegel,** then, the universal, not the singular is real, and that most universal of all concepts, that of Being, inasmuch as it expresses all reality, must be the Absolute and foundation of all reality, evolving itself into all reality, identifying all things, opposite though they be one to another, in itself, for outside of Being there is nothing.

Schopenhauer (born in Danzig, 1788) asserts that reality, considered in its origin, is a Will underlying all things, and evolving itself immanently into them as its modifications. This Will, as the groundwork of all things, is not the faculty of choice, but a necessary impulse—the blind impulse to self-preservation. It shows itself in all our passions: pleasure, pain, hope, fear, love, hatred. **Schopenhauer** was a pessimist, teaching that the only positive feeling is pain; pleasure is but the temporary satisfaction of a need; hence it is negative.

Though differing with regard to the nature of the Absolute, Idealistic Pantheists are substantially in agreement concerning the nature of all other beings. These are but modes or modifications of the absolute, not real modes, but ideal only, or thought-modes. They are necessarily produced by the absolute. The world, then, consists of nothing but necessarily produced mental modifications of the Absolute. There is but one ultimate reality, the Absolute God; all things else are his mental-modifications. According to some Idealistic Pantheists the Absolute is a personal being; according to others it is not. Individual human consciousnesses, according to some, will endure forever; according to others, they will be finally absorbed in the Absolute Self.

A brief summary of the doctrines of some pantheistic schools.

Hall, *The Being and Attributes of God,* p. 221, gives the following list of the teachings of some pantheistic schools. Though by no means a complete list, it, nevertheless, presents clearly some of the fundamental, erroneous teachings of Pantheism.

"Genuine theism insists upon the closely related truths that God is personal; and that He is other than the universe in which He is immanent,

transcending it altogether. Pantheism in all its forms fails to acknowledge any genuine personality in God: and it is fatal to the doctrine of creation in the proper sense of that term, and to the doctrine of divine transcendence.

"Coming to details, pantheists have maintained the following theories:

"a. All substance is one and eternal, exhibiting itself in many modes;

"b. God is the immanent principle of the world, and does not transcend it. He is often called the *anima mundi,* and the reality of things;

"c. He is impersonal, and without consciousness or will. Sometimes He is conceived as realizing Himself through the evolution of the world, especially in man, in whom He becomes personal. This is a hybrid form of pantheism;

"d. There is no creation, but an unending and necessary process in universal substance;

"e. Human persons are not individual moral agents, but moments in the life of Deity, doomed to pass away forever;

"f. Human acts are divine and the manifestation of predetermining law. Consequently evil is also divine—really good, if good and evil mean anything;

"g. Man is the highest mode of divine life."

Whence comes Pantheism?

Among the reasons given to explain the rise of Pantheism are the following. There may be others:

1. There is in man a natural inclination to seek the why and wherefore of himself and all things round about him; to seek unity in multiplicity, and to continue his search till he has reached an ultimate answer in his line of investigation. In other words, man is not only a rational animal, but also one endowed by nature with a scientific, a philosophic, bent or instinct.

   Under the impulse of this instinct, seeking the ultimate reason for the transitory existence of all things in the world, himself included; for the wonderful, awe-inspiring forces of nature, and the marvelous order that pervades its every part, man was led to acknowledge the existence of a being above nature, above himself, and distinct from both and their cause, on whom he and all things in the world depended. This being, God, an invisible being, whose intimate presence and power is shown everywhere in nature, in the creatures that He pro-

duces, sustains, and acts with, was, by some, through primitive and childish ignorance of nature's laws, in course of time, wholly or partially identified with nature, and envisaged as the spirit underlying, and giving substance and life to all things that are. So came into existence some of the earlier and cruder forms of Pantheism.

Mills, *Prehistoric Religion,* speaking of the Totemic age of humanity, which follows the Primitive, or Monotheistic, age, writes:

"While a Supreme Personality still directs the destinies of man in the abstract, in practice his worship is less direct, more mysterious, more occult, more magical, more mixed up with lifeless and impersonal agencies. In this we discern a mental tendency which is never without danger, the desire to know too much of the origin of things, to trace the divine operations in every shining crystal, in every living cell. It was impossible to make the experiment without the risk of a one-sided development, of degrading into a vague mystery-cult, which is frankly nature-worship. . . . This is the age of Pantheistic Monism in which the notion of immanence becomes all important, it is nature herself which is the All. And yet the idea of a unique being has not been lost, . . . the Creator of heaven and earth. . . . Among the righteous the totem is a blessing, the growing knowledge of nature has but deepened their love for the Creator." Pp. 556, 573.

2. Others again, later in the world's history, not through ignorance of nature's laws, but trusting with supreme confidence in man's ability to completely master all things knowable, and basing their conclusions on perverted philosophic principles, insisted that the unity we see in the world round about us can be fully explained only by admitting that the source and immanent groundwork of all things existing is a one, substantial, divine reality, or even one, substantial, divine, individual being—God.

Paulsen, *Introduction to Philosophy,* himself a Pantheist, writes:

"To popular opinion the world appears as a plurality of independent objects, each of which has an existence independent of all the rest. . . . If we look at the matter a little more closely, we shall discover a few further facts that are worthy of notice. In the first

place, things act and are acted upon, not occasionally only, but constantly and universally. Every portion of existence bears a constant reciprocal relation to every other portion. . . .

"All mass-particles that coexist in space make up a unitary system possessing a uniform motion, in which the movement of every part is contained and determined as a partial movement.

"The same system which comprehends all movements in space into an all-embracing unity, also combines them into a unity in time. . . . We are therefore driven to the statement: All motions in infinite time and infinite space really form a single motion; the corporeal world is a unitary system possessing one great single movement, to which all the separate movements are related as parts to a whole. . . .

"A second fact conspicuous in the constitution of the world, is the reign of universal law. So great is the homogeneity of elements, that the behavior of all of them may, at least in certain respects, be expressed by simple formulae. . . .

"A third significant fact must be added: the cosmical organization of reality. The great unitary system which we call the world displays a tendency to a peculiar arrangement of its parts, the tendency, namely, to organize itself into smaller, relatively independent systems possessing an equally relatively independent unity of motion. . . .

"It is easy to see that the mental world, as far as we know it, reveals the same trait; here, too, unity and organization are the prominent fundamental features. . . . We see the historico-mental sphere forms a unity like the physical world: all in each and each in all.

"Reality, therefore, respresents, as far as we can see, a unitary, organized system governed throughout by laws: a cosmos. That is a fact. And now the question arises, How shall we interpret or construe these facts? How does it happen that the world is not a chaotic plurality of elements absolutely indifferent to one another, for that, too, would be conceivable? What is the explanation of the cosmical nature of existence, the organization and concentration of all things into one great correlated system? . . .

"Pantheism, finally, assumes the principle of unity as a principle immanent in the world. Reality is a single being; not the unity, but the plurality is the illusion. Or the elements of reality are not independent objects whose sum constitutes the whole. They are elements determined by the whole, immanent determinations or modifications of its essence." Pp. 145 ff.

3. The seeming impossibility of admitting the coexistence of the infinite and the finite, as really distinct beings, which has led not a few to deny the infinity of God, has led the Pantheist

who admits the infinity of the Absolute, i.e., God, to deny the existence of any being distinct from Him.

Furthermore, the admission of the infinity of the Absolute leads some Pantheists, e.g., **Fichte, Schelling,** to assert that the Absolute is not a conscious being, for a conscious being, knowing at least himself, is necessarily limited by the object of his knowledge. The Absolute, therefore, is impersonal. Others, however, admit that the Absolute, though infinite, is conscious, but insist that he cannot be a person, for a person, they say, is one who is conscious of himself as distinct from other beings, hence a person is one whose existence is limited, namely, by the existences of other beings. To insist, then, that God is a person, is to make him finite and a mode of the Absolute. According to them, then, the Absolute is not personal, nor is it impersonal, but super-personal. Still other Pantheists admit the Absolute to be infinite, conscious, and personal.

Within the infinite Absolute, whether it be conscious or not, personal or not, are contained, according to all Pantheists, all finite consciousnesses or persons. Not all Pantheists, however, admit the immortality, or never-ending, existence of the finite person. Some assert that, in the end, when all things will be consummated, all finite consciousnesses or persons will be absorbed in the absolute; others, on the contrary, attempt to establish some sort of never-ending existence for them.

Höffding, *Philosophy of Religion:*

"If God and the world are to be regarded as two different beings or powers, then they must naturally limit one another. One stops where the other begins. . . . But in that case God cannot be an infinite being." P. 62.

Paulsen, *Introduction to Philosophy:*

"I have already said that, in my opinion, the development of human thought tends to idealistic monism. Scientific and philosophical reflections lead to it on the one hand, while the development of the religious view of the world leads to a monotheism that, if consistently carried out, deprives God of all finiteness and limitation, and therefore of all finite determinations, leaving no place for an

independent world alongside of him. If monotheism is logically carried out, its most universal world-formula coincides with pantheism: μόνος ὁ θεός, God alone exists." P. 266.

In another passage of the same book, **Paulsen** refers as follows to the two reasons for the rise of Pantheism given under this and the preceding numbers:

"Philosophy has at all times shown a tendency to overcome plurality and to reach unity. The unity and harmony of the world appears to be so great that it cannot be conceived as the result of an accidental confluence of entirely heterogeneous elements. The monistic view of the world exists in two forms. Either, it derives the unity and harmony of things from the action of an architectonic intelligence operating according to a uniform plan: this gives us Theism. Or, it seeks a still more thoroughgoing unity, and maintains: Reality is a single, unitary being, a substance; plurality is but the systematic arrangement of the parts of this unity: this gives us Pantheism. Philosophy is led to this latter conception from two sides. The notion of God leads theological speculation to it. If God creates all things out of nothing, as monotheistic theology claims, then he is in truth the sole being, and all objects are through him and in him; they cannot exist independently, outside of him or in opposition to him. On the other hand, the concept of nature directs physical speculation towards the same idea of the unity of essence. If things are universally and uniformly correlated, then all processes are joined together into a single and comprehensive process—the unitary structure of the world. This gives the notion of unity in all change, the notion of the unity of substance." Pp. 48 f.

Father Hull, S. J., *God, Man and Religion,* speaking of the rise of Pantheism, tells us that:

"It seems to have been the work of men who were deeply interested with the incomprehensibility of God and his intimate presence in all creation, but who were puzzled with the existence of finite creatures. How can the finite co-exist with the infinite? The infinite seems to comprise all being, and therefore leaves no room for any finite being outside or over-and-above itself. Nevertheless the finite exists; therefore it cannot be outside or over-and-above the infinite, but must be contained in it. The infinite therefore must be capable of being at once infinite and finite. But as the infinite comprises all reality, the finite cannot have any reality of its own. It can only have reality as thought, not as thing. Therefore the universe is merely the thought of God. The human mind perceives this thought objectively, and thus thinks of the world as a substantive reality. But this is a delusion due to the limitation of our

mind. Once remove this limitation, and we begin to perceive the thought subjectively as God perceives it; and then we see that the world is merely a thought. As soon as we perceive it as a thought, we perceive it as our own thought, and therefore recognize our identity with the All." Pp. 115 f.

Christlieb, *Modern Doubt and Christian Belief:*

"The chief argument which pantheists bring forward against the existence of a personal God is, that personality cannot be conceived without finite limitations. Personality, they say, consists in the contraposition of self to another object, a *non-ego* which forms an insuperable limit to the *ego*. . . . In short the infinite greatness of God is supposed to be incompatible with His personality." P. 168.

Calkins, *Persistent Problems of Philosophy,* says of **Fichte's** philosophy:

"But though the ultimate reality, or independent activity is a 'self which determines itself absolutely,' this absolute I is, none the less, it appears, impersonal. For since it is independent of all other realities,—since it is ultimate or realest reality,—it is evidently, Fichte says, unlimited. But every personal self is conscious of itself, that is to say, it has an object of its own consciousness, and is thus limited by its object. Evidently, therefore (so Fichte teaches . . . in all his works), the absolute self, or I-in-itself, is impersonal, 'never comes to consciousness,' 'is conscious of itself only in individual form.' Any apparent assertions by Fichte of the personal nature of the absolute are mere metaphor." P. 325. (Cf. also Pp. 331, 339, for Schelling's doctrine on this point.)

Further on in the same work, **Calkins** presents her own doctrine of Monistic Personal Idealism:

"We reassert the monistic, and yet personalistic doctrine. Ultimate reality is absolute self, not a totality of related conscious selves, but a self, inclusive of the many selves, yet characterized by a single personality. . . . We have gained a vision of the truth as the monistic personalist sees it: the vision of a One which includes, without annihilating, the many, of an absolute self who guarantees the individuality of the particular selves, of an eternity which transcends yet does not negate time, and of an immortality required by the deathless ideals of every moral self." Pp. 439, 455.

That the finite selves are not immortal, is held by the Pantheists of India.

4. Insisting with the Idealist that the intellect cannot in thought

reach beyond itself, and hence that all things are, only inasmuch as they are known, and consequently have an existence only in thought, the idealistic Pantheist was led to assert that ultimately reality is an Absolute, infinite, universal Mind or Self, and all finite, relative, determined beings are but thought manifestations of this Absolute.

Royce, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy:*

"There is nothing in the universe absolutely sure except the Infinite . . . of the Infinite we know that it is one and conscious. Of the finite things, that is, of the particular fashions of behavior in terms of which the infinite Consciousness gives himself form and plays the world game, we know only what we experience. . . . There is, then, at last, but one Self, organically, reflectively, consciously inclusive of all the selves, and so of all truth. . . . The world, then, is such stuff as ideas are made of. Thought possesses all things." Pp. 345, 379, 380.

In *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy,* **Royce** develops the same idea. He says:

"The universal consciousness and the individual minds make up together the sum total of reality. . . . As my thought at any time, and however engaged, combines several fragmentary thoughts into the unity of one conscious moment, so, we affirm, does the Universal Thought combine the thoughts of all of us into an absolute unity of thought, together with all the objects and all the thoughts about these objects that are, or have been, or will be, or can be, in the Universe. This Universal Thought is what we have ventured, for the sake of convenience, to call God. It is not the God of very much of the traditional theology. It is the God of the idealistic tradition from Plato downwards. . . . And now, we must add, we are quite indifferent whether anybody calls all this Theism or Pantheism." Pp. 351, 475, 477.

5. **Spinoza's** Pantheism, as we have seen, finds its origin in an arbitrarily assumed and false definition of substance, which excluded the possibility of any substance but that which is necessarily self-existent and absolute. It was, therefore, implicitly, if not explicitly, pantheistic.

PROOF OF THE THESIS.

A system which is fundamentally erroneous, under whatever form it appears, is to be rejected.

But Pantheism is fundamentally erroneous.

Therefore, Pantheism, under whatever form it appears, is to be rejected.

Maj. This proposition is self-evident.

Min. The Minor will be proved by adducing many of the errors which are fundamental to Pantheism.

I. Pantheism by identifying God and the world identifies contradictories. A comparison of the attributes which a sane philosophy predicates of God and the world will make this clear.

a. **God** is an unproduced being; hence a being who exists of Himself and with absolute necessity.

The World is a produced being, hence a being whose existence is caused by another, and is, therefore, not absolutely necessary but contingent.

b. **God** is an individual, spiritual, personal being.

The World is not a spiritual being, and hence is not an individual, spiritual, personal being.

What is more the world is not an individual, personal being of any kind, but a collection of countless material substantially complete, individual beings, really distinct from one another; and of varied and opposite natures and tendencies; many of them persons, conscious of themselves as complete beings, really distinct from all other persons and things, and responsible for their actions; many of them not persons, but living beings, sensitive and non-sensitive, and complete in themselves as individual substantial beings; many of them non-living beings, substantially complete, and substantially distinct from one another.

The world, then, being such a collection, is not a person, because it is wanting in that intimate union of parts necessary in a composite being who is a person, namely—an intrinsic and essential union of

parts, which implies that the parts are strictly parts, i.e., incomplete, and not complete substances; and an intrinsic and essential union in the action of those parts, subserving and leading up to the specifically personal actions of intellect and will.

There is a unity in the world, it is true, but it is not the unity of an individual thing, or of a person, as we have shown, i.e., a unity demanded by the very nature of the parts; but the unity found in the extrinsic correlation of the activities of many complete substantial entities, each with its own intrinsic, specific end, each giving extrinsic and necessary aid to those depending on it, and, so extrinsically united, all working towards a common end.

Finally, even though the world were a corporeal personal being, the assertion of those Pantheists who claim that God could be the soul of the world would have to be rejected as absolutely false. For, if God could be the soul of the world, He would be but a part of it, i.e., an incomplete, finite being, subject to changes of all kinds. God, however, as a necessary being, is complete in Himself, infinitely perfect, absolutely immutable, and excludes, as absolutely impossible, union with any other being.

c. **God** is necessarily one, and only one; as a consequence, multiplication of the divine nature is impossible. There can be but one God.

The World, whilst it may be *de facto* one, and only one, is not necessarily so; hence other worlds are possible.

d. **God** is absolutely infinite in perfection, i.e., He actually possesses, of Himself, and independently of any being, every possible perfection, limitlessly and absolutely free from any imperfection.

The World is not infinite in perfection, but finite

or limited. It is composed of beings of limited essential perfections, and limited power; beings that depend on one another for assistance in their various correlated activities; and absolutely, and utterly, and always, and in everything, in their being and in their actions, on God.

e. **God** is absolutely simple. Composition of no kind can be found in Him; neither physical composition, which supposes really distinct parts; nor metaphysical composition, which supposes only mentally distinct or metaphysical parts, i.e., mental divisions or objective concepts of His physically simple essence perfectly exclusive one of the other.

The World is not only not absolutely simple, but it is in many ways composite. In the first place, its unity is that of a collection, wonderfully ordered, it is true, still only a collection, of countless, complete, substantial beings; again, each one of those beings is physically composite, having real substantial parts, both essential and integral, and real accidents physically distinct from it, with which it unites in real accidental composition; furthermore, each one of those same beings admits of conceptual or metaphysical composition, i.e., each one may be mentally so divided that the formal or immediate and proper objects of the various dividing concepts perfectly exclude each other.

f. **God** is, intrinsically, absolutely immutable. He could not have had a beginning; He can have no end. No physical change is possible in Him; nor can there be any change in the attitude of His Intellect and Will towards their various objects. God, then, is eternal. There is in His existence neither past, nor future, nor present, inasmuch as present connotes past and future. God eternally is. Whatever is

knowable God knows from eternity, immutably; the acts of God's Will are also from eternity and immutable.

The World, on the other hand, is not only not absolutely immutable, but in so many ways changeable, and actually and incessantly changing, that some philosophic Schools have been led thereby to assert, but falsely, that the only thing stable or immutable in the world is its instability or mutability; the only thing changeless, its constant change, —"Nothing is; all is becoming." Continual are the changes everywhere and in everything: continual change of bodies from place to place, continual change in the relative position of parts of those bodies; continual heat, light, and electrical changes; continual substantial changes; continual changes as creatures of all kinds are brought to life, continual changes in the living that they may continue to live, continual change in the countless passings from life to death; continual change in sense knowledge and feeling in man and in the animal kingdom; and in man continual change in thought, emotion and desire; continual change in these changes themselves, in rate, intensity, duration.

II. Pantheists of the immanent type, that is, practically all modern Pantheists, assert that the world is made up not of substantial finite beings, complete in themselves and as such really distinct from God and from one another, but of modes or modifications of one and the same individual, divine, substantial being, i.e., God, produced in Him by a necessary evolution of His nature. Nay more, Idealistic Pantheists assert that these modes are thought-modes, in other words, that the creatures of the world are but thought-modifications of God.

These assertions, however, contradict what we have

already solidly established from our study of Natural Theology, namely, that God cannot be the subject of evolution, or of finite modes or modifications of any kind.

They also contradict solidly certain conclusions reached in other parts of philosophy, namely, that creatures, considered in themselves, are neither physical nor, much less, mental modes of any substantial being at all. They are complete substances in themselves, really distinct from God numerically and essentially, and really distinct from one another numerically and, in numberless cases, specifically and also generically. What is more, unless we wish to admit that our cognitive faculties are utterly and absolutely untrustworthy, we must admit that we ourselves, and the rest of the creatures in the world are not mere thought-modifications of any being, but have an existence in the physical world, an existence, namely, really distinct from, and outside of, the intellect or thought of any being, even God. To insist that the world is a mere mental illusion of God's intellect or of our intellects is intellectual suicide. To attempt to live practically in accord with such a theory is impossible. Even the Idealists themselves admit this. The result of such an attempt is described by **J. Volkelt,** *Erfahrung u. Denken,* Hamburg, 1886, p. 519. The quotation is taken from the article on "Idealism," in the *Catholic Encyclopedia:*

> "Any man," says **Volkelt,** "who carries his theoretical doubts or denial of the external world so far that even in his everyday experience he is forever reminding himself of the purely subjective character of his perceptions . . . will simply find himself flung out of the natural course and direction of life, stripped of all normal feeling and interest, and sooner or later confronted with the danger of losing his mind completely."

III. That man is free, and hence that he is responsible for his free acts, is a truth proved conclusively in Psychology. One of the arguments advanced in its support is drawn

from the common consent of mankind, that is, from the fact that morally speaking all men, either explicitly or implicitly, admit this truth.

Even the Pantheist implicitly admits it in admitting that man is responsible for many of his actions. On the other hand, nevertheless, he flatly denies it when he asserts that everything that exists in the world, and hence every action of man, is a mode or modification of the Absolute, necessarily produced by the evolution of the Absolute according to a law of his nature; for what is produced by the necessary and natural evolution of the Absolute, is absolutely removed from the control of man's will. Hence man is not free.

IV. Furthermore, if everything that is in the world is due to a natural and necessary evolution of the Absolute, i.e., God, since God is good, everything in the world must be good. Nor can there be any question of the moral goodness or badness of any action, either as coming from God or as coming from man, for nowhere, neither in God nor in man, is there any freedom with regard to the happenings in the world. On the same plane, then, with the savior of his country, the man who lays down his life for his friend, the heroes, and saints, and righteous men of all walks of life, the Pantheist must put the wanton murderer, the lustful destroyer of honor, the professional bandit, dishonest business men, bank wreckers, slave-driving employers, and countless other outcasts of society. None are praiseworthy, none are blameworthy; all are the slaves of inexorable fate.

V. But the Pantheist may cry out, and insist, even though illogically, that he, with the rest of mankind, holds the actions of men of this latter class to be truly criminal and worthy of punishment. If that be so, then as these men are but puppets in the game of life, with no control of their actions, and mere modifications of a higher

being, from whom those actions ultimately proceed, if any one is criminal and blameworthy, surely it is the source from whom those actions flow. If the Pantheist, then, illogically insist that there is moral evil in the world, God, not man, is its cause.

VI. Religion actually consists in the supreme homage given to God by man because of God's supreme dominion over him, and his own absolute dependence on God. This homage is shown interiorly and exteriorly in acts of adoration, sacrifice, supplication, thanksgiving, etc. It is founded essentially on the real distinction of a personal God and a personal creature.

Pantheism by really and substantially identifying man and God destroys religion, and thus contradicts again the testimony of mankind.

Many more reasons for the rejection of Pantheism might be given. The ones given above, however, which are some of the principal ones, will suffice.

CONCLUSION

With the rejection of Pantheism we conclude our present study of God. In its development reason has been our guide, and how safe and sane a guide, the countless lamentable and degrading errors concerning God, into which modern philosophy has been led by reason's rejection, have clearly shown us.

In this Babel of confusion, no two speaking the same tongue, "with so many conceptions of God afloat that . . . it seems now rather needless to be an atheist"; with God made a mockery—"a continuity of shooting out," a creative force evolving itself in the world, consciously but aimlessly, and apparently in pantheistic fashion; "the Dependable Factor . . . the Ultimate Conserver of Absolute Values, . . . personal Spiritual Life immanent in and using a Cosmic Body, and related to human beings both immanently as a Higher Life, and socially as an ever-present Perfect Friend"; "that great environing reality of the growing universe," which "should be conceived under the category, not of completeness and immutability, but of becoming and development"; "a limited being, hence unable to control the world without involving it in evils"; "nature" and "not the great moral governor," who is but "the fiction of our brains"; "the Spirit of the Beloved Community"; "the name, not of the whole of things, . . . but only of the ideal tendency in things, believed in as a superhuman person"; the "personified, idealized whole of reality, . . . analogous to my idea of my Alma Mater, . . . the common will, the spirit of mankind," a being "growing and finite," "the totality of relations constituting the whole social order of growing humanity"; "the mighty spirit of humanity"; "a new God, for both theoretical and practical reasons, a God of the people, by the people, and for the people," "a democracy of God which will ultimately supplant the essentially medieval conception of 'a Kingdom of God' "; "the social consciousness, the whole of humanity, the great Group Spirit,

personified in popular Christianity as the Father"; "the unified totality of spiritual, ethical, personal life"; "not a single spiritual being, but a society"; the "child of Divine Imagining, . . . finite, . . . not a single experient" but "the supreme Society of sentients of *our* world," for there may be other world-systems; "the undying human memory, the increasing human will"; "our unrealized idea of a Best, the name of a symbol for that perfection which eludes us in earthly things"; "the Common Will of all living creatures"; "that larger order of law and ideality which though as yet beyond our wildest conceptions, is, nevertheless, flesh of our flesh, and spirit of our spirit," called "by Jesus . . . the Heavenly Father, and by us Evolution, *Élan Vital,* Life Force"; "an inadequately defined cosmic support of human values, . . . that quality in environment which supports and enriches humanity in its spiritual quest"; "an infinite creature of the Universe of Space-Time," that is, "the infinite world of Space-Time at any level of emergent evolution, with its nisus towards deity," towards the next higher level, namely, of emergent perfection as yet unattained, which quality of deity, however, God "as an actual existent" can never possess and can never know; which, in like manner, "we cannot know, . . . [and hence] our altars still are [and ever must be] raised to the unknown God, . . . [over whom, moreover,] there is always impending . . . the menace which Prometheus levels against Zeus, of supersession by a higher God"; "God! It is all God, . . . I, the imperfect, adore my own perfect,"—with God so mocked and so degraded, and when we are told that "it is impossible that the great truths which science has revealed in the last nineteen centuries should not have profoundly altered our view of the ultimate realities from that of the naïve and pre-scientific believers of the primitive Christian Gospel," and that "probably our modern God-ideas have really more of the Master's teaching than the Hellenic subtleties of the Nicene Creed, or even of the Fourth Gospel," we recognize the logical outcome of Subjectivism gone mad, and see the sad realization, in the world of free-thought, of **Heine's** prophetic estimate of **Kant's** theistic philosophy—"I can hear the

bell. Kneel down. They are bringing the Sacraments to a dying God."

A truly prophetic estimate, for back of all the fanciful opinions of these modern god-makers—they welcome the title,—and urging them on in their ceaseless activity, is the firm conviction that "the God of our fathers," "the God of the Nicene Creed," has outlived His usefulness. He must be dethroned. "The Nicene idea of God does not interpret the world to modern man; between that idea and the world of today is an impassable gulf. If the alternative is either that idea of God unmodified or none, then the conclusion must be—no God. Such an idea cast in irreformable dogma is the greatest possible encouragement to atheism." **(C. A. Beckwith,** *The Idea of God,* p. 3.)

In the same strain writes **Professor Overstreet,** in his article, "The Democratic Conception of God," *The Hibbert Journal,* Vol. 11. The god **Professor Overstreet** favors is the offspring of democracy—"a god of the people, by the people, and for the people." He writes:

"The God of the future, is the figure of myriad lives, and yet of one vast group of life, in ceaseless activity. There is no place in the figure for an eternally perfect being, and no need; no need,—for the vast society, by its own inherent mass-dialectic of struggle and adaptation, cooperation and conflict, is working out its own destiny; no place,—for the society, democratic from end to end, can brook no such radical class distinction as that between a supreme being favored with eternal and absolute perfection and the mass of beings doomed to the lower ways of imperfect struggle. It is . . . the conception of God *that is ourselves,* in whom and of whom we literally are; the God that, in every act and intention, we, with all our countless fellows are realizing. . . . It is a God that in one respect is in the making, growing with the growth of the world; suffering and sinning and conquering with it; a God, in short, that *is* the world in the spiritual unity of its mass-life." Pp. 409 f.

Over against these and other numberless false gods, then, that unreason has made, we have set the only one true God whom reason has discovered for us; and whereas the fictitious gods fashioned by unreason, when indeed they are considered to be something more than mere shadowy ideals, are envisaged as finite, constantly changing, temporal beings, the true God made known to

us by reason, has been proved to be a Self-existent personal Being, and the only one Being who can so exist, a God absolutely infinite, absolutely changeless and unchangeable, absolutely simple, eternal, immense, all-knowing, all-powerful, all-loving.

A transcendent God! Yes, an infinitely transcendent God; really and in every way distinct from, and infinitely above and superior to, all other beings that exist or can exist, but, not, as our adversaries who accuse us of Deism would have it, a God, who, having made the world of His choice, has left it, as a thing forgotten, to its own devices. For Deism, no less than Atheism, Polytheism and Pantheism, finds its complete refutation in reason's certain conclusions concerning God.

This refutation, however, though touched on in the corollary to our thesis on God's infinity in which the utter and continual dependence of finite beings on God was noted, will be developed more at length in the third part of our Natural Theology, *God Infinite, The World and Reason.* As its title suggests, the questions there to be treated have to do with the relations which exist between God and the world, and which, presupposing the free production of the world by God, necessarily arise from the nature of God—self-existent, absolutely necessary, infinite; and the nature of all things in the world—produced, contingent, finite.

Our study of these relations will show us, first, that God, with a full and absolutely infallible knowledge of all that would come to pass in the world, freely called it forth from nothingness into existence, freely created it; secondly, that nothing in the world, no matter how small, after having been brought into existence, can continue to exist, unless God directly and continually gives it its existence; thirdly, that no being, thus continually receiving its existence from God, can perform any action, or bring anything, however insignificant, into existence, unless God, as the Primary Cause of all things, concurs with it in performing that action, and producing that thing. After these truths have been established, a rather thorough discussion of the nature of this concurrent action of God with actions of creatures, and especially with free actions, will immediately follow.

The last question which will engage our attention, and bring to a close our reasoned study of God, will be that of God's providence in ruling the world. It is a question of supreme importance, demanding, as it does, a solution of the so-called Problem of Evil, a problem which is said by our adversaries to be "the crux of theism."

"This is the terrible mystery of evil," writes **F. C. S. Schiller,** *Riddles of the Sphinx,* "which for two thousand years has been a stumbling-block to all practical religion, tried the faith of all believers, and depressed and debased all thought on the ultimate questions of life, and is as 'insoluble a mystery' to the theologian now as it was at the beginning." P. 307.

There is, nevertheless, a solution of this mystery; and a patient estimate of the nature of evil and the infinite perfections of God, will show us that notwithstanding the presence in the world of evil, both physical and moral, the providence of God, all-wise and all-loving, is over His creatures, directing them all, according to their different natures, to the end for which everything that is made is necessarily made—Himself, the Alpha and Omega, the Beginning and End of all things, All-wise, All-powerful, All-holy, All-loving.

APPENDIX

In the proofs of our theses and solutions of difficulties some few abbreviations occur. Those who are familiar with the use of the syllogism will have no difficulty in understanding and applying them; those who are not, will find the following explanation simple and yet sufficiently helpful. With very little practice the handling of syllogisms becomes quite easy.

The abbreviations used are those of the corresponding Latin words. This choice was made because the Latin verb, excluding as it does the separate use of the personal pronoun, is more easily abbreviated than its English equivalent. In the appended list we give the abbreviations, the corresponding Latin words, the corresponding English words, and whatever explanation is necessary.

Maj., *Major,* the Major, i.e., the first or principal proposition, from which, in a syllogism, the conclusion is derived. When this abbreviation is used in our proofs, it is followed either by the proof of the Major in question or any other reference to it thought necessary.

Min., *Minor,* the Minor, i.e., the second or subordinate proposition leading to the conclusion of a syllogism. In our proofs this abbreviation is used like the preceding one.

Ant., *Antecedens,* the Antecedent. The Antecedent, referred to by this abbreviation, is the *only expressed* proposition, from which, in an enthymeme, the conclusion is derived. An enthymeme is an abbreviated syllogism; a syllogism, namely, the Major or Minor of which is not expressed. In the few cases in which enthymemes take the place of syllogisms in our proofs, this abbreviation is used like the preceding ones.

Con., *Consequens,* the Consequent. The Consequent, referred to by this abbreviation, is the conclusion of a syllogism, an enthymeme, or any other form of argumentation.

C. Maj., *Concedo Majorem,* I concede, i.e., I admit the truth of the Major.

C. Min., *Concedo Minorem,* I concede the Minor.

N. Maj., *Nego Majorem,* I deny, i.e., I reject as false, the Major.

N. Min., *Nego Minorem,* I deny the Minor.

Tr. Maj., *Transmitto Majorem,* I transmit, i.e., I pass no judgment on, the Major. For one reason or another, it may be advisable, or even necessary, at times, to pass a Major by without comment. In such cases, the Major is said to be transmitted.

Tr. Min., *Transmitto Minorem,* I transmit the Minor.

Tr. Ant., *Transmitto Antecedens,* I transmit the Antecedent.

D. Maj., *Distinguo Majorem,* I distinguish the Major. At times a Major may be understood in two different senses. When this happens, it is distinguished, or divided, according to these senses, into two propositions. If one of these is to be admitted as true, the abbreviation, *C., Concedo,* I concede, is placed after it. If one is to be denied, the abbreviation, *N., Nego,* I deny, is used. If one is to be transmitted, the abbreviation, *Tr., Transmitto,* I transmit, follows it. If, however, as not infrequently happens, one is still further to be distinguished, the abbreviation, *Subd., Subdistinguo,* I subdistinguish, is placed after it. The propositions resulting from this subdistinction, are treated in the same way as those resulting from the first distinction.

It is quite evident that a subdistinction is a distinction under (*sub*) a distinction.

D. Min., *Distinguo Minorem,* I distinguish the Minor. When the Major *is not distinguished,* and the Minor *requires distinction,* this abbreviation is used to denote that fact. The remarks just made concerning the distinction of the Major, are to be applied here also.

Cd. Min., *Contradistinguo Minorem,* I contradistinguish the Minor. When the Major is *distinguished,* and *the same dis-*

tinction is also to be applied to the Minor, the abbreviation *Cd.* is used to denote the fact that this application is to be made *contrariwise,* i.e., in a way contrary, to that made in the Major. To make clear just what this means it will be necessary to say a few words about the terms of a syllogism, and the application of distinctions to them.

In a categorical syllogism, i.e., one whose propositions are not conditional but absolute, two terms, called extremes, are compared with a third, called the middle term, and from this comparison, which is made in the Major and Minor, is derived the Conclusion, in which one of the extremes, which is the predicate of the Conclusion, is, according to the quality of the syllogism, affirmed or denied of the other, which is the subject of the Conclusion. As is evident, the middle term appears only in the Major and Minor; one of the extremes, in the Major, the other in the Minor, both in the Conclusion. When, therefore, a Major is distinguished, and the distinction falls on one of the extremes, as this extreme appears again only in the Conclusion, the same distinction is to be applied to it there, and in the same way. In this case, the Minor is not distinguished; it is conceded or, if advisable, transmitted. Similarly, when a Minor is distinguished, and the distinction falls on one of the extremes, as this extreme appears again only in the Conclusion, the same distinction is to be applied to it there, and in the same way. In this case the Major is not distinguished; it is conceded or, if advisable, transmitted. When, however, the Major is distinguished, and the distinction falls on the middle term, as that term appears again in the Minor, the same distinction is to be applied to it there, not, however, in the same way, but, as was noted above, *contrariwise,* i.e., that term of the distinction which *was conceded* with regard to *one extreme* in the Major, is to be *denied* with regard to the *other extreme* in the Minor, and *vice versa.*

In a conditional syllogism the Major is a conditional proposition, and the Minor either affirms the antecedent *of this proposition,* in which case *its* consequent is affirmed in the

Consequent, or Conclusion, *of the syllogism;* or it (the Minor) *denies* the consequent of the *conditional proposition,* in which case the antecedent *of this proposition* is denied in the Consequent *of the syllogism.* If the Major of a conditional syllogism requires distinction, the part there distinguished is to be contradistinguished in the Minor, if it appears there; if it does not appear there, it is to be distinguished in the Conclusion.

N. Con., *Nego Consequens,* I deny the Consequent. When a syllogism is distinguished, its conclusion is to be denied, according to the sense of the distinction used.

We make no use of this abbreviation, as the denial of the consequent in this case is taken for granted in our solutions of difficulties.

When the Major or Minor of a syllogism is denied, the syllogism falls. In this event nothing is said concerning the Consequent.

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